

## Tilburg University

### Nominal anaphors and the coherence of discourse

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NOMINAL  
ANAPHORS AND  
THE  
COHERENCE  
OF DISCOURSE

ALFONS A. MAES

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Nominal Anaphors  
and  
the Coherence of Discourse

Proefschrift

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aan de Katholieke Universiteit Brabant,  
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Alfons André Maes

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ANAPHORS AND  
THE  
COHERENCE  
OF DISCOURSE

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## *Preface*

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## *List of Abbreviations*

NP	Noun Phrase
NA	Nominal Anaphor
DefNP	Definite Noun Phrase, i.e., definite NP with definite determiner or no determiner (e.g. proper names)
DemNP	Demonstrative Noun Phrase, i.e. definite NP with demonstrative determiner
DezeNP	Demonstrative Noun Phrase with determiner <i>deze</i> or <i>dit</i>
DieNP	Demonstrative Noun Phrase with determiner <i>die</i> or <i>dat</i>
DefNA	Definite Nominal Anaphor, i.e., NA with a definite determiner or no determiner (e.g. proper names)
DemNA	Demonstrative Nominal Anaphor, i.e., NA with a demonstrative determiner
DaNA	Definite Alternative Nominal Anaphor, i.e., alternative NA with definite determiner
DezeNA	Demonstrative Nominal Anaphor with determiner <i>deze</i> or <i>dit</i>
DieNA	Demonstrative Nominal Anaphor with determiner <i>die</i> or <i>dat</i>
DREF	Discourse Referent (Representation)

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 Nominal anaphors in discourse

In producing and processing discourse people appear to be able to simultaneously carry out many ingenious cognitive actions. The ultimate goal of these cognitive actions is to understand or be understood. Understanding and modelling these intentional actions is the central concern of cognitive linguists studying discourse. A well-established view on discourse production and comprehension, agreed upon amongst cognitive linguists, is that people build up coherent mental representations of discourse, coherence being the teleological principle governing discourse production and comprehension, and hence governing the study of discourse.

One of the major assumptions underlying the coherence of discourse is that speakers and writers behave intelligibly in the way they indicate what they are talking about, and that addressees are able to keep track of the things talked about. This assumption motivates the importance of referential coherence as a topic in discourse research.

Over the last decade a considerable number of studies have emerged on the establishment and especially on the maintenance of reference in discourse. They are mainly concerned with the question how types (forms) of anaphoric expressions relate to functional or processing aspects of establishing and maintaining reference or - more generally - to identificational needs in discourse. A dichotomy of anaphoric expressions that appears to be relevant in analytical as well as in process studies of discourse reference is that between pronominal (1a) and nominal anaphors (1b):

- (1) *George Bush*<sub>i</sub> is trying to convince the European countries to support the war in the Gulf.
  - a. *He*<sub>i</sub> is very determined to win the war.
  - b. {*Bush*<sub>i</sub> / *The president* } is very determined to win the war.



Two clear reasons for a dichotomy between pronominal and nominal anaphors are, first of all, the simple formal difference between pronominal and nominal anaphors, and, second, the differences in identificational function between the two anaphoric classes.

This study starts from the dichotomy between pronominal and nominal discourse anaphors, and concentrates upon the semantic and pragmatic functions of nominal anaphors in discourse. The purpose of the study is to develop a view on and an analysis of nominal anaphors (henceforth NAs) in which their contribution to the coherence of discourse is accounted for.

## 1.2 Two views on nominal anaphors

### 1.2.1 The identificational view on NAs

A promising way of looking at referential coherence, popular in process-oriented studies on reference, is to regard referential expressions as linguistic devices, accessing representations of *discourse referents*, the form or type of referential expressions being dependent on the degree of *accessibility* of the discourse referent at that particular moment in the discourse. In different proposals the idea of referential expressions accessing discourse referent representations is defined and formalised in different ways, such as Webber's 1979 *invoking descriptions*, Bosch's 1988 *focus representations*, Seuren's 1985 *discourse addresses*, Heim's 1982 *file cards*, Cornish's 1986b *discourse entities*. The idea of the accessibility of referents can be found behind theoretical notions in many proposals, accounting for the choice of referential expressions in discourse. Examples are *accessibility (hierarchy)*, *availability*, *mutual knowledge*, *common ground*, *given-new*, *referential continuity*, (*explicit vs. implicit*) *focus*, *attentional state*, *mutual acceptance*, *familiarity*. The notion of *referent accessibility* can be said to underlie dichotomic as well as multi-value classifications of referential expressions, e.g. the distinction of *explicit and implicit focus* in Garrod & Sanford (1982:27), the *anaphoric hierarchy* in Lakoff (1976:295), the *given-new taxonomy* in Prince (1981b:237), the *accessibility marking scale* in Ariel (1990:73) etc.

An attractive characteristic of this accessibility view is that the behaviour and function of anaphoric as well as non-anaphoric

referential expressions can be predicted, two research areas which for a long time received separate attention. In the case of non-anaphoric referential expressions, accessibility predicts that definite expressions presuppose a certain degree of accessibility of the underlying referent; indefinite expressions indicate low accessibility of the referent. With regard to anaphoric expressions accessibility predicts that the lexical specificity or identificational explicitness of anaphors is inversely proportional to the accessibility of the underlying referent.

Referential coherence in terms of accessibility offers a first and straightforward view of nominal anaphors. Being explicit forms of anaphoric reference, nominal anaphors should be used if the accessibility of the referent involved is low, i.e., if lexically empty pronominal forms would hardly or not at all enable the addressee to identify the intended referent. I will call this the *identificational view of nominal anaphors*.

Support for this functional value of nominal anaphors can be found in discourse analytic studies of reference in which nominal anaphors are associated with text conditions which can be considered to decrease the accessibility of discourse referents. Francik (1985:29), for example, shows that *non-protagonists* in narrative discourse are more often and more easily referred to by means of nominal anaphors than protagonists, i.e., that non-protagonist referents are less accessible than protagonists (see also Anderson et al. 1983, Karmiloff-Smith 1980:248). Marslen-Wilson, Levy & Tyler 1982 associate NAs with (re-)establishing (as opposed to merely maintaining) reference in narrative discourse: (re-)establishment of reference implies a relatively low degree of accessibility. Clancy 1980 demonstrates that nominal anaphors often signal *discourse boundaries, changes in scenarios and points of view*. Fox (1984:211) looks upon nominal anaphors as signals indicating the transition to new *rhetorical units* in discourse. Anderson et al. 1983 reveal the association of nominal anaphors with changes in *scenarios* (see also Sanford & Garrod 1981). In terms of accessibility: all these discourse circumstances decrease the accessibility of referents. Givón (1983:11) shows among other things that potential *interference of competing candidates* increases the possibility of nominal-anaphor occurrences. Finally, Ariel (1988:69-70) shows that nominal anaphors occur more frequently as the *distance* between anaphor and antecedent increases; in other words, interference and distance decrease the accessibility of referents.



Conversely, in these and other proposals pronouns are associated with high accessibility in the broad sense, a view which is identificational as well. Pronouns are associated with notions such as *explicit-focus referents* (Garrod & Sanford 1982:27), *high-focus-level actors* (Reichman 1978:311), *given referents* (Clark & Haviland 1977:27, Chafe 1976), *maintenance of referents* (Marslen-Wilson, Levy & Tyler 1982:351), *current entities* (Yule 1981:49), *protagonists* (Francik 1985:59, Anderson et al. 1983:433), *thematic subjects* (Karmiloff-Smith 1980:235), *topical referents* (Linde 1979). Experimental results provide evidence for a link between pronominal anaphors and accessible referents (e.g. Purkiss 1978 in Sanford & Garrod 1981:137).

These proposals illustrate the major trend in the research on nominal anaphors in discourse: nominal anaphors are associated with a low degree of accessibility of discourse referents or with discourse variables decreasing the accessibility of the referent. As such, their contextual contribution can be described in two ways: on the one hand, the use of an NA can be considered to be the *resultant of identificationally problematic discourse conditions*, and an NA can be looked upon as a device that the writer necessarily has to use and that is expected selfevidently by the reader in view of the contextual conditions encountered in the discourse. On the other hand, NAs can be seen as a *signal predicting identificationally problematic context elements*.<sup>1</sup> Although these two perspectives can be neatly distinguished from a conceptual point of view, it is hardly possible to distinguish them in analysing or processing occurrences of NAs in discourse. Anyway, in both modes of description the function of NAs can be seen as reflecting the dynamic accessibility status of the referent, which is affected or determined by a series of context conditions.

The intuitive reasonableness of attributing an identificational function to NAs emerges naturally from their nominal nature, nominal information having in itself a stronger identificational force than pronominal information.<sup>2</sup> The identificational view of NAs is further based on the empirical fact that NAs often take the form of simple literal or partial repetitions of the antecedent. The function of simple repetition only sporadically goes beyond the identificational function just mentioned. The view finds its justification in the fact that NAs, being anaphoric expressions, are supposed to obey the principle of referential scarcity which states that an anaphor is no more explicit than is needed in order to enable the reader to establish the intended referent.

This principle can be regarded as the instantiation of the communicative principles of quantity and economy with regard to the use of anaphoric expressions. With respect to the variation of pronouns and NAs in discourse, it predicts that anaphors are pronouns by default, unless discourse conditions require nominal anaphors. This principle is congruent with the perspective on the pronoun-NA variation in the studies on reference mentioned earlier and with lots of principles regulating the pronoun-NA variation in discourse (e.g. Chomsky 1981, Reinhart 1983, Levinson 1987).<sup>3</sup> It is the basis for an intuitively acceptable predictive preference in anaphor resolution mechanisms (e.g. Lockman & Klappholz 1980:57).

Thus, in this view the relevance of NAs as a research topic is its 'nominalness', as opposed to the non-nominal nature of pronouns. The key question is when and why the pronominal default has to be overruled by nominal anaphoric devices. Answers to that question are predominantly formulated in terms of discourse variables affecting the accessibility and hence the identification of referents, i.e., sequential structure (distance, discourse boundaries) and content structure (episode, point of view, scenario, rhetorical units, protagonist, competing candidates).

### 1.2.2 The qualificational view of NAs

However sound and obvious the purely identificational interpretation of nominal anaphors may be, it by no means accounts for the functionality of all nominal anaphors. Important classes of NAs cannot be captured merely on the basis of their identificational function. The fact is that systematic classes of NAs refer to highly accessible referents and they are not associated with the discourse variables associated with low accessibility. These NAs violate the principle of referential scarcity. Although these classes can be characterised by their high-accessibility status, the basic predictions of the accessibility view no longer work. Of course their identificational function remains obvious, but their NA-format cannot be accounted for by identificational needs alone: a pronoun would have done the referential job perfectly well. This is stereotypically the case with nominal anaphors which do not literally or partially repeat their antecedent, and occur in a one-topic discourse context, a simple example of which can be found in (2):



- (2) Fortunately, *Ceausescu<sub>i</sub>* is dead. {*The / this*} *satanic Roumanian dictator<sub>i</sub>* is sentenced to death yesterday.

By default, occurrences of NAs as in (2) are used for other than purely identificational reasons. They have to be regarded as qualificational devices, which contribute to the coherence of discourse in that they modify discourse referents semantically or pragmatically. I will call this view *the qualificational view of NAs*.

Research on the qualificational functions of NAs only receives sporadic attention in the literature on reference. Firstly, there is the discussion about so-called epithets, which are said to have evaluative value (see e.g. Bolinger 1977:51-52; Bosch 1983:149; Droste 1977:182; Hinds 1978; Seuren 1985:348 and also sections 2.2.1 and 3.4.5 below). Secondly, there is the analysis of non-identificational functions of demonstrative NPs, especially in Lakoff 1974 (see also section 4.2.1.2). Third, there is the discussion of sentences in which literal repetitions occur in structurally unusual positions as in (3) to (6).

- (3) I was sorry to hear about *Tom<sub>i</sub>*. Yes, the doctor warned *him<sub>i</sub>*, but *Tom<sub>i</sub>* [i.e., Tom who is being stubborn (A.M.)] kept on. (Bolinger 1979:292)
- (4) <*John*>.. *he<sub>i</sub>* lied to me, and *John<sub>i</sub>* was my friend. (Bosch 1983:172)
- (5) <*Mary*>.. *She<sub>i</sub>* was told that under no circumstances would *Mary<sub>i</sub>* have to compromise herself. (Mc Cray 1980:334)
- (6) Look fathead. If everyone loves *Oscar<sub>i</sub>*'s mother, then certainly *Oscar<sub>i</sub>* must love *Oscar<sub>i</sub>*'s mother (Evans 1980:356)

Sentences like these can be considered to be ungrammatical according to structural co-referentiality rules. For example, the examples (3) and (4) violate the rule for co-referential NPs in conjoined structures formulated by Langendoen (1969:167-8) and Hinds & Okada (1975:332); and the examples (5) and (6) violate co-reference rules like the ones in Reinhart (1983:43) or Lasnik (1976:16).<sup>4</sup>

With regard to our discussion, the examples are relevant in that nominal repetitions occur where pronouns would have been perfect and even necessary according to the structural relations

between antecedent and anaphor. A necessary condition underlying these sentences (which, however, remains implicit in the sentence-internal discussions) is that the referent in question must be highly accessible. This means that these sentences only occur naturally in contexts in which the referent has just been mentioned or is topical.<sup>5</sup> The acceptability of these sentences can only be accounted for in qualificational terms. Explanations for these peculiar sentences are given in semantic terms, such as, for example, Mc Cray's (1980:335) notion of *semantic peak*, in pragmatic terms, e.g. Evans' (1980:357) notion of *conversational concern*, or in terms of interactional relations between speaker, hearer and referent, e.g. Maes' (1987:143) notion of *perspective focus*. Intuitively it is clear that NAs in these examples are not used merely to access the referent, but to evoke pragmatic inferences about the referent involved.

Finally, with regard to accessibility-driven discourse analyses of anaphoric expressions, Fox mentions the relevance of so-called *non-structural factors* that account for occurrences of NAs in discourse. As to written context, which is the most relevant for our purposes, she states that "*while hierarchical structure relations are crucial in the patterning of anaphora in written English texts, they are not responsible for every use of all of the anaphoric devices that are available to us in English; some of these uses have other communicative functions as their source. These non-structural uses of various anaphoric devices have been ignored in the recent discourse analysis, especially with regard to written material, so it is important that they be recognised in a full treatment of anaphora*" (1984:240). This, together with a functional explanation of some non-identificational occurrences of NAs in her database is an important initial statement, but it does not as yet offer a full treatment of non-identificational uses of NAs.<sup>6</sup>

In the present study the qualificational use conditions of NAs are taken to be central in accounting for the discourse functions of nominal anaphors. Qualificational NAs turn out to occur systematically in written context, especially in popular scientific discourse, political commentaries, reviews, sport reports etc. This study intends to account systematically for different uses of qualificational NAs and to go beyond the level of ad hoc explanations of peculiarities.



### 1.3 The definition of nominal anaphors

At first glance, the definition of nominal anaphors is extremely simple: NAs are NPs which are both nominal and anaphoric. NPs are *nominal* if their head is a noun. Nominal NPs can be preceded by a determiner or can be 'bare' (for example, in the case of proper names).<sup>7</sup> *Anaphoric* NPs are NPs that are co-referential with an antecedent in the preceding discourse.

However descriptively sound and straightforward this definition may be, it will appear to be too shallow and insufficient for our purposes. In order to determine the definition and extension of NAs more accurately, I start from the following three levels involved in the description of reference in language, each addressing conceptually distinct reference objects:

- level 1 the level of discourse;
- level 2 the level of discourse representation;
- level 3 the level of (real, presupposed, possible ..) world.

Given these three levels, the nominal anaphor *the ex-president* in (7) can be said to refer to an antecedent NP (level 1), to an underlying discourse referent (level 2) and to a world referent (level 3):

- (7) Yesterday, *Reagan<sub>i</sub>* celebrated his birthday. *The ex-president<sub>i</sub>* was wearing a tiny crown for the occasion.

Although the words *refer* and *reference* could be used to express all these relations between referential levels, as we did above, we will establish the following clarifying terminological conventions, summarised in figure (1) below:

#### Level 1

- Reference objects on the linguistic or discourse level are called *NPs* and *anaphoric NPs*.
- Anaphoric NPs are said to be *co-referential* with their antecedents.
- A nominal anaphor is abbreviated as *NA*, its antecedent is the *NA's antecedent*.
- In the examples anaphoric NPs are *italicized* and *co-indexed* with their antecedents.

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Level 2

- Reference objects on the level of representation are called *discourse referents* or *discourse referent representations*. Discourse referents are parts of the representation of the discourse unit in which the (anaphoric) NPs occur. Discourse referents represent linguistic features of NPs and descriptive features of world referents.
- NPs and anaphoric NPs are said to *access* discourse referents. Conversely, discourse referents are said to *underlie* (anaphoric) NPs.
- A discourse referent or discourse referent representation is abbreviated as *DREF*.
- Reference objects within discourse referent representations are *capitalised*.

## Level 3

- Reference objects on the world level are called *world referents*. World referents are part of real, presupposed, possible worlds.
- NPs and discourse referents are said to *denote* world referents.
- World referents are indicated by putting them between *quotes*.



Figure (1): *Descriptive levels and terminology of reference.*<sup>8</sup>

Reference levels	reference objects
<b>LEVEL 1</b> ↓      ↑ A      U C      N C      D E      E S      R S      L E      I S      E ↓      S ↓      ↑	(anaphoric) NPs  ANTECEDENT NA  <i>Reagan<sub>i</sub></i> <i>The ex-president<sub>i</sub></i>
<b>LEVEL 2</b> ↓ D E N O T E S ↓	discourse referent representations  DREF      DREF  <i>[REAGAN]</i> <i>[REAGAN ... EX-PRESIDENT]</i>
<b>LEVEL 3</b>	world referents  <i>'R. Reagan'</i> <i>'R. Reagan'</i>

In this study the representational level is regarded as the central level of description. Generally speaking this means that the interpretative relationship between NAs and their antecedents has to be described in terms of their representational effect, and that relations between anaphoric NPs and world referents are relevant only insofar as they are reflected on the representational level.

Discourse representations are conceived of in this study as the systematic description of what readers construct while processing

language. The following two characteristics of discourse representations are taken for granted:

- (i) Discourse participants build successive representations of successive discourse units. Successive discourse representations are said to *increment* each other. This means that each successive representation replaces, changes and adds to the previous one. An application of such a view on discourse representations is found in Kamp 1981.
- (ii) Discourse referents are the organising components of discourse representations: all discourse information is assumed to be stored with the referent it belongs to. The representational design of attaching discourse information 'under' discourse referents is founded cognitively. It reflects the fact that the linking of information with referents is a major task in discourse comprehension, a view which can be found in comprehension research, e.g. in Garrod & Sanford (1977:88), Cloitre & Bever (1988:295) and Anderson & Hastie (1974:512). An application of this view on discourse referents is found in Seuren 1985.

Given these distinctions with respect to reference objects and discourse representations, in this study, an NA will be defined as follows:

- (8) An NA is a nominal anaphoric NP, accessing an incremented discourse referent representation  $DREF_n^1$ . The notion of *incremented DREF* is assumed to include the following two characteristics of DREFs underlying NAs:
  - (i) an incremented DREF contains the lexical material and hence represents the semantic content of the accessing NP; and
  - (ii) an incremented DREF has the same identification number (n) in the representation as a DREF already included in the representation of at least one previous discourse unit.

At first sight, the definition gives rise to a paradoxical situation concerning the status of an NA: on the one hand, the semantic

content feature (i) of the definition can be seen as an indication for the fact that an NA and its antecedent access *different* DREFs, at least in cases in which the lexical content of the NA is different from the lexical content of its antecedent; on the other hand, feature (ii), applying to other anaphoric devices, such as pronominal anaphors as well, indicates that *one and the same* DREF is involved. In the following, it will be argued that the two features are not contradictory, but that both features are necessary components of a definition of NAs, touching upon fundamental processing features of nominal anaphors in discourse.

The *first* characteristic of the definition of NAs concerns the *semantic content* of DREFs underlying NAs: the discourse referent representation obligatorily includes the lexical content of an NA, formalised in some way or the other. This characteristic reflects the fact that nominal and pronominal anaphors differ crucially with respect to the way they access their respective discourse referents.

Pronominal anaphors are assumed to trigger a simple *copy* of a DREF, included in the representation of a previous discourse unit, into the representation of the discourse unit containing the pronoun. This means that the semantic content of DREFs underlying pronominal NPs is determined by the lexical content of the antecedent NP. Nominal anaphors, on the other hand, are assumed to trigger the *incremented* version of a DREF included in the representation of a previous discourse unit, the increment being determined by the lexical content of the nominal anaphor. Differences between *original* DREF and *incremented* DREF are especially obvious in the case of nominal anaphors the content of which is different from the content of their antecedents. The difference between representations underlying pronominal and nominal anaphors is illustrated in the figures (2) and (3):

Figure (2): *The representation of pronominal anaphors*

LEVEL 1	<i>Reagan<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>he<sub>i</sub></i>
LEVEL 2	DREF <sup>n</sup> [REAGAN <sup>n</sup> ]	DREF <sup>n</sup> [REAGAN <sup>n</sup> ]
LEVEL 3	'R. Reagan'	'R. Reagan'



Figure (3): *The representation of nominal anaphors*

LEVEL 1	<i>Reagan<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>the ex-president<sub>i</sub></i>
LEVEL 2	DREF <sup>n</sup> [REAGAN <sup>n</sup> ]	DREF <sup>ni</sup> [REAGAN <sup>n</sup> EX-PRESIDENT <sup>n</sup> ]
LEVEL 3	'R. Reagan'	'R. Reagan'

It is important to note that the only representational difference which is relevant to us here is the difference which is effected by the anaphors themselves, hence the simplified DREFs in the figures above. In fact, these DREFs should include linguistic information about the NPs, knowledge information about the world referent and, of course, the predication information contained in the discourse unit involved, as is made clear in the second characteristic of discourse representations mentioned above.

A cognitive reason for this representational difference between DREFs underlying pronominal and nominal anaphors is the assumption that different processing mechanisms underlie pronominal and nominal anaphors respectively. It is assumed that the processing of NAs always includes the recognition and evaluation of the lexical content of the anaphoric NP, a crucial processing step which is absent in the processing of pronominal anaphors. Such processing differences are argued for in experimental studies which exhibit differences in processing effort between the pronominal and nominal anaphors. Cloitre & Bever find a greater processing effort for repeated nouns than for pronouns. They explain the difference by the fact that "*pronouns provide direct access to a conceptual representation of the antecedent, whereas repeated noun anaphors do so indirectly, priming a surface (lexical) level of representation as a preliminary to accessing the conceptual representation*" (1988:294). Chang (1980:63) finds the opposite results but - paradoxically - assumes a similar processing difference: the processing ease of noun-anaphors as opposed to pronouns is explained by the fact that the noun anaphor reinstates not only a meaning code, but an additional surface code, which facilitates the recognition of the antecedent. Consequently, however contradictory the results are, both explanations assume the lexical level, and hence the lexical content of the anaphor, as a relevant step in processing NAs.



The *second* characteristic of NAs in definition (8) determines the *referential status* of NAs: the decision as to whether a nominal NP is an NA or not depends on whether or not the underlying DREF has the same number as a previous DREF. This feature reflects a necessary and sufficient processing condition for determining NAs, a condition which can be formulated from two processing perspectives. According to the perspective of the writer, an NA must be the result of a writer's intention to access a referent which is already present in the representation of at least one previous discourse unit. According to the perspective of the reader, the (coherent or intended) processing of an NA must imply the establishment of a link with a referent which is already present in some previous representation.

The same-number characteristic makes it possible to further determine the exact extension of NAs. It makes clear that there is a fundamental difference between the *contextual or intended reading* of a nominal anaphor and its *denotational extension*. This difference can be demonstrated easily by the following two observations. Firstly, an NA need not have the same denoting extension as its antecedent, as is clear from example (7), repeated below, where the NP *the ex-president* potentially denotes more world referents than the one which is meant.

- (7) Yesterday, *Reagan<sub>i</sub>* celebrated his birthday. *The ex-president<sub>i</sub>* was wearing a tiny crown for the occasion.

Conversely, two different NPs denoting the same world referent do not have to be looked upon as NAs in every text setting, as is clear from (9) and (10):

- (9) <In the village of Weert, the owner of a building, in which a youth club is located, refuses to renew the tenancy agreement of that building. The owner also happens to be the mayor of Weert. The tenants of the youth club have written a protest letter to the village council, part of which is represented below.>  
...We demand that *the mayor of Weert<sub>i</sub>* should force the owner<sub>j</sub> by warrant to renew the tenancy agreement.
- (10) <An eyewitness tells his wife that he told the police officer the story of the robbery he saw. Neither of them knows, however, that the very same police officer has in fact committed the robbery. The eyewitness says the following>

I told *the police officer<sub>i</sub>* that *the thief<sub>j</sub>* was masked.<sup>9</sup>

Although the underlined NPs in (9) and (10) denote the same world referent - i.e., the relationship between them is *accidentally* co-referential, as Evans (1980:360) calls it - the examples do not contain NAs, because the two NPs are not meant to access the same discourse referent.

Finally, the same-number characteristic of DREFs underlying NAs is not meant to express *referential dependency* between nominal anaphor and antecedent. The notion of referential dependency, found in Evans (1980:358), captures the intuition that some anaphors, such as pronouns, do not enable the reader to identify the referent on its own, i.e., without hinging on the antecedent. A condition of referential dependency for NAs is intuitively acceptable in the light of NAs as in (11), in which the intended referent cannot be identified without contextual information, among which the antecedent:

- (11) For the first time this season *KV Mechelen<sub>i</sub>* played well at home. *The home team<sub>i</sub>* gained an easy victory.

However, there are several reasons why referential dependency is not considered to be a necessary feature of NAs. First, and most obviously, NAs that literally repeat their antecedent cannot be considered to be referentially dependent upon their antecedent. Both antecedent and anaphor have to be considered to possess the same referential potential. Second, NAs that do not literally repeat their antecedent (so-called alternative NAs) are often hardly explicable in terms of referential dependency, as will be shown especially in chapter 2. To name only one striking fact, they can belong to an anaphoric class which is regarded as identificationally stronger than the anaphoric class of its antecedent, as for example in (12):

- (12) GRAFOLOGE: "DEMJANJUK VERVALSTE HANDTEKENING"

*Een Amerikaanse deskundige inzake schriftvervalsing, verklaarde gisteren tegenover een Israëlsche rechtbank die de zaak van de oorlogsmisdadiger John Demjanjuk behandelt dat een nazi-identiteitskaart op naam van de beklaagde werd vervalst. Edna Robinson, een grafologe en een deskundige inzake ontleding van documenten, zei dat de handtekening op de kaart van het Trwaniki*



oefenkamp niet van Demjanjuk was. (De Morgen, 7-08-1988)

**GRAPHOLOGER: "DEMJANJUK FORGED SIGNATURE"**

*Yesterday an American expert for forgery declared to an Israeli court handling the case of war criminal John Demjanjuk that the nazi identity-papers with the name of the accused were forged. Edna Robinson, graphologer and expert analyser of documents, said that the signature on the card of the Trwaniki camp was not Demjanjuk's.*

Third, and more importantly, the question as to whether or not an NA is referentially dependent on its antecedent in its strict sense is the wrong question. It presupposes a view on NAs which is purely identificational. As to the co-referential nature of an NA, the only thing which matters is not the question whether or not an NA would be able on its own to identify the referent involved, but the condition that an NA accesses an 'old' DREF.

#### 1.4 The classification of nominal anaphors

Existing classifications of NAs in the literature are based upon the relationship of NAs with their antecedents. So, classes of NAs in fact mean classes of antecedent-NA pairs. There are various classification criteria, yielding different classes of NAs. Firstly, NAs can be classified according to their *formal* relationship with the antecedent: an NA can have a repeated or a non-repeated/alternative form. Repeated forms can be subdivided into literal and partial repetitions. The relevance of the formal criterion is self-evident and widely accepted (see e.g. Halliday & Hasan 1976, Cornish 1986b, Hirst 1981). Secondly, NAs can be classified according to the type of *knowledge relationship* involved in the antecedent-NA pair: the relationship can be semantic or pragmatic. The first type represents relations between lexical items in the lexicon (synonymy, hyperonymy), the second type expresses relations involving encyclopaedic knowledge or knowledge of the world. Although these knowledge-based classes are conceptually clear, it is difficult to distinguish them in all occurrences of NAs.

Thirdly, antecedent-NA pairs can be classified on the basis of their *anaphoric type*. A nominal anaphor can have the same anaphoric type as its antecedent, or a different one. The two anaphoric types involved in NAs are proper names and definite descriptions. The relevance of this criterion is suggested by



Cornish in his critique of the distinction of co-reference and anaphoricity made by Reinhart 1983. According to Cornish (1986a:247-248) for an NA to be of a different anaphoric type from its antecedent, it must be lower on the anaphora hierarchy than its antecedent, a condition which is violated in an example like (12) above.<sup>10</sup>

An important characteristic of the three previous classifications is that they yield classes of NAs which are neither necessarily context-sensitive nor necessarily cognitively relevant: i.e., they are not classified according to the way NAs contribute to the discourse or to the way NAs establish coherence. The classifications mentioned yield *lexical* classes of NAs, not *contextual* classes of NAs.

In this study NAs are ultimately defined and classified according to their contribution to the coherence of discourse: i.e., contextual uses or classes of NAs are what ultimately matters. Lexical classes of NAs are relevant only insofar as they represent differences in contextual interpretation. Of course, the lexical class of NAs often serves as an initial trigger in recovering the contextual interpretation of NAs. Especially NAs repeating literally and NAs not repeating literally the lexical material of the antecedent are easy to differentiate analytically and they constitute plausible candidates for relevant contextual classes of NAs.

Another characteristic of the given classifications is the fact that they do not differentiate between NAs with a *definite* determiner and with a *demonstrative* one: according to the three classification criteria, all classes include NAs with both definite and demonstrative determiners.<sup>11</sup> In this study the difference between NAs with definite and demonstrative determiners is taken to be relevant: it will be argued that both forms signal different ways in which NAs contribute to the coherence of discourse. The key-intuition in differentiating between them is the fact that both classes differ in markedness due to the presence or absence of the demonstrative determiner. This focal device can plausibly be related to different processing mechanisms underlying NAs as will be shown in chapter 2 and 3. Although NAs with definite and demonstrative determiners both have to be defined as definite NAs, we will henceforth term NAs with a definite determiner (*de* 'the', *het* 'the') and 'bare' NAs as *definite NAs* or *defNAs*, and NAs with a demonstrative

determiner (*deze* 'this/these', *dit* 'this', *die* 'that/those', *dat* 'that') as *demonstrative NAs* or *demNAs*.

Thus, in this study two minimal formal criteria cross-classifying NAs are taken as the organising principles, partitioning the field of nominal anaphors and serving as an entrance, accessing contextual classes of nominal anaphors:

- (i) the formal relationship between antecedent and anaphor, yielding *literally repeated NAs* and *alternative NAs*.
- (ii) the nature of the determiner, yielding *definite NAs* and *demonstrative NAs*.

### 1.5 Overview

This study contains the following chapters, based on the minimal classification of NAs. In chapter 2 definite alternative NAs are analysed; in chapter 3 the use of literally repeated and alternative demonstrative nominal NAs as opposed to definite ones is accounted for in accordance with the qualificational view of NAs; in chapter 4 the variation between different classes of demonstrative NPs is investigated. Finally, in chapter 5 the qualificational view is supported by an analysis of repeated and alternative NAs in a special discourse environment, i.e., in legal discourse.

### 1.6 Research territory

As was already mentioned in section 1.2, NAs are investigated especially in written context, the context where they occur most naturally. This means that the analysis of contextual readings of NAs starts from possibilities and restrictions imposed by the written medium. The following three characteristics of written communication are known as relevant for the interpretation of referential expressions:

- (i) the absence of explicit interaction and explicit *collaboration* of discourse participants, resulting from their physical separation;
- (ii) the absence of a common situation, which can act as a deictic field for the interpretation of referring expressions;

- (iii) the absence of supra-segmental features (such as stress), which can play a decisive role in interpreting referential expressions (see e.g. Akmaijan & Jackendoff 1970).

The proposals made in this study are supported by an extensive corpus of Dutch written material. Here I will only give a short survey of the corpora that have been used. In the pertinent chapters the function and use of these corpora are described more precisely:

- cor 1-2 a compilation of 9 informative (cor 1) and 9 instructive (cor 2) leaflets  
number of words 28.424  
number of demonstrative NPs 222
- cor 3 excerpts from political journals, from subcorpus 2 of the so-called Eindhoven-corpus (see Uit den Boogaert 1975)  
number of demonstrative NPs 665
- cor 4 a compilation of 22 popular scientific texts (500 to 1000 words each)  
number of words 15.000  
number of demonstrative NPs 104
- cor 5-8 a compilation of book reviews (cor 5), tv reviews (cor 6), autobiographical columns (cor 7) and personal commentaries (cor 8) from the magazine 'Vrij Nederland'  
number of words 28.961  
number of demonstrative NPs 262
- cor 9 excerpts from popular scientific texts, coming from subcorpus 5 of the 'Eindhoven-corpus'
- cor 10 a collection of 8 legal decisions of a lower Belgian civil court  
number of words: 4400  
number of anaphoric elements: 231
- cor 11 a collection of 30 opinion texts of Dutch and Flemish newspapers and magazines  
number of words: 17720



In this study examples supporting the functional interpretation of NAs are not exclusively based on the corpora mentioned. Empirical linguistic evidence in favour of the interpretation proposals is both corpus-driven and intuition-driven. That means that support for the proposals presented is inspired by corpus evidence as well as by the intuitive or argued acceptability of constructed examples.

*Corpus evidence* is central to the chapters 4 and 5. The chapters are based almost exclusively on the characteristics NAs exhibit in the corpora in question. This method fits in with the methodology used in text-oriented analyses of referential expressions (see e.g. Fox 1984, Ariel 1988)

In the *intuition-based* method evidence is based on judgments on constructed examples, a method fitting in with traditional linguistic theories which try to formulate syntactic, semantic and pragmatic restrictions on the behaviour of referential expressions. Quite a number of these theories only use constructed examples, often representing peculiar structural, semantic or pragmatic characteristics (see e.g. Reinhart 1983, Bosch 1983)

In principle, the proposals on nominal anaphors are restricted to *Dutch*: they are developed using Dutch corpora and native Dutch intuition (especially mine). Although sporadically crosslinguistic arguments and examples are given in favour of the proposals presented, extensive evidence for the cross-linguistic validity falls outside the scope of this study.

### 1.7 Presentational conventions

In this study judgments about constructed or real-life examples play a crucial role in the introduction, the argumentation and the corroboration of the proposals on NAs. Hence, it is important that the reader should look upon these examples as they were intended by the writer. Therefore, the following conventions are important:

*Coreferentiality*

NAs and the NAs antecedents are italicised and co-indexed, with 'i' if only one co-indexed anaphoric pair occurs in the example, 'i' and 'j' for two co-indexed pairs. If relevant, non-anaphoric NPs are marked by using 'i' and 'j' respectively.

*Unacceptability*

The acceptability of nominal anaphors is indicated - as it is conventionally done in the literature on co-reference - by a question mark (?) preceding the NA, the sentence or the discourse unit involved. The question mark covers a broad range of semantic, pragmatic and contextual adequacy judgments, the exact nature of which will be explained on the spot.

*Ungrammaticality*

Asterisks (\*) preceding NAs, sentences or discourse units indicate structural ungrammaticalities. However, asterisks are used only occasionally because judgments rarely concern structural impossibilities of nominal anaphors.

*Different possibilities*

If different anaphoric possibilities are presented in one example, they are divided by slashes and put in curly brackets ({... / ... / ...}). In these cases acceptability question marks are located immediately before the anaphoric possibility which is judged to be unacceptable.

*Discourse information*

The acceptance by the reader of the judgments on NAs given in this study is heavily dependent on knowledge of the conditions of use of the examples presented. Therefore, information about discourse mode (in principle written communication), text type and discourse position of the referent or sentence is made explicit, either in the text itself or between 'triangular' brackets (<...>) immediately preceding the examples.

*Examples*

If Dutch examples are used, which is mostly the case, they are always accompanied by English translations. Dutch examples are presented if the Dutch language of the example is somehow relevant in the frame of this study. Two reasons for their relevance are: (i) they stem from the corpora mentioned in section 1.6 and hence they are 'real-life' examples; (ii) there are differences in acceptability or contextual interpretation between (constructed) Dutch and English examples.

English translations of Dutch examples are not provided with the conventions concerning coreferentiality, acceptability and grammaticality.

For the reader the guideline concerning examples should be: if an example is presented in Dutch, all the arguments only apply to the Dutch example and the English translation should be seen merely as extra support for the reader.



## Notes to chapter 1

1. Fox (1984:59) names these two modes of description *context determines use* and *use accomplishes context* respectively.
2. This view underlies, for example, the anaphoric hierarchy in Lakoff (1976:295), the coding scale of topic accessibility of Givón (1983:17) and the classification of referential expressions according to their lexical specificity in Marslen-Wilson, Levy & Tyler (1982:344).
3. Chomsky (1981:227) states the following general discourse principle regulating NA-occurrences (included in what he calls R-expressions):

*Avoid repetition of R-expressions, except when conditions warrant.*

Reinhart (1983:43):

*A given NP must be interpreted as non-coreferential with any distinct non-pronoun in its c-command-domain.*

Levinson (1987:410):

*The use of a marked form, a lexical NP where a pronoun might have been used, or a pronoun where a zero might have occurred, will Q/M-implicate a non-co-referential interpretation.*

4. Langendoen (1969:167-8):  
*NP<sup>a</sup> may not be used to pronominalize NP<sup>b</sup> if NP<sup>a</sup> and NP<sup>b</sup> are elements of separate conjoined structures and NP<sup>b</sup> precedes NP<sup>a</sup>.*

Hinds & Okada (1975:335):

*NP<sup>a</sup> may not be used to pronominalize NP<sup>b</sup> if NP<sup>a</sup> and NP<sup>b</sup> are elements of separate conjoined structures, NP<sup>b</sup> precedes NP<sup>a</sup>, and NP<sup>a</sup> is stressed.*

Reinhart (1983:43):

*A given NP must be interpreted as non-coreferential with any distinct non-pronoun in its c-command-domain.*

Lasnik (1976:16):

*If NP<sub>1</sub> precedes and commands NP<sub>2</sub> and NP<sub>2</sub> is not a pronoun, then NP<sub>1</sub> and NP<sub>2</sub> are disjoint in reference.*

5. Although the condition of high accessibility is not mentioned in these proposals as such, conditions with the same tendency can be found, such as Evans' condition that the 'illegal' NAs in the sentences are not *referentially dependent* upon their antecedent (Evans 1980:358).
6. Although Fox does not talk about the non-identificational use of full NPs, her interpretation is the same as mine: i.e., "*the use of fullNP where we could have expected pronouns*" (Fox 1984:240)
7. Pronominal NPs are thus clearly excluded as well as NPs which are not pronominal, but not nominal either, such as *iedereen* 'anyone/every one'. Determiners of NAs usually are definite or demonstrative, although NAs can be introduced by indefinites as well, as in (a):

- (a) De konventie van New Orleans moest het toppunt worden van de republikeinse campagne. Daar moest het gebeuren. De zorgvuldig opgezette show werd enigszins verstoord toen de *kandidaat vice-president Dan Quayle* (*Wie? Quayle?*), het podium opsprong en de stijve George Bush op de schouders sloeg onder het slaken van de kreet: 'Go get'em!'. *Dixit een man die het bracht tot mogelijk vice-president van de machtigste natie van de wereld.* (Knack, september 1988)

*The New Orleans convention was supposed to be the climax of the republican campaign. That was where it was all going to happen. There was a slight disturbance of the carefully planned show when candidate vice-president (Dan Quayle) (Who? Quayle?) jumped on the stage and hit rigid George Bush on the shoulders, shouting: 'Go get'em!'. And this from a man who actually managed to rise possibly to the vice-presidency of the most powerful nation in the world.*

8. It should be noted that in this study the words *reference* and *refer* are not used in a technical sense. They are, however, used in a general sense, i.e., when differences between reference levels and reference objects do not matter.

9. More complicated is the following example:

- (a) <Same situation, but the example is part of a detective story>  
I told *the police officer*<sub>i</sub> that *the thief*<sub>j</sub> was masked.

The setting of the detective story makes this sentence referentially more complicated. As regards the nominal NPs in

this sentence two representations are possible: either the reader of this sentence is not supposed to know the world identity of 'police officer' and 'thief', in which case the two discourse referents do not have the same DREF-number, since the world identity is not reflected in the representation, or the reader is supposed to know the world identity, in which case the discourse referents have the same DREF-number, since the identity of *POLICE OFFICER* and *THIEF* is intended by the writer to be recognised by the reader.

10. Cornish defines the two classes of anaphors as follows:

(i) *Coreference without anaphora*

*Sequences of two full NPs of the same type, of full NP and non-R pronoun (in either order) in equative sentences, of two first- or two second-person pronouns, of two third-person non-R pronouns of the same type, or of non-R pronoun or full NP and full NP in cases like (5a) and (5b):*

(5a) *Look, fathead. If everyone loves Oscar<sub>i</sub>'s mother, then certainly Oscar<sub>i</sub> must love Oscar<sub>i</sub>'s mother*

(5b) *Everyone has finally realised that Oscar<sub>i</sub> is incompetent. Even Oscar<sub>i</sub> has realised that Oscar<sub>i</sub> is incompetent. (Evans 1980:357)*

(ii) *Coreference with anaphora*

*Non-'bound-variable' anaphora between a full NP as antecedent and a non-R pronoun or definite NP as anaphor, where the anaphor is lower on the 'anaphora hierarchy' than the antecedent, cf. Lakoff (1968:18) Principle (134): (1) Proper nouns; (2) Definite descriptions; (3) Pronominal epithets (e.g. the fool, the bastard, etc.), and (4) (non-R) third person pronouns. (Cornish 1986a:247-248)*

This classification implies a division in (i) referentially independent and (ii) referentially dependent antecedent-NA pairs on the basis of their anaphoric type.

It is clear, however, that NAs do not obey Lakoff's principle, amongst others while definite descriptions can easily act as antecedents of proper names, although the anaphoric hierarchy would prescribe the opposite. Lakoff's *anaphora hierarchy* does not apply to the following examples either. The examples differ clearly in acceptability, although antecedent and anaphor have the same position on the *anaphora hierarchy*:

- (a) *Yesterday, the president of the US<sub>i</sub> left for his annual holiday in Kennebunkport. By doing so, the fisherman from Texas<sub>i</sub> makes clear that no one can upset his holiday plans.*



- (b) Yesterday, *the fisherman from Texas*<sub>i</sub> left for his annual holiday in Kennebunkport. By doing so, *the president of the US*<sub>i</sub> makes clear that no one can upset his holiday plans.

These examples show that restrictions on NAs in terms of the anaphoric type of NAs and their antecedent are unreliable.

11. Only demonstrative proper names are unusual, but not excluded, as is clear in (a):

- (a) Ook de politie weigerde deze moorden op het conto van de Ripper te schrijven. Op 31 december immers werd uit de Theems het lijk opgevist van *ene Montague John Druitt*<sub>i</sub>, een jonge advocaat. Wat men toen niet wist, maar wat later bleek uit de memoires van politiemannen zoals in 'Days of my Years' van Sir Melville Macnaghten, was dat *deze Druitt*<sub>i</sub> door New Scotland Yard als de eerste verdachte van de Rippermoorden werd beschouwd. (Knack)

*The police too refused to hold the Ripper responsible for these murders. The fact is that on 31 December the body of one Montague John Druitt, a young lawyer, was picked up from the Thames. What one did not know then, but what later appeared from the memoirs of policemen such as 'Days of my Years' of Sir Melville Macnaghten, was that New Scotland Yard considered this Druitt to be the first suspect of the Ripper murders.*

## Chapter 2

### *Alternative nominal anaphors*<sup>1</sup>

#### 2.1 Introduction

##### 2.1.1 Definite alternative NAs in discourse

In analysing discourse different types of anaphoric NPs can be distinguished. The most obvious possibilities are illustrated in (1) and (2): literal repetition and pronominal reference

- (1) Yesterday *Reagan<sub>i</sub>* decided to retire from the White House. *Reagan<sub>i</sub>* announced his decision during a show on American television.
- (2) Yesterday *Reagan<sub>i</sub>* decided to retire from the White House. *He<sub>i</sub>* announced his decision during a show on American television.

Anaphoric NPs can also take the form of NAs which do not repeat their antecedent literally, i.e., by *definite alternative NAs* (henceforth abbreviated as daNAs), as is illustrated in (3) and (4):

- (3) Yesterday *Reagan<sub>i</sub>* decided to retire from the White House. *The president<sub>i</sub>* announced his decision during a show on American television.
- (4) Yesterday *Reagan<sub>i</sub>* decided to retire from the White House. *The ex-movie star<sub>i</sub>* announced his decision during a show on American television.

Definite alternative NAs in discourse can be characterised in different ways:

- (i) first of all, they can be said to be means of identification, just like literally repeated and pronominal anaphors in that they establish a link of co-referentiality with the antecedent NP;
- (ii) secondly, they can be characterised as lexical cohesive elements in that they establish lexically based or

- (iii) knowledge-based relations between items in texts; thirdly, they can be said to provide information about the intended referent.<sup>2</sup>

### 2.1.2 Objectives

Definite alternative NAs are the subject of this chapter. The main question is which interpretation and representation must be attributed to the relationship between daNAs and their antecedents if they are to justify the functions and the adequacy of daNAs in texts.

It will be argued that the adequacy of daNAs cannot simply be made dependent on either the status of the referents within the reader's knowledge store, or on surface characteristics of sentences or texts, such as the distance to or the structural relationship with their antecedent. Rather, in this chapter the adequacy is made dependent on the question whether adequate implicit coherence relations can be attributed to them.

At the very heart of this chapter lies the notion of *an adequate daNA*, meaning a daNA properly fulfilling its functions in a text. This implies that a daNA must not just enable the reader to establish a co-referential link. I do not consider each daNA enabling the reader to access the intended discourse referent to be adequate. There is, for instance, a clear distinction to be made between the daNAs in (5); yet, in principle all these daNAs enable the reader to make a link with the antecedent NP:

- (5) In the Senate commission report on the Iran affair, *Reagan<sub>i</sub>* was told that *he<sub>i</sub>* had left his collaborators too much leeway. {*The president<sub>i</sub>* / *The head of the White House<sub>i</sub>* / *?Nancy's husband<sub>i</sub>* / *?The owner of a ranch in California<sub>i</sub>*} had omitted to see to what was taking place in the cellars of his own official residence.

In this chapter adequacy is based only on the intuitive evaluation of the co-referential, cohesive and informative functions of the daNAs in a given text environment. The intuitive evaluation can be put to the test because the daNA-examples are provided with the necessary contextual information.

This chapter deals with the behaviour of definite alternative NAs in *written texts*. Especially in expository and opinionative texts, the central discourse intention of which is the identification, description, exposition and evaluation of referents, daNAs are



quite frequent: sports reports, travel brochures, popular scientific texts, political commentaries contain a striking number of definite alternative NAs. The fact that daNAs occur predominantly in written language or in 'prepared' spoken language such as, for instance, that of newsreaders is a reason to look upon them as the result of 'time-consuming' reflexion, which is not tolerated in spoken discourse.<sup>3</sup> As a written phenomenon, in this chapter daNAs are looked upon as an 'autonomous' identification act on the part of the writer or, in other words, as an act of identification coming about without any form of explicit 'collaboration' between the communication partners.<sup>4</sup>

Finally, this chapter deliberately refrains from pursuing the matter of the *relationship between definite and demonstrative NAs*, which is the subject of chapter 3.

### 2.1.3 Overview

In section 2.2 various characteristics and interpretations of daNAs are commented on and evaluated, the conclusion being that all attempts to describe daNAs in terms of identification, cohesiveness or familiarity are descriptively inadequate because they do not result in an integrated picture of all the functions of daNAs in texts. In section 2.3 a proposal is made with regard to the interpretation and representation of daNAs, which takes as its starting point the informational function of the antecedent and anaphoric NPs in question, the relationship between which is represented in terms of implicit coherence relations included in the underlying discourse referent representations.

## 2.2 Characterisations of daNAs

### 2.2.1 The pronominal interpretation of daNAs

#### 2.2.1.1 DaNAs as pragmatic, referential pronouns

A crucial processing characteristic of a daNA is that it aims at accessing the same discourse referent as the discourse referent underlying its antecedent (i.e., the same-number characteristic, which was mentioned in section 1.3). Moreover, daNAs and their antecedents are not always interchangeable. Given these two characteristics, daNAs can be regarded as so-called *denoting* or

*referential* pronouns - as opposed to *bound* pronouns. Referential pronouns are assumed to have a relationship of intended co-reference with their antecedent (Evans 1980:358-360).

In the research on co-reference and pronouns, no extensive analysis has as yet been made of daNAs. As far as I know, the only type of daNA which have been given some sporadic attention are epithets, degree nouns and classifiers (e.g. Bolinger 1977:50; Bosch 1983; Hinds 1978; Seuren 1985). It is important to note, however, that the attention they receive only affects their usefulness with respect to the analysis of pronouns. For Bosch, for instance, nominal anaphors play a crucial role in determining which pronouns occur referentially, as is clear in the following criterion:

*The criterion for referential pronoun occurrence*  
*A pronoun occurrence  $P_i$  in a text or sentence  $S_i$  that is interpretable as being anaphorically related to a particular antecedent  $NP_i$  in  $S_i$  is an RP-occurrence [referential-pronoun occurrence (A.M.)] if there is a non-pronoun  $NP_k$  that may be substituted for  $P_i$  in  $S_i$  without disrupting the anaphoric relation with  $NP_i$ . (Bosch 1983:49)*

Following Bosch, Seuren also formulates an epithet test for what he calls denoting pronouns:

*Moreover, only denoting pronouns may be represented, salva veritate, by an epithet. This fact, first noted by Bosch (1983:49) is particularly interesting and important because it can be used as a test: pronouns which can be replaced, salva veritate, by an epithet must be crucially different from pronouns that do not allow for such a substitution. (Seuren 1985:350)*

The epithet test could be an empirical reason to regard (at least some) daNAs as referential or denoting pronouns. Such a test is in keeping with the fact that, like referential pronouns, daNAs are ungrammatical in a structural environment where they are syntactically bound to their antecedent, as is clear in (6) and (7):

- (6a) *John<sub>i</sub> washes himself<sub>i</sub>.*
- (6b) *\*John<sub>i</sub> washes the boy<sub>i</sub>.*

- (7a) *Reagan<sub>i</sub> says he<sub>i</sub> will continue supporting the contras.*
- (7b) *\*Reagan<sub>i</sub> says the president<sub>i</sub> will continue supporting the contras.<sup>5</sup>*

And yet, the test is misleading because it is used as a criterion to distinguish classes of pronouns and, as such, cannot be indiscriminately used to investigate daNAs. Even if all denoting or referential pronouns could be replaced by epithets, this still would not mean that all daNAs can be replaced by a (denoting or referential) pronoun. Examples such as (8) - (10) appear to confirm this view: the daNAs in these examples cannot be indiscriminately replaced by a referential pronoun without producing particularly awkward sentences (the b-versions). All sentences are opening sequences of radio news items:

- (8a) *Bij de overname van de uitgeverij<sub>i</sub>, heeft Kluwer<sub>i</sub> beloofd dat er geen arbeidsplaatsen op de tocht zouden komen staan.*

*In the takeover of the publishing company, Kluwer promised no jobs would be lost.*

- (8b) *?Bij de overname {van zichzelf<sub>i</sub> / ervan<sub>i</sub>}, heeft Kluwer<sub>i</sub> beloofd dat er geen arbeidsplaatsen op de tocht zouden komen staan.*

*In its takeover, Kluwer promised no jobs would be lost.*

- (9a) *In de strijd om de verzekeringsmaatschappij<sub>i</sub> heeft Assubel<sub>i</sub> een belangrijke stap gezet om niet in buitenlandse handen te vallen.*

*In the battle for the insurance company, Assubel has taken an important step in order not to fall into foreign hands.*

- (9b) *?In {zijn<sub>i</sub> strijd / de strijd om zichzelf<sub>i</sub>} heeft Assubel<sub>i</sub> een belangrijke stap gezet om niet in buitenlandse handen te vallen.*

*In [its battle / the battle for itself], Assubel has taken an important step in order not to fall into foreign hands.*

- (10a) *Luc van de Vijver, die jarenlang de woordvoerder was van de Generale Maatschappij van België<sub>i</sub>, verliet de*



'oude dame<sub>i</sub>' op 1 april.

*Luc van de Vijver who, for years, was the spokesman of the Compagnie Générale de Belgique, left 'the Grand old Lady' on 1st April.*

- (10b) ?Luc van de Vijver, die jarenlang de woordvoerder was van de Generale Maatschappij van België<sub>i</sub>, verliet ze<sub>i</sub> op 1 april.

*Luc van de Vijver, who for years was the spokesman of the Compagnie Générale de Belgique, left her on 1st April.*

### 2.2.1.2 DaNAs and c-command

It follows from these considerations that daNAs cannot simply be replaced by pronouns. But there is more: daNAs are not bound by the same structural restrictions applicable to referential pronouns, as is shown in the c-versions of (8) and (9):

- (8c) Bij de overname van Kluwer<sub>i</sub>, heeft {de uitgeverij<sub>i</sub> / \*ze} beloofd dat er geen arbeidsplaatsen op de tocht zouden komen staan.

*In the takeover of Kluwer, {the publishing company / it} promised no jobs would be lost.*

- (9c) In de strijd om Assubel<sub>i</sub>, heeft {de verzekeringsmaatschappij<sub>i</sub> / \*ze} een belangrijke stap gezet om niet in buitenlandse handen te vallen.

*In the battle for Assubel, {the insurance company / it} has taken an important step in order not to fall into foreign hands.*

When regarded as referential, not-bound pronouns, the daNAs in (8c) and (9c), i.e., *de uitgeverij* and *de verzekeringsmaatschappij* do not obey the restrictions imposed by the so-called primacy relationship between antecedent and pronoun.<sup>6</sup> The core of this relationship is that the pronoun must not c-command its antecedent. Reinhart formulates this restriction as follows:

*A given NP must be interpreted as non-coreferential with any distinct non-pronoun in its c-command-domain. (Reinhart 1983:43)*

According to this rule, the NP *Kluwer* in (8c) or *Assubel* in (9c)

cannot be co-referential with *the publishing company / it* or *the insurance company / it* respectively, because they are distinct non-pronouns within the c-command domain of the NP *the enterprise / the insurance company / it*. However, as the grammaticality judgments show, this rule turns out to be applicable only to the pronominal versions, and not to the daNAs in the c-versions. A striking fact is that the 'illegal' daNAs in the c-versions are far more acceptable than the 'legal' a-variants above.

### 2.2.1.3 DaNAs and the precede-relationship

What does remain of the similarity between daNAs and referential pronouns is that both have a relationship of *intended co-reference* with the antecedent NP. In order to be recognised as co-referential, it is selfevident that the antecedent must precede the daNA. However, this weak precede-condition can be violated, as in the case of pronouns:

- (11) <advertisement>  
Morgen treedt in de Arenberg-schouwburg *de meester van het Franse chanson*<sub>i</sub>, op. Het is *Gilbert Becaud*<sub>i</sub>, 's twaalfde optreden in België.

*Tomorrow, the master of the French chanson will play in the Arenburg theatre. This will be Gilbert Becaud's twelfth Belgian appearance.*

Apart from unusual cases like (11), it is clear however that a daNA normally is inadequate if its underlying referent has not yet been activated, as in (12), a variation on an example of Kuno (1975:283):

- (12) Who did you calm when you saw him getting mad?  
?I calmed *the idiot*<sub>i</sub>, before *Harry*<sub>i</sub> did something rash.

Cases as (11) can be compared with backward anaphors. They draw their effect and their function from the violation of the precede-condition (see Maes 1987:136). They are different, however, in that backward anaphoric pronouns, unlike definite alternative NAs, obligatorily occur in the same sentential unit, as is clear from examples like (13):

- (13a) *He* lied to me, and *John* was my friend. (from Bosch 1983:172)

- (13b) ?*He* lied to me. (And) *John* was my friend.

#### 2.2.1.4 'Antecedentless' daNAs

Although we are concerned here with definite NPs which are co-referential with their antecedent, there are nominal NPs which can be looked upon as being 'antecedentless'. Metaphorical nominal NPs such as in (14) and (15) can serve as examples:

- (14) <*advertisement with a picture of the Lada Samara 1300, accompanied by the following text*>  
*De meest verkochte 1300 verbreedt zijn gamma.*

*The best sold 1300 widens its scope.*

- (15) <*a review in the newspaper of a play in which L. Vandervost plays the part of Hamlet in an adaptation by theatre company 'De Tijd'*>  
*Hamlet* was tired after the performance in Volendam.

In these cases, it can be argued that the 'antecedents' (*Lada Samara 1300* and *L. Vandervost*) can be inferred on the basis of available information (in the context, situation or knowledge base). This means that in the representation a discourse referent must be present which can be accessed and incremented by the NPs *de meest verkochte 1300* and *Hamlet*. On account of their nominal nature such antecedentless daNAs are more powerful than antecedentless pronominal anaphors when it comes to accessing a discourse referent. They can appeal to lexical knowledge and world knowledge shared by the communication partners and need not be based on contextual or situational knowledge only, as is the case with antecedentless pronominal anaphors. On the other hand - unlike antecedentless pronouns - antecedentless daNAs are subject to the pragmatic restrictions outlined in section 2.3.3.4.

#### 2.2.2 The topical interpretation of daNAs

Like a pronominal anaphor, a daNA does not only access a discourse referent representation, but it is also an indicator of topic, i.e., an indicator of what a sentence or text is about. The literature on pronouns adopts different views on and proposals



for this topical function. Bosch (1983:205) for one formulates the *aboutness-principle* to which both pronominal and nominal anaphors are subject, as follows:

*An anaphorically used expression refers to an object which the discourse at the relevant moment is about.*

So, like a pronominal anaphor, a daNA is the reintroduction of topical elements.<sup>7</sup>

If one accepts that the topical value of daNAs is sufficiently determined by the condition that daNAs must refer to the topic of the text, the following problems remain unsolved:

- (i) The condition is applicable both to pronominal and nominal anaphors, thus leaving differences as in the examples (8)-(10) unresolved.
  - (ii) Not all daNAs referring to the topic of the text are adequate. In other words, the topic condition is indeed a necessary condition for daNAs, but not a sufficient one. See (16):
- (16) On 18th March 1612, for the first time *a human<sub>i</sub>* set foot on the island of Ebreo. *He<sub>i</sub>* started to build a hut right away. ?*The woman<sub>i</sub>* lived there for twenty years.

When *the woman* occurs in (16), there is obviously only one topic candidate. And yet, the daNA is not adequate. An explanation of this inadequacy cannot be given on the basis of the topical interpretation of alternative NAs since it does not enable us to impose restrictions on the informative load of daNAs.

### 2.2.3 The cohesiveness interpretation of daNAs

DaNAs can be characterised in terms of the lexical relationship they have with their antecedent. In particular, the relationship of synonymy or hyperonymy often applies to relations of daNAs with their antecedents. As such, daNAs belong to the broad class of lexical cohesive elements called *reiteration* in the dichotomy of lexical cohesion as proposed by Halliday & Hasan (1976:274-292):

*Reiteration is a form of lexical cohesion which involves the repetition of a lexical item at one end of a scale; the use of a general word to refer back to a lexical item, at the other end of the scale; and a number of things in between - the use of a synonym, near-synonym, or superordinate. (1976:278)*

According to Halliday & Hasan the cohesive value of these lexical items must be distinguished from the referential function:

*Properly speaking, reference is irrelevant to lexical cohesion. It is not by virtue of any referential relation that there is a cohesive force set up between two occurrences of a lexical item; rather the cohesion exists as a direct relation between the forms themselves (and thus is more like substitution than reference). (1976:284)*

The difference between cohesiveness and referentiality of daNAs follows from the fact that cohesive NPs need not be co-referential, as e.g. in (17):

- (17) *My car proved to be worth nothing. Any new car will have to be a lot more reliable.*

The distinction between referential and cohesive function has been carried through by Stotsky (1983:441). In her dichotomy - which is based on the Halliday & Hasan dichotomy - co-referential and non-co-referential cohesive elements are not discriminated:

- (i) semantically interrelated words (elements systematically related to a preceding element via, for instance, repetition, synonymy, opposition, inclusion, and so on);
- (ii) collocationally related words (elements related to other elements via frequent co-occurrence in similar contexts).

The question now is whether the characterisation of daNAs in terms of cohesiveness tells us something about the interpretation and the functions of daNAs in discourse. The characterisation of cohesion given by Halliday & Hasan, viz. "*the cohesion exists as a direct relation between the forms themselves*" and "*reference is irrelevant to lexical cohesion*", is unclear with regard to the way in which the cohesive function of daNAs contributes to their interpretation. A better point of departure in determining the role

of cohesiveness in interpreting NPs is provided by Garrod & Sanford 1977. They proved there was no difference in processing time between sentences like (18) and (19):

- (18) A *bus*<sub>i</sub> came trundling down the hill. A pedestrian was killed by *the vehicle*<sub>i</sub>.
- (19) A *bus* came trundling down the hill. It nearly smashed into a *vehicle*.

The lack of difference in processing time between (18) and (19) is attributed by Sanford & Garrod to the fact that readers conduct a similar semantic check on the sentences (18) and (19). Such a semantic check is obvious in (18) because it is essential to the correct interpretation of the referential identity between *bus* and *vehicle*. The fact that the processing time of (19) is the same as that of (18) proves, according to Sanford & Garrod that a similar check takes place when (19) is processed. In other words, readers still construct a link between the semantically related elements *bus* and *vehicle* although they are not co-referential in the text.

Although these findings touch upon the processing of cohesive NPs, it remains unclear what exactly is the content of the semantic check readers are claimed to conduct and hence, what is the role of cohesion in interpreting daNAs. Moreover, the lack of difference in processing time observed by Sanford & Garrod does not provide conclusive evidence for the semantic-check interpretation, since the semantic check does not explain yet why co-referential and non-co-referential cohesive NPs do not produce any difference in processing time.

Similar research concerning the processing of superordinate NPs in discourse is reported in Sanford & Garrod 1981. They refer to research (Sanford & Garrod 1975) that proves that the verification time of superordinate daNAs is dependent on the semantic relationship existing between anaphor and antecedent. The processing time decreases as the degree of *conjoint frequency* increases. This frequency is to be looked upon as a "*joint function of the category and the exemplar*" (1981:108).

However, with regard to our adequacy analysis, this finding is incomplete and misleading. It is misleading because it would be improper to interpret differences in processing or verification time between different daNAs simply in terms of adequacy: the



fact that daNAs with a high conjoint frequency are easier to process only indicates that in the language user's practice they probably occur more often than daNAs with a low conjoint frequency, but it does not necessarily shed light on their adequacy. It is incomplete because the adequacy of daNAs is not only determined by (text independent) semantic relations of the co-referential NPs, but also by text dependent intentions, as will be shown below.<sup>8</sup>

#### 2.2.4 The familiarity condition on daNAs

A final characterisation of daNAs can be given in terms of *familiarity*. It is plausible to assume that the adequacy of a daNA can be made dependent on the condition that it contains information which is *familiar* (see e.g. Bosch 1983:150). This means that the processing of daNAs hinges crucially on the fact that the information is part of the discourse participants' *shared knowledge or common ground*.<sup>9</sup> This condition seems justifiable in the light of inadequate daNAs such as the one in (20):

- (20) <Starting point: few know that Anatoli Karpov is a keen stamp collector>  
 ?Anatoli Karpov<sub>i</sub> has been operated on. One day after the operation, the stamp collector<sub>i</sub>'s medical condition is satisfactory.

However obvious a familiarity condition on daNAs might be, both from an intuitive and from a psychological viewpoint, it is contestable from both a theoretical and an empirical viewpoint. Firstly, in a discourse representation a familiarity condition can hardly be formalised. Whatever can be introduced in a text as *familiar* or *new* with regard to a certain referent will depend on the question what can be regarded as being part of the presumed knowledge-store of the reader. There is a high degree of redundancy in what should be formalised in the representation as familiar information about text referents: far more is familiar than what is actually used in a concrete text setting. In addition, the dividing line between what is familiar and what is new will differ from reader to reader.<sup>10</sup>

Secondly, daNAs which are not familiar can still be adequate in a specific text environment. See for instance (21):

- (21) The first novel by *the unknown director Frank Vriesakker*<sub>i</sub> deals with the themes of guilt and responsibility. In his earlier films *the son of a calvinist preacher*<sub>i</sub> has already shown a predilection for those themes.

The examples (22) and (23) are similar: if we assume that both Schmidt's being an *ex-Nazi* and a *drug dealer* are equally novel, the familiarity condition does not explain why the following texts are both adequate:

- (22) <Newspaper item; *J. Schmidt is unknown*>  
De Hamburgse politie heeft gisteren *Josef Schmidt*<sub>i</sub> gearresteerd. *De ex-nazi*<sub>i</sub> bleek een drugdealer te zijn.

*The Hamburg police arrested Josef Schmidt yesterday. The ex-nazi turned out to be a drug dealer.*

- (23) <Newspaper item; *J. Schmidt is unknown*>  
De Hamburgse politie heeft gisteren *Josef Schmidt*<sub>i</sub> gearresteerd. *De drughandelaar*<sub>i</sub> bleek een voormalig Nazi te zijn.

*The Hamburg police arrested Josef Schmidt yesterday. The drug dealer turned out to be a former Nazi.*

As such, a familiarity condition cannot cope with the *creative* function of daNAs, i.e., the possibility of providing *new* information by means of daNAs.

Third, familiar daNAs do not have to be adequate in just any text environment. Compare for instance (24a), (24b) and (24c):

- (24) <At a press conference Reagan introduces his new press chief Donald Baker who, as is well-known, happens to be the grandson of Jesse James. The fact that he was going to be the new press chief, however, had been known for some days throughout the whole world and was certainly known to the press people. The press conference is to be looked upon as a kind of 'inauguration' of the new press chief>  
(24a) This is *Donald Baker*<sub>i</sub>. *He*<sub>i</sub> is the new press chief. From now on *he* will speak to you every Wednesday afternoon. *The new press chief*<sub>i</sub> ....  
(24b) ?This is *Donald Baker*<sub>i</sub>. From now on *the new press chief*<sub>i</sub>

will speak to you every Wednesday afternoon.

- (24c) ?This is *Donald Baker*. *The grandson of Jesse James*, is the new press chief ...

The daNAs in (24b) and (24c) are inadequate although the relationship between the daNAs and their antecedents is knowledge shared by speaker and listener.

Fourth, there are many discourse referents which can be accessed by means of different NPs which clearly cannot be regarded as equally available, familiar or well-known with regard to the reader's knowledge-store. In accordance with the notion of familiarity, we could expect that these referents have to be mentioned first by means of the most familiar NP. However, there are many discourse conditions in which the unfamiliar variants are adequately used in first-mention position. This is clear in the examples (25) and (26), which both provide us with adequate discourses, fitting in the context of an encyclopaedia. Although the italicised NPs are not anaphorically related, the examples show that both sequences can occur.

- (25) *The aquila heliaca* is a bird of prey.  
It lives on hunting and fishing.  
It has a wing span of 1 meter.  
It is also called the *imperial eagle*.

- (26) *The imperial eagle* is a bird of prey.  
It lives on hunting and fishing.  
It has a wing span of 1 meter.  
It is also called the *aquila heliaca*.

Conversely, the familiarity condition does not explain why NPs which with regard to the reader's knowledge-store are equally *familiar* or *novel* can have a preferential sequence in a concrete text setting. Look at example (27). At least for Belgian readers, it is plausible to assume that both *W. Martens* and *our Prime Minister* are equally familiar, in view of the referent's extremely long term of office. However, in a context in which the value-indication (*W. Martens*) rather than the role-indication (*Prime Minister*) prevails, as is the case in (27), the value-role sequence - as in (27a) - is preferable to the role-value sequence - as in (27b):

- (27a) <Official press release>  
On the occasion of the formation of his tenth cabinet in a



row, *W. Martens<sub>i</sub>* will be received with pomp and circumstance in the royal palace. There, *our Prime Minister<sub>i</sub>* will receive a golden cup.

(27b) <Official press release>

On the occasion of the formation of his tenth subsequent cabinet, *our Prime Minister<sub>i</sub>* will be received with pomp and circumstance in the royal palace. There, *W. Martens<sub>i</sub>* will receive a golden cup.<sup>11</sup>

### 2.2.5 Conclusion

The following conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing:

- (i) The referential behaviour of daNAs is not quite the same as that of referential pronouns: daNAs cannot always be replaced by referential pronouns and both anaphoric expressions turn out to be subject to different structural restrictions.
- (ii) The characterisation of daNAs as topical, cohesive or familiar NPs does not enable us to account for the adequacy differences mentioned in the examples above.

## 2.3 DaNAs and implicit coherence relations

### 2.3.1 Introduction

From the above it appears that referential or cohesive daNA-proposals do not provide us with a satisfactory treatment, especially with regard to the informative function of daNAs. Furthermore, from the examples in section 2.2.4 it appears that the adequacy of daNAs is dependent on text specific intentions rather than on the opposition familiar vs. new. In other words, the function of daNAs is to be found in the role they play in the specification of the intentions underlying the text involved. The following section aims at implementing such an interpretation (section 2.3.2) and at indicating how the interpretation manages to integrate the various functions of daNAs, thus eliminating the objections mentioned earlier (section 2.3.3).

### 2.3.2 Intention-based discourse representation

Especially in research on computational linguistics, proposals have recently been made to generate or represent a text in terms of hierarchically ordered text (segment) intentions. Grosz & Sidner 1986 for instance, take a text to be a whole of hierarchically constructed discourse segments - all of them containing an aggregation of discourse utterances - with, at the basis, a discourse segment purpose. Grosz & Sidner take discourse (segment) purposes (DPs/DSPs) to be intentions meant to be recognised by the reader. They distinguish different types of intentions that could serve as DPs/DSPs and two structural relationships between them: the relationship of *dominance* and the relationship of *satisfaction-precedence*. These structural relationships between intentions are regarded as basic ingredients in the recognition process:

*Since the CPs [conversational participants (A.M.)] can never know the whole set of intentions that might serve as DP/DSPs, what they must recognise is the relevant structural relationships among intentions. Although there is an infinite number of intentions, there are only a small number of relations relevant to discourse structure that can hold between them. (Grosz & Sidner 1986:179)*

Although this 'minimal' apparatus may well be sufficient for recognising relevant relationships between intentions underlying discourse, it is clearly not sufficient for recognising - let alone for fully determining or characterising - subtle interpretation aspects in discourse, such as those demonstrated in the daNA-examples in the preceding section. Nor is it meant to. Even a list of possible intentions is not enough to recognise the informative value of daNAs. At best, intentions or basic structural relationships enable us to classify roughly utterances in a discourse. But they are unable to fully characterise (relations between) these utterances semantically, or to evaluate the contribution of these utterances in the recognition process of text intentions.

One way of 'enriching' the recognition process is the postulation of an intermediate level of representation between intentions and utterances. Such an intermediate level should be able to map utterances on to intentions and to evaluate or characterise the contribution of discourse utterances in the intention recognition



process. A psychologically plausible formalisation of such an intermediate level is not readily available. For the phenomena under scrutiny here, however, we can confine ourselves to assuming such an intermediate level, i.e., the level of the determination or specification of text intentions. In order to achieve this I indicate which *coherence relations* hold between the propositions underlying the utterances of each text segment. Such relationships are comparable to the rhetorical structure (RS) schemes in the RS-theory of Thompson & Mann 1987.<sup>12</sup> In my view, they are labels covering the propositions underlying the utterances of a discourse and the inferences to be drawn by the reader if he wants to be able to assign an interpretation to the utterances, an interpretation of coherence relations which is similar to that of Hobbs 1983 & 1985.

Coherence relations representing the specification of text intentions are empirically and theoretically highly problematic. Firstly, the relationship between utterances and intentions is not predictable: the same text intention can be realised in different ways, i.e., by means of totally different constellations of coherence relations. Secondly, just as there is no definitive list of all possible intentions underlying discourse (Grosz & Sidner 1986:179), there is no definitive list of all possible coherence relations underlying discourse either. Moreover, there is no consensus about the question whether such a list has to be open-ended or finite. Thompson & Mann claim that such a list should be finite. However, their 'fixed' set of RS-relations has grown in the course of subsequent publications. Third - and more important - there is the problem of the plausibility of postulating coherence relations as devices at work during the processing of language. It has not been proved that coherence relations represent information which readers need during processing. Grosz & Sidner even claim that "*a discourse can be understood at a basic level if the OCP [other conversational participant (A.M.)] never does or can construct, let alone name, such rhetorical relationships*" (1986:202).

However, we suggest that coherence relations operate at a level that links utterances to intentions. The reason for this suggestion is that we are concerned here with phenomena that go beyond "*basic level understanding*", i.e., phenomena which can never be accounted for if only Grosz & Sidner's minimal recognition ingredients are postulated. We are concerned with the different possible interpretation aspects of daNAs in written discourse.



This requires an analytical position yielding a 'maximal' discourse representation in which even these possible inferences underlying daNAs are accounted for. This does not mean, of course, that readers need (and consequently compose) such a maximal representation to establish a coherent interpretation. As appears from for instance Noordman & Vonk 1987, readers act as economically as possible when composing discourse representations: they appear to make only those inferences that are necessary to enable a minimal coherent interpretation of the text.

In such a representation coherence relations are an adequate way of expressing the possible inferences and semantic relations underlying discourse utterances. They are meant as analytical tools, as descriptive categories, characterising the relationship between the propositions underlying the utterances. Not the processing value of coherence relations, or their predictive value in the recognition process is under discussion here, but their analytical value. Note that at this point I use coherence relations as a tool to explain the behaviour of daNAs in discourse, and that it is not my objective to present a theory of coherence relations as such.

To avoid terminological confusion, I will refer to the link between intentions and coherence relations by means of the terms *specify* and *specification*; the link between coherence relations and actual utterances will be referred to by means of the terms *actualise* and *actualisation*.

Apart from a component where the specification of discourse (segment) purposes is represented in the form of coherence relations (CR-component), a component is necessary to verify which referents, which characteristics of these referents and which relations between these referents are active at which precise moment of the discourse. Grosz & Sidner 1986 call this component the *attentional state*, which is the formalisation of the focus of attention in a text. In the representation this attentional state is represented by the so-called focus space. Grosz & Sidner's attentional state is to be regarded as a dynamic discourse component, reflecting the accessibility of referents during discourse.<sup>13</sup>

By way of a simplified illustration, within the proposed framework a text such as (24a) might be represented as in figure

(1):

- (24a) (i) This is *Donald Baker<sub>i</sub>*  
 (ii) *He<sub>i</sub>* is the new press chief.  
 (iii) From now on *he<sub>i</sub>* will speak to you every  
 Wednesday afternoon.

Figure (1): Representation of (24a)

TEXT INTENTION		
define/install D. BAKER as NEW PRESS CHIEF		
COHERENCE RELATIONS		FOCUS SPACE
(i)	define D. BAKER	D. BAKER
(ii)	define BAKER as NEW PRESS CHIEF	D. BAKER, PRESS CHIEF
(iii)	elaboration BAKER/PRESS CHIEF	D. BAKER ....

In the following I will not go into the representational format or details of intention-based discourse representations, I only claim that the three kinds of representational information, i.e., text intentions, coherence relations and focus space, are necessary in order to account adequately for the function of daNAs in discourse.

### 2.3.3 Representing daNAs

#### 2.3.3.1 DaNAs and implicit coherence relations

Two important characteristics of daNAs are (i) that they are co-referential with their antecedents, and (ii) that the underlying discourse referent is highly accessible. These characteristics are reflected in the representation, (i) by the same-number feature (n) of the underlying discourse referent representation, as is seen in section 1.3, and (ii) by locating the DREF at the top of the focus space of the representation.

These features only account for the 'minimal' interpretation of daNAs, i.e., the establishment of a co-referential link in discourse.

However, they are not able to evaluate which daNA is an adequate lexical actualisation of the underlying referent. In accordance with the definition of NAs in chapter 1, and with the framework outlined in section 2.3.2, the evaluation of the lexical load of daNAs can be reflected in the representation by accepting an implicit coherence relation within the incremented discourse referent representation in the focus space - as opposed to the *explicit* coherence relations represented in the CR-component.<sup>14</sup> An example of such an implicit coherence relation is given for the nominal anaphor in (24a), segment (iv), which is represented in figure (2):

- (24a) (i) This is *Donald Baker*<sub>i</sub>  
 (ii) *He*<sub>i</sub> is the new press chief.  
 (iii) From now on *he*<sub>i</sub> will speak to you every Wednesday afternoon.  
 (iv) *The new press chief*<sub>i</sub>....

Figure (2): Representation of (24a), the NA included

TEXT INTENTION	
define/install D. BAKER as NEW PRESS CHIEF	
COHERENCE RELATIONS	FOCUS SPACE
(i) define D. BAKER	D. BAKER
(ii) define BAKER as NEW PRESS CHIEF	D. BAKER, PRESS CHIEF
(iii) elaboration BAKER/PRESS CHIEF	D. BAKER
(iv) ...	D.BAKER <sup>n</sup> <--- NEW PRESS CHIEF <sup>n</sup> (identify)

In the following section, I will show that the notion of implicit coherence relations is able to integrate the different functions of daNAs in texts.



### 2.3.3.2 DaNAs, antecedents and the dominance relationship

A coherence relation can be conceived of as a characterisation of the rhetorical interaction between a *satellite* and a *nucleus* (Thompson & Mann 1987:89). This implies that each coherence relation has to link two or more elements. These elements can be referents, clauses, sentences or larger discourse units. This also implies that there is a certain dominance relation between these elements, which is expressed in the representation by an arrow pointing to the left, reflecting the fact that the antecedent NP dominates the anaphoric NP. As such, coherence relations are capable of representing the dependency within alternative NAs.

### 2.3.3.3 The informative value of daNAs

By representing daNAs by means of implicit coherence relations, the informative value of daNAs is characterised as the way in which daNAs contribute to the coherence structure of a discourse. In this respect *informative* does not refer to the fact that daNAs add information to the knowledge-store of the reader but rather to the fact that daNAs add relations to the coherence relations structure of the ongoing text.

Most coherence relations underlying daNAs are of the identifying type, i.e., *equals* (identify, definition, reformulation), *is an element of the class of* (classify) or *has the attribute* (attribute). But daNAs are not at all limited to this, as is shown by the following examples. The a-versions of the examples represent the implicit coherence relations underlying the daNAs. They have to be read as 'exploded views' of a part of the discourse referent representation in the focus space of the representation of the discourse segment involved (see figure (2) above). The b-versions give an explicitation of the propositions that can be taken to lie at the basis of the implicit relations. That these implicit propositions are indeed caused by the occurrence of a daNA becomes clear when the daNA is replaced by a pronominal anaphor: the given interpretations in the b-versions become invalid.

- (4) Yesterday Reagan<sub>i</sub> decided to retire from the White House. The ex-movie star<sub>i</sub> announced his decision during a show on American television.
- (4a) REAGAN<sup>n</sup> <--- EX-MOVIE STAR<sup>n</sup>

- a. (identify)  
b. (sequence)  
c. (evaluate)  
d. (circumstance)
- (4b) a. *Reagan is the ex-movie star in question.* (identify)  
b. *Reagan used to be a movie star.* (sequence)  
c. *Reagan - according to the author - is an ex-movie star (and that is all he has ever been).* (evaluate)  
d. *Circumstances are such that Reagan, being an ex-movie star, announced his retirement in a show on television.* (circumstance)
- (21) The first novel by *the unknown director Frank Vriesakker<sub>i</sub>*, deals with the themes of guilt and responsibility. In his earlier films *the son of a calvinist preacher<sub>i</sub>* has already shown a predilection for those themes.
- (21a) THE UNKNOWN DIRECTOR <--- THE SON OF A  
FRANK VRIESAKKER<sup>n</sup> PROTESTANT  
PREACHER<sup>n</sup>  
a. (identify)  
b. (justification)
- (21b) a. *FV is the son of a protestant preacher.* (identify)  
b. *FV deals with the themes of guilt and responsibility, since FV is the son of a calvinist preacher.* (justification)
- (28) It is said that *Ronald Reagan<sub>i</sub>* is not in control of his own domestic staff. Often *the most powerful man in the world<sub>i</sub>* is being shamelessly laughed at by his maids.
- (28a) REAGAN<sup>n</sup> <--- THE MOST POWERFUL MAN IN  
THE WORLD<sup>n</sup>  
a. (define)  
b. (concession)
- (28b) a. *Reagan can be called the most powerful man in the world.* (identify/define)  
b. *Although Reagan is the most powerful man in the world, he is still being bossed about in his own house.* (concession)
- (29) In the match against Beerschot, *Patrick Vervoort<sub>i</sub>* was the best player. *The former left back of Beerschot<sub>i</sub>* scored two goals.
- (29a) PATRICK VERVOORT<sup>n</sup> <--- EX LEFT BACK

OF BEERSCHOT<sup>m</sup>

- a. (identify)
- b. (sequence)
- c. (circumstance)

- (29b) a. *Patrick Vervoort is the (ex) left back (of Beerschot) in question.* (identify)  
 b. *Patrick Vervoort used to be left back of Beerschot.* (sequence)  
 c. *Circumstances are such that P.V., as a former left back of Beerschot, scores two goals against his former team.* (circumstance)

- (30) At the Berlin film festival the latest film by *John Willey*<sub>i</sub> was awarded a prize. *The busy director*<sub>i</sub> could not attend the prize award ceremony.

- (30a) JOHN WILLEY<sup>n</sup> <--- THE BUSY DIRECTOR<sup>n</sup>

- a. (identify)
- b. (attribute)
- c. (reason)

- (30b) a. *John Willey is the director of the film in question.* (identify)  
 b. *John Willey is busy.* (attribute)  
 c. *Because John Willey is busy, he cannot attend the prize award ceremony.* (reason)

In principle, this kind of analysis is applicable to antecedentless daNAs as well. The daNA in (14) *the best sold 1300*, for example, can be interpreted by establishing an *attribute/evaluate*-relation in the DREF underlying the daNA (LADA SAMARA 1300<sup>n</sup> <-- BEST SOLD 1300<sup>n</sup>). A detailed description of this sort of antecedentless daNAs (especially of the actor-role type) can be found in Fauconnier 1985. He is particularly interested in the formalisation of the *mental distance* which, in different text environments, can exist between *trigger* (that which is written, i.e., *the best sold 1300*) and *target* (that which is meant, i.e., *Lada Samara 1300*). He considers the relationship as a pragmatic function. However, it does not appear from his analysis which is the function of such mental leaps in a concrete text, in other words, which might be the different values of the pragmatic function. In our approach this value can be expressed by means of text intentions and coherence relations.

The idea of making explicit the relationship between a daNA and its antecedent by means of underlying propositions, as is done in



the b-versions of the examples above, is in essence similar to the predicational nature some authors attribute to the noun in definite and demonstrative NPs.<sup>15</sup>

#### 2.3.3.4 Pragmatic conditions on daNAs

In view of the inadequacy of the problematic daNAs in section 2.2.4 and in line with the characteristics of implicit coherence relations, two pragmatic conditions can be formulated that are applicable to implicit coherence relations underlying daNAs, i.e., *the condition of relevance* and *the condition of centrality*. These conditions have to be regarded as conditions regulating the adequacy of the informative load of daNAs. The first condition is defined as follows:

*The Condition of Relevance* as applied to implicit coherence relations underlying daNAs:

Implicit coherence relations should be related in a relevant way to the intention of the text (segment) concerned.

As a result of this condition, a daNA will only be adequate if it is based on an implicit coherence relation which is relevant to the text intention. In other words, a reader must be able to ground a daNA on an implicit coherence relation or proposition which, drawing on his knowledge of the kind of text, the text objective and the preceding context, he conceives to be a relevant addition. This does not explain how exactly the notion of relevance is to be conceived of or how it should be formalised. All that is claimed is that such a notion is more helpful in determining the adequacy of daNAs than the notions of shared knowledge or familiarity.

Examples such as (20) and (24c) infringe upon this condition of relevance.

- (20) ?*Anatoli Karpov<sub>i</sub> has been operated on. One day after the operation, the stamp collector<sub>i</sub>'s medical condition is satisfactory.*
- (24c) ?*This is Donald Baker<sub>i</sub>. The grandson of Jesse James<sub>i</sub> is the new press chief.*

If we look upon these sentences as being awkward, the reason is that we cannot possibly reduce the anaphoric NPs to any implicit coherence relation relevant to the intention of the text.

Relevance has to be understood as relevance at the moment of occurrence in the discourse, i.e., relevance with regard to the intention of the text segment obtaining at that particular moment and to the explicit coherence relations as specified up to that moment. This can be demonstrated by (31). In the unacceptable b-version the implicit coherence relation is relevant, but not yet at the moment the daNA occurs in the discourse:

- (31a) A woman<sub>i</sub> was walking down the street. She<sub>i</sub> was shot down. The victim<sub>i</sub> was quickly taken to hospital.
- (31b) A woman<sub>i</sub> was walking down the street. ?The victim<sub>i</sub> was shot down. She<sub>i</sub> was quickly taken to hospital.

Evidence for such a relevance condition can be found in Ortony & Anderson 1977. By way of experiment, they put the difference between *names* (values) and *definite descriptions* (roles) to the test. They claim that both names and definite descriptions can be used referentially as well as attributively. The referential use of names (32a) and the attributive use of definite descriptions (32b) is called *direct*; the attributive use of names (32c) and the referential use of definite descriptions (32d), is termed *indirect*.

- (32a) Alfred Nobel wore a fine beard.
- (32b) The inventor of dynamite had a profound influence on the nature of warfare.
- (32c) Alfred Nobel had a profound influence on the nature of warfare.
- (32d) The inventor of dynamite wore a fine beard.

A recognition test enables Ortony & Anderson to find evidence for the fact that while processing, test persons replace indirectly used names and definite descriptions by their direct variants. This is shown in the fact that cases such as (32c) and (32d) are less well memorised.

Two aspects of this experiment are relevant as far as our analysis

of daNAs is concerned. Firstly, the examples used in the experiment show that the 'direct-ness' of NPs in a text is not the same as referential force. In a concrete text setting a *role*-term, being a definite description - as in (32b) -, can indeed be more direct than a *value*-term, being a proper name - as in (32c) -, although the latter has an intrinsically higher referential force. With regard to our analysis this means that a *value*-term can serve as antecedent for a *role*-daNA, and vice versa, as is shown in (33a) and in (33b) respectively. The choice between role-value or value-role sequence is ultimately made on the basis of considerations concerning text intention and relevance:

- (33a) <Encyclopaedia entry entitled: *the life of Alfred Nobel*>  
*Alfred Nobel*<sub>i</sub> was born just before the first World War.  
*The inventor of dynamite*<sub>i</sub> had a profound influence on  
 the nature of warfare.
- (33b) <Encyclopaedia entry, entitled: *the role of dynamite in human warfare*>  
*The inventor of dynamite*<sub>i</sub> had a profound influence on  
 the nature of warfare. *Alfred Nobel*<sub>i</sub> ....

Secondly, NPs (names or definite descriptions) are characterised as being direct on the basis of their relevance in the text environment. Directness can consequently be regarded as adequacy. The fact that indirect NPs are harder to memorise than direct ones indicates that language users have an eye for the adequacy of NPs in a sentence.

These findings justify a condition of relevance for the adequacy of daNAs as expressed above. However, this does not mean that any daNA which is relevant in a certain text environment also produces an adequate daNA. This is shown in an example such as (24b).

- (24b) ?This is *Donald Baker*<sub>i</sub>. From now on *the new press chief*<sub>i</sub> will speak to you every Wednesday afternoon.

In these cases another pragmatic condition seems to be involved, which I call the condition of centrality:

*The Condition of Centrality* as applied to implicit coherence relations underlying daNAs:



---

Implicit coherence relations should not be the specification of central text (segment) intentions.

This condition states that daNAs cannot be the actualisation of coherence relations which are part of the specification of the central text (segment) intention. Put differently: propositions underlying daNAs must not express central statements in the discourse. This condition is illustrated in (34), the b-version of which is awkward, at least if we consider it to be the variant of (34a):

- (34a) *The president of Costa Rica<sub>i</sub>* has postponed the elections in his country, because he is seriously ill. *He<sub>i</sub>* has been flown to the United States.
- (34b) *The president of Costa Rica<sub>i</sub>* has postponed the elections in his country. ?*The suffering president<sub>i</sub>* has been flown to the United States.

The only way to arrive at a coherent interpretation of the two sentences in (34b), is the assignment of an *attribute/reason*-relation underlying the two sentences, induced by the attribute *suffering* in the daNA. Thus the central relation in this text is actualised in an implicit form, which causes the awkwardness of the b-version.

Additional elements in favour of the acceptance of the condition of centrality can further be found in the sentences (24a) and (24b), repeated below.

- (24a) This is *Donald Baker<sub>i</sub>*. *He<sub>i</sub>* is the new press chief. From now on *he* will speak to you every Wednesday afternoon. *The new press chief<sub>i</sub>* ....
- (24b) ?This is *Donald Baker<sub>i</sub>*. From now on *the new press chief<sub>i</sub>* will speak to you every Wednesday afternoon.

As a result of the text intention (REAGAN introduces D.BAKER as NEW PRESS CHIEF) the *define*-relation between D.BAKER and NEW PRESS CHIEF is a necessary part of the explicit coherence relation structure of (24), since it specifies the central text intention. In the a-version this explicit relation has been adequately actualised. In the b-version this is not the case: the central text intention has been specified in an implicit coherence

relation, which violates the centrality condition. It is only after and as a consequence of the explicit *define*-relation, that the NPs *Donald Baker* and *the new press chief* will be available as co-referential NPs.

The condition of centrality also explains the inadequacy of (25a) and (26a), which have to be read as equivalents of (25) and (26):

- (25)    *The aquila heliaca* is a bird of prey.  
          It lives on hunt and fishing.  
          It has a wing span of 1 meter.  
          It is also called the *imperial eagle*.
- (25a)    ?*The aquila heliaca*, is a bird of prey. *The imperial eagle*,  
          lives on hunting and fishing.
- (26)    *The imperial eagle* is a bird of prey.  
          It lives on hunting and fishing.  
          It has a wing span of 1 meter.  
          It is also called the *aquila heliaca*.
- (26a)    ?*The imperial eagle*, is a bird of prey. *The aquila heliaca*,  
          lives on hunting and fishing.

In (25), the referent IMPERIAL EAGLE is part of an explicit *define*-relation in which the referent AQUILA HELIACA is defined. This *define*-relation realises the central text intention *define AQUILA HELIACA*. Such a central text intention is most plausibly conceivable in the context of an encyclopaedia. Only after the explicit establishment of this *define*-relation, will *imperial eagle* and *aquila heliaca* be available in the text as co-referential NPs. The same reasoning is applicable to (26) but in a converse relation of dominance.

The pragmatic conditions under discussion should be applicable in principle to antecedentless daNAs as well, as is partly shown by Ortony & Anderson 1977. The adequacy of a metaphorical, indirect, nominal NP - as in (14), (15), (32c) and (32d) - is not only dependent on the question whether the reader is able to identify the intended referent, but also on the relevance and the centrality of the information conveyed by the daNA.

### 2.3.3.5 *Update-daNAs and surplus-daNAs*

Implicit coherence relations between referents have to be looked upon as text-specific. They 'live on' information concerning the referent, information which at that moment is accessible and relevant in the text. This can be information that has just been mentioned in the text. This is particularly clear in (35), where the relationship between WOMAN and VICTIM owes its existence to the information given about WOMAN in between the daNA and its antecedent:

- (35) *A woman<sub>i</sub> was shot in the street. The victim<sub>i</sub> was quickly taken to hospital.*

The informative value of the daNA in (35) will be said to be an *update* of what has been said about the referent earlier in the text.

Other implicit coherence relations depend on information about the referent not mentioned in the context concerned but which can be introduced into the context as relevant *surplus* information. This is the case for instance in (36):

- (36) *A woman<sub>i</sub> was shot in the street. The young woman<sub>i</sub> was quickly taken to hospital.*

The difference between *update* and *surplus* can be described as follows:<sup>16</sup>

An *update-daNA* is a daNA the underlying DREF of which contains an implicit coherence relation which is dependent on one or more (implicit or explicit) coherence relations in the representation.

A *surplus-daNA* is a daNA the underlying DREF of which contains an implicit coherence relation which is not dependent on another (implicit or explicit) coherence relation in the representation.

On the basis of the above, (35) and (36) can be represented as in figure (3) and (4), which includes only the representational information which is relevant to us here:



Figure (3): Representation of the update-daNA in (35)

CR		FS
(i) <i>situation</i> (WOMAN, TO SHOOT) →	WOMAN ←	DEAD (attribute)
	↓	
(ii) <i>sequence</i> (VICTIM, TAKE TO HOSPITAL)	WOMAN <sup>n</sup> ←	VICTIM <sup>n</sup> (reformulation/result)

Figure (4): Representation of the surplus-daNA in (36)

CR		FS
(i) <i>situation</i> (WOMAN, TO SHOOT) →	WOMAN ←	DEAD (attribute)
(ii) <i>sequence</i> (VICTIM, TAKE TO HOSPITAL)	WOMAN <sup>n</sup> ←	YOUNG <sup>n</sup> (attribute)

In figure (3) the *reformulation/result*-relation between WOMAN and VICTIM in the FS of segment (ii) is dependent on the percolation of the *attribute*-relation between WOMAN and DEAD in (i) (symbolised by ↓), which in its turn is the result of the explicit *situation*-relation represented in the CR of segment (i). Thus the daNA in (35) can be said to update information provided by the previous context. In figure (4), in contrast, the *attribute*-relation between WOMAN and YOUNG WOMAN in the FS of segment (ii) is not dependent on the information in the previous context. The daNA in (36) offers surplus information vis-à-vis the contextual information present.

The intuition that certain daNAs rely more heavily on information in the linguistic context than others is thus formalised in the representation in terms of implicit coherence relations.<sup>17</sup>

### 2.3.3.6 Simple and complex coherence relations

Apart from the update-surplus dichotomy, yet another distinction can be made on the basis of the examples given, that between *simple* and *complex* daNAs, i.e., daNAs based on *simple* and *complex* coherence relations respectively.

*A simple implicit coherence relation* is a coherence relation the explicitation of which is a simple proposition, i.e., an *is* or *has* proposition with the antecedent in the argument part and the daNA in the predicate part.

A simple daNA will be based on a relation of one of the following types: identify, attribute, classify, define.

*A complex implicit coherence relation* is a coherence relation the explicitation of which is a complex proposition. A complex proposition is a combination of propositions linked by a conjunction.

A complex daNA will not only be based on a simple implicit coherence relation, but also on an implicit coherence relation, for example of the type reason, concession, justification. In propositions that make explicit complex relations the propositional information of the whole sentence is involved.

The difference between simple and complex is shown in the b-versions of the examples (4), (21), (28), (29), (30) in section 2.3.3.3. For example, the first explicitation in (21b) - repeated below - is a simple proposition, the second explicitation is a complex proposition:

- (21b) a. *FV is the son of a protestant preacher.* (identify)  
 b. *FV deals with the themes of guilt and responsibility, since FV is the son of a calvinist preacher.* (justification)

A daNA must at least be based on a simple coherence relation. This means that the inference of a simple proposition is a minimal condition for the interpretation of daNAs. However, a complex relation cannot or should not be attributed to each and every daNA. When a complex coherence relation or proposition underlies a daNA, there will undoubtedly also be a simple relation or proposition underlying it. This means that a complex

coherence relation can only be assigned when/because a simple relation is present. This characteristic of daNAs can be deduced from the examples in section 2.3.3.3. In these examples the simple proposition is an essential part of the complex propositions.

With respect to the processing of discourse, this means that the establishment of discourse coherence minimally requires the inference of a simple implicit coherence relation underlying daNAs. If one or more complex coherence relations can be distinguished analytically, this does not necessarily mean that these relations are actually inferred by readers during processing. In view of the results of processing research of Noordman & Vonk 1987 for example, it can plausibly be assumed that readers process daNAs by default at a superficial level; i.e., by default, readers are satisfied with a minimal interpretation. In view of the examples in this chapter, it is plausible to assume that, by default, readers process the simple *identify*-relation underlying daNAs. It is this assumption which will be corroborated in chapter 3, where the variation between *default* definite and *marked* demonstrative nominal anaphors is investigated.

## 2.4 DaNAs and Discourse Topic

On the basis of the given representation an empirically and psychologically adequate topic interpretation can be developed in which daNAs play a predominant part, the notion of topic being interpreted from the dynamic-incremental viewpoint of the ongoing discourse. From that viewpoint all discourse referents at a given moment of the discourse are defined as potentially topical, which are accessible as elements the rest of the text could be dealing with. Such a conception of the notion of potential topic fits in with a dynamic discourse representation such as the one proposed by Grosz & Sidner 1986, and is in keeping with the view of topic and focus taken in Cornish (1986b:155) and Lockman & Klappholz (1980:37). In accordance with the above mentioned interpretation of daNAs, the following heuristic for Potential Discourse Topics (PDT) can be proposed:

### *Potential Discourse Topic (PDT)-heuristic*

Only those NPs allowing at a particular text moment the construction of a daNA satisfying the pragmatic



conditions of relevance and centrality are the actualisation of potential discourse topics at that given moment of the discourse.

This heuristic requires some justification and comment:

Firstly, the PDT-heuristic is in keeping with the intuition that, at a given text moment, different elements are potential topics. See for example (37):

- (37) *John<sub>i</sub>* arrived in *Rome<sub>j</sub>* by *bicycle<sub>k</sub>*.
- (37a) *The poor boy<sub>i</sub>* hadn't eaten in two weeks. He ...
- (37b) *The historical city<sub>j</sub>* was celebrating its two thousandth anniversary. It ...
- (37c) *The wreck<sub>k</sub>* had collapsed twice on the way. It ...

According to the PDT-heuristic there are three potential topic candidates in (37). Although JOHN is the most plausible topic candidate, (37b) and (37c) clearly show that also ROME and BICYCLE can easily act as topics for the continuation of the text.

Secondly, the PDT-heuristic does not exclude the possibility of different referents being full-fledged topics at the same text moment. See (37d):

- (37d) *The bike<sub>k</sub>* had caused *the poor boy<sub>i</sub>* lots of troubles on the way.

Thirdly, according to the heuristic all the referents are PDT-candidates for which a daNA can be constructed that obeys the conditions put forward in section 2.3.3.4. This leads to other topic candidates than the ones produced by the heuristic that stipulates that all pronominalisable NPs are topic: the fact is that certain non-pronominalisable referents can be accepted as plausible PDTs. This is shown in (38). Without supplementary information, FUSS and KLUWER are equivalent PDT-candidates. In (38a) and (38b) the daNA-heuristic shows that both do indeed acquire a topic status. (38c) and (38d) show that the pronoun-heuristic does predict FUSS but hardly predicts KLUWER as a discourse topic.

- (38) *The fuss<sub>i</sub>* about *Kluwer<sub>j</sub>* continues.
- (38a) *The bickering<sub>i</sub>* will most probably go on next week too.
- (38b) *The publishing company<sub>j</sub>* will still be in trouble next

week.

(38c) *It<sub>i</sub>* will most probably go on next week too.

(38d) *?It<sub>j</sub>* will still be in trouble next week.

This difference in heuristic value also explains the acceptability differences in examples (10a) and (10b), repeated below. The inadequacy in the b-version has to be attributed to the fact that pronouns are incapable of topicalising a second referent within one and the same sentence, that is in this case *the Compagnie Générale de Belgique*: although the pronoun *ze* 'it' would not cause any ambiguity in (10b), it is not acceptable here.

(10a) Luc van de Vijver, die jarenlang de woordvoerder was van *de Generale Maatschappij van België<sub>i</sub>*, verliet *de 'oude dame<sub>i</sub>*' op 1 april.

*Luc van de Vijver who, for years, was the spokesman of the Compagnie Générale de Belgique, left 'the Grand old Lady' on 1st April.*

(10b) *?Luc van de Vijver, die jarenlang de woordvoerder was van de Generale Maatschappij van België<sub>i</sub>*, verliet *ze<sub>i</sub>* op 1 april.

*?Luc van de Vijver who, for years, was the spokesman of the Compagnie Générale de Belgique, left her on 1st April.*

Finally, with the topic-heuristic it is possible to unravel topically complex or inadequate discourses, such as (16):

(16) On 18th March 1612, for the first time *a human<sub>i</sub>*, set foot on the island of Ebreo. *He<sub>i</sub>* started building a hut right away. *?The woman<sub>i</sub>* lived there for twenty years.

Example (16) does not satisfy the topic-heuristic: the daNA does not satisfy the pragmatic conditions underlying daNAs. Either the inadequacy is a consequence of a violation of the condition of relevance in which case the fact that the first human to set foot on Ebreo was a woman is irrelevant to the intentions underlying the text, or the inadequacy is the consequence of a violation of the condition of centrality, in which case the relation between HUMAN and WOMAN is part of the CR-component and cannot be actualised in a daNA. See (39) in which that relation is actualised adequately:

(39) On 18th March 1612, for the first time *a human<sub>i</sub>*, set foot

on the island of Ebreo. *He<sub>i</sub>* stayed there till his death. In 1976 archeologists discovered it must have been a *woman<sub>i</sub>*. *She<sub>i</sub>* lived on the island for twenty years.

## 2.5 Conclusion

The central question in this chapter was: what 'informative load' are definite alternative nominal anaphors allowed to contain in texts? The answer has been given in terms of coherence relations and text intentions. I have also tried to propose a first formalisation of the answer together with some classes of and pragmatic conditions on definite alternative nominal anaphors formulated in terms of that formalisation. It was contended that the adequacy of daNAs cannot be simply made dependent on either the status of the referents within the reader's knowledge store, or on surface characteristics of sentences or texts, such as the distance or the structural relationship between daNAs and their antecedents. Rather, the adequacy is dependent on the question whether, on the representational level, daNAs are adequate actualisations of implicit coherence relations which, in turn, have to be adequate specifications of the intentions underlying the text. Although formalisation is still premature, this description of daNAs is to be conceived of as a test enabling us to grasp subtle form-function relationships in texts and to justify them in terms of coherence relations and text intentions.

Although this chapter only aims to evaluate daNAs, it is possible to deduce from the given representation a claim regarding the production of daNAs in texts. The representation starts from three levels in the production of language: the level of text intentions, the level of (implicit and explicit) coherence relations and the level of the linguistic actualisation.<sup>18</sup> This chapter claims that daNAs do not result from planning strategies at the linguistic actualisation level, but rather from strategies at the level of coherence relations. As such they do not merely depend on stylistic considerations of a suitable alternation between pronominal and nominal anaphors.

In connection with the following chapters, a last point has to be mentioned. In interpreting daNAs I made a clear distinction between what can be assumed plausibly as being the maximal inferencing related to the occurrence of a daNA on the one hand, and the inferences readers are assumed to draw by default in



processing a daNA on the other. I referred to this difference as a difference between a maximal and a minimal representation underlying daNAs. It is demonstrated that many coherence relations and propositions can plausibly be attributed to daNAs in discourse; on the other hand, I assumed that by default readers process the simple *identify*-relation underlying daNAs, according to the minimal effort they make in order to get a coherent representation of discourse.

Although this difference is not accounted for in the form of experimental evidence, and although it can be expected that the interaction of the elements determining the depth of processing of daNAs is to a large extent unpredictable, its postulation is plausible, and even necessary. It captures the difference between the real and rich interpretation possibilities of daNAs which can be analytically displayed on the one hand, and the intuition that daNAs in fact just require the simple identification of the intended referent on the other. Furthermore, differences in processing depth and representational explicitness have to be postulated in view of interpretation differences between definite NAs and demonstrative NAs, a topic which is elaborated upon in the following chapter.

## Notes to chapter 2

1. This chapter is a revised version of Maes 1990.
2. In terms of Donnellan's dichotomy of *attributive* versus *referential* definite descriptions, daNAs can be considered to be used both attributively and referentially:

*A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an assertion states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so. A speaker who uses a definite description referentially in an assertion (..) uses the description to enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states something about that person or thing. (Donnellan 1971:102)*

3. The use of epithets in conversational context is of course an exception to this planned use of daNAs.
4. In contrast, the form of referring acts in spoken, interactive communication - according to Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs 1986 for example - is largely determined by a shared responsibility, actions of and collaboration between speaker and hearer. The possibility of being interrupted and of 'repairing' induces the use of identification strategies which are totally different from those used by the writer.
5. This sentence is obviously acceptable, except in the version in which the daNA is intended to be referentially dependent on its antecedent.
6. Such 'illegal' anaphoric NAs can have evaluative function, as is shown in the following examples from Cornish (1987:236) and Tasmowski & Verluyten (1985:355) respectively:
  - (a) *Julius<sub>i</sub> father hates the poor chap<sub>i</sub>*
  - (a') *?Julius<sub>i</sub> father hates the senator<sub>i</sub>*
  - (b) *Le comité<sub>i</sub> s' imagine que ce ramassis de vieux crabes<sub>i</sub> restera au pouvoir.*
  - (b') *?Le comité<sub>i</sub> a dit que ce ramassis de vieux crabes<sub>i</sub> restera au pouvoir.*

7. Such a broad principle allows us to consider different referents as being topical simultaneously. In other words, all the referents *that the text deals with*, can be called topical, or all the referents *activated* at a given moment in the discourse. In this way *topical* is closely related to what Prince (1985:66) calls "Chafe-given", i.e., "*taken by the speaker to be currently in the hearer's consciousness*".
8. Sanford & Garrod recognise that not every intelligible discourse is automatically adequate discourse or, as they call it, *considerate discourse*. Still, they reduce the difference between considerate and inconsiderate discourse to a difference in processing, or in other words, a difference in processing time :

*It must be recognised that writers of messages typically attempt to match the format of these messages to the processing constraints of the readers, and that although 'inconsiderate' discourse may be intelligible, it nonetheless makes abnormally heavy processing demands upon readers. (1981:198)*

Even though a difference in processing between adequate and inadequate daNAs could be determined, it would still be necessary to measure the adequacy in other ways, for instance via experiments of evaluation and rewriting.

9. With the *familiarity-novelty* dichotomy I refer to the status of discourse referents with regard to the (presumed) knowledge store of the reader, independent of the concrete text setting. As far as *shared knowledge* is concerned, I think of it as part of the hearer's general knowledge-store or, as what Prince calls, *Clark-given* (1985:66). *Common ground* is a conversationally based notion which includes "*the mutual knowledge, beliefs, and assumptions shared by the speaker and addressees*" (Clark, Schreuder & Buttrick 1983:246-7, also Clark & Marshall 1981).
10. With respect to this Stotsky says that "*.. the analysis of collocational cohesion in an experienced writer's text by an experienced reader may be very different from the analysis of collocational cohesion (...) by a relatively inexperienced reader of texts on that topic*" (1983:439).
11. Most of the examples in this section are inconsistent with the daNA-proposal in Steinitz 1980 too. The condition she imposes on daNAs is that they always represent the *Obermenge* 'superordinate class' of their antecedent. This notion of *Obermenge* is implemented in terms of semantic features of the



lexical items contained in the NPs. The condition is formulated as follows:

*Ein neueingeführtes Nomen A (bezeichnend >>A<<) kann durch ein Nomen B fortgeführt werden, das aufgrund seines geringeren Merkmalbestandes die Obermenge >>B<< zu >>A<< charakterisiert. (Steinitz 1980:250)*

12. Thompson & Mann de facto recognise that the attribution of rhetorical structure (RS) schemes depends on the intention underlying the text. This appears for instance from the fact that for each RS-analysis they indicate precisely the intention of the text. And yet they - erroneously - do not go so far as to recognise intentions as a level of representation. This is necessary, however, because a text analysis in terms of RS-schemes the representation of which does not immediately reveal which text intentions are being actualised with those RS-schemes, is meaningless. The recognition and representation of both text intentions and coherence relations is not only necessary for an adequate understanding of texts, but also for the evaluation of text quality (see Maes 1988a).
13. Such a focussing mechanism is represented in different ways in the literature. Grosz & Sidner 1986 for instance, locate discourse referents per discourse segment in a focus space. These spaces are arranged in a *last-in-first-out* focus stack reflecting the availability of the referents. Heim 1982 gives a similar representation. She looks upon referents as an ordered set of file cards introduced at a given moment in the discourse domain. On the basis of the moment of introduction as a file card, the linguistic actualisation (definite vs. indefinite) of a referent can be derived.
14. Obviously, implicit coherence relations underlying co-referential NPs are not the only type of implicit coherence relation to be represented in the focus space. The focus space contains at least two more types of implicit relations. Firstly, there are implicit coherence relations underlying non-co-referential NPs, in which the accessibility of the second is dependent on the presence of the first, such as in (a) where an implicit coherence relation can be assumed underlying the NPs *the car* and *the door*, as is shown in (a'):

(a) John tried to get in *the car*. *The door* turned out to be locked.

(a') CAR <--- DOOR  
(whole-part)

Relations of this particular type are known in the literature as relations between referents within the same *scenario* (Sanford & Garrod 1981:passim) or *script* (Schank & Abelson 1977:36). As opposed to the notion of implicit coherence relation, the notions of scenario and script are text-independent and represent knowledge structures and not text structures. A notion like scenario consequently allows us to predict which referents, in a certain scenario, are *in principle* available or in "implicit focus" (Sanford & Garrod 1981:154), but not which referents are introduced into which type of dominance relation in the present text setting, thus actualising the current text intention;

Secondly, there are coherence relations within discourse referent representations which are the result of explicit coherence relations in that particular text segment. Relations between referents expressed in the CR-component of the representation (which are explicitly realised in the utterances of the discourse) are incremented in following representations as coherence relations within the referent representations in the FS, a view which is congruent with the discourse representation characteristics given in section 1.3.

15. Kleiber 1984 analyses the semantic content of French constructions of the type *ce + N* 'this/that + Noun' as *ce + est + N* 'this/that + is + Noun'. Ortony 1978 takes the viewpoint that definite descriptions are based on predicates which can either be derived from the preceding context or which are based on shared knowledge. Droste (1977:184) derives epithet-anaphors from underlying relative clauses, with which they are in a paraphrase-relationship. And, finally, Bach 1968 proposes reducing all NPs to underlying relative clauses.
16. The use of the notion of *surplus* is a little bit misleading, since *update-daNAs* can be said to provide the context with some kind of surplus too.
17. The difference between update and surplus can be compared to the difference Ortony makes between *definite descriptions of entailment* and *definite descriptions of inference* if we assume that *surplus-daNAs* depend more on knowledge from outside the text involved than do *update-daNAs*:

*The important difference between a definite description of entailment and a definite description of inference is that the interpretation of the former does not depend on the*

---

*provision of suppressed premises drawn from the comprehender's general world knowledge. (1978:74)*

18. This triple division can also be found in Hobbs (1979:87-89), who distinguishes three planning levels : *message level*, *coherence level* and *description level*.



## Chapter 3

# *Definite and demonstrative nominal anaphors*

### 3.1 Introduction

#### 3.1.1 DemNAs in discourse

In chapter 2 an attempt was made to explain the nature and function of the informative content of nominal anaphors. This proposal only applies to definite non-demonstrative alternative nominal anaphors (*daNAs*) in written context. What remained in that proposal is the variation between non-demonstrative definite NAs (henceforth *definite NAs* or *defNAs*) and definite NAs with a demonstrative determiner (henceforth *demonstrative NAs* or *demNAs*). The function and interpretation of both alternative and literally repeated demNAs is the subject matter of this chapter.<sup>1</sup>

The demNA-proposal in this chapter starts from the following empirical claims with respect to demNAs, which will be accounted for later:

- (i) As they access predominantly highly accessible discourse referents, demNAs are referential expressions the function and markedness of which is *not primarily identificationally inspired*, that is, the demonstrative determiner in demNAs cannot be considered to be simply a strong marked device, being co-referential with the antecedent NP and hence enabling the reader to access the intended referent.
- (ii) Almost every demNA-occurrence in discourse is replaceable by its defNA-variant, without causing referential ambiguity or obscurity. The demNA-interpretation process, as well as the demNA-proposal, is based on the permanent availability of the defNA-demNA variation in interpreting demNAs.
- (iii) The markedness of the demonstrative determiner is

meant to signal the special status of the following NP, the effect being that the underlying referent is *semantically modified*, i.e., demNAs effect a change in the semantic representation of the referent which has been built up so far in the discourse. The modifications are expressed in terms of the implicit coherence relations *classify*, *attribute*, *contextualise* and *evaluate*.

- (iv) The semantic modification caused by demNAs (as opposed to defNAs) should be discriminated, theoretically as well as empirically, from pragmatic effects caused by the variation of *deze/dit*-NAs vs. *die/dat*-NAs. Thus, the interpretation process of demNAs is claimed to involve two separate components, based upon different contextual cues, and theoretically located on different levels of language description (semantics vs. pragmatics), as will become clear in this chapter and the next.

The demNA-proposal is first of all based on a qualitative analysis of demNAs occurring in various text corpora, described in section 1.6 and more accurately in section 4.1.2. Sporadically, quantitative data taken from the corpora are used to support empirical claims concerning demNAs. The examples in this chapter are not always taken literally from the corpus, but are often constructed on the basis of examples in my data. When the examples are taken from the corpus literally, the references are given.

In section 3.1.2 I shall examine the relevance of the defNA-demNA dichotomy. In section 3.1.3 I shall define the three interpretations of the defNA-demNA variation which are dealt with: the *minimal* interpretation (section 3.2), the *identificational* interpretation (section 3.3) and the *maximal* interpretation of the defNA-demNA dichotomy (section 3.4). In section 3.5 conclusions are drawn with regard to the processing of demNAs and with regard to the theory of markedness of referential expressions.

### 3.1.2 The relevance of the defNA-demNA substitution

An important starting point in the demNA-analysis is the fact that a demNA is first of all considered to be a variant of a defNA, rather than of a (demonstrative) pronoun. This starting point is *prima facie* obvious in view of the fact that both types of anaphors share an important characteristic, i.e., their lexical content. That is the reason why the linguistic tradition captures both anaphoric types under the same heading, i.e., that of

definite nominal anaphors.

A strong indication for the similarity between demNAs and defNAs can be found in the fact that by far the most occurrences of demNAs can be replaced by their corresponding defNA-variant without causing serious referential problems.<sup>2</sup>

Further support for the similarity between demNAs and defNAs is found in the fact that they are the only types of anaphoric expressions the substitution of which never results in ungrammaticality, given the fact that simple substitution of the determiner can never result in structural changes, and hence in violations of structural restrictions on anaphors.

Starting from a standard classification of anaphoric expressions (zero-pronoun, reflexive pronoun, pronoun, demonstrative pronoun, definite NP, demonstrative NP), the pair *definite NP & demonstrative NP* proves to be the only pair of anaphoric expressions for which no example can be constructed in which the replacement of one by the other leads to syntactic ungrammaticality. For all other pairs, such an example can be found, as can be seen in the examples (1) to (3), in which certain anaphoric pairs are substituted each time.

In (1) the replacement of an NA by a pronoun or demonstrative pronoun leads to ungrammaticality, whereas the replacement of the defNA by a demNA leads to unacceptability at the most:

- (1)      Bij de overname      {*van het bedrijf<sub>i</sub>*  
                                       ?*van dat bedrijf<sub>i</sub>*  
                                       \**ervan<sub>i</sub>*  
                                       \**daarvan<sub>i</sub>*  
                                       \**hiervan<sub>i</sub>*},  
          heeft de uitgeverij *Kluwer<sub>i</sub>* beloofd dat er geen  
          arbeidsplaatsen op de tocht zouden komen staan.

*In the takeover of {the enterprise  
                                   that enterprise  
                                   it  
                                   that  
                                   this},*

*the Kluwer publishing company promised no jobs would be lost.*

Example (2) shows that ungrammaticality is caused by the replacement of a zero pronoun by a pronoun, a demonstrative



pronoun, a definite NA and a demonstrative NA respectively. In (3) and (4), the same is done for all types replacing a reflexive anaphor and a pronoun respectively. Note that the ungrammaticality judgment in (4) is caused by a surface word order phenomenon:

- (2) *Jan<sub>i</sub> denkt* {*0<sub>i</sub>* *te komen.*  
                           *\*hij<sub>i</sub>*  
                           *\*die<sub>i</sub>*  
                           *\*de jongen<sub>i</sub>*  
                           *\*die jongen<sub>i</sub>}*
- John thinks* {*0* *to come.*  
                           *he*  
                           *this*  
                           *the boy*  
                           *this boy}*
- (3) *Jan<sub>i</sub> kon* {*zich<sub>i</sub>* *niet meer herinneren wie*  
   *hij net gezien had.*  
                           *\*hem<sub>i</sub>*  
                           *\*die<sub>i</sub>*  
                           *\*de man<sub>i</sub>*  
                           *\*die man<sub>i</sub>}*
- John couldn't* {*himself* *remember any more who he had seen.*  
                           *him*  
                           *this*  
                           *the man*  
                           *that man}*
- (4) *Gisteren kocht Marie het pakje<sub>i</sub> voor Jan.*  
       *Zij geeft* {*het<sub>i</sub>* *hem vandaag.*  
                           *\*dat<sub>i</sub>*  
                           *\*het pakje<sub>i</sub>*  
                           *\*dat pakje<sub>i</sub>}*
- Yesterday, Mary bought the present for John.*  
       *She'll give* {*it* *him today*  
                           *that*  
                           *the present*  
                           *that present}*

It is clear from these examples that the replacement of demNAs by defNAs does not affect the syntactic environment, so that this substitution can and will in fact be used as a reliable analytical instrument for the evaluation of differences in function, effect and

adequacy of demNAs vs. defNAs. A number of problems arising with the substitution of other types of anaphors are excluded (such as the difference in length between for example a pronominal and a nominal NP, which often affects acceptability judgments drastically.)

The privileged relationship I assume between demNAs and defNAs does not mean that the relationship between defNAs and demNAs on the one hand and other types of anaphoric expressions on the other is abandoned in this study. In the discussion of the various proposals in sections 3.2 and 3.3 relationships with other referential expressions are looked at as well. But the variation between defNAs and demNAs will turn out to provide the best perspective for a justification of the functions of demNAs in written discourse.

### 3.1.3 Three interpretations of the defNA-demNA variation

For the justification of the defNA-demNA variation in written texts I shall start from three views, each of which contains different predictions on the function and the behaviour of defNAs and demNAs in texts, i.e., the minimal, the identificational and the maximal interpretation of the defNA-demNA variation. In the *minimal* view demNAs are a kind of free, stylistic variation of defNAs. This position implies that the alternation between demNAs and defNAs in texts is theoretically uninteresting, and that functionally it is no more than the result of a superficial preference.

In the second interpretation, a demNA is an anaphorically stronger variant of a defNA, i.e., it is conceived of as an *identificational* device motivating the reader to look harder, in a different way or elsewhere for the referent concerned. The deictic character of demNAs is responsible for this identificational interpretation. In view of the restriction to written contexts, the term *deictic* here is taken in its *anaphoric* sense. Following Bühler, it refers to the occurrence in certain anaphoric elements of "*a deictic moment and, to be sure, a pointing to something which is not to be sought for and encountered at places in the space of perception but at places in the whole of discourse*" (Bühler 1982:20).

The *maximal* interpretation puts a systematic functional

difference at the basis of the defNA-demNA variation: with regard to the development of the text, defNA- and demNA-occurrences function differently. This chapter will provide evidence for a maximal interpretation of the defNA-demNA variation. In general, the function of demNAs will be characterised as a semantic modification of the discourse referent accessed by the NP involved. This modification is caused by the fact that the demonstrative determiner activates a non-default interpretation of the NP concerned.

### 3.2 The minimal interpretation of defNA-demNA

The minimal interpretation of the defNA-demNA variation regards demNAs in all cases as free - at the most as stylistically marked - variants of defNAs. This explanation is also given to other variations of anaphoric expressions. Cornish (1986b:26), for instance, accounts for the variation between pronominal and nominal anaphors in certain discourse circumstances as "*typical of a certain journalistic style used to create variety and hence sustain the reader's interest (namely, so-called 'elegant variation')*".

The fact that the variation between demNAs and defNAs is rarely looked upon as relevant in the literature on anaphors (with a few exceptions, such as Hawkins 1978, Ariel 1988 and Corblin 1987) can be seen as lending indirect support to this interpretation. In many classifications of anaphors, both demNAs and defNAs are simply classified as nominal anaphors, to which - as a whole - certain functional, pragmatic or semantic differences with other anaphoric types can be attributed, without mention of the difference between demNAs and defNAs.

This minimal interpretation is applicable, for instance, to Cornish's survey of *semantically defined anaphoric relations* (1986b:19-31) and Halliday & Hasan's survey of *reiteration relations* (1976:274-292), in which defNAs and demNAs are introduced as examples, the difference between them however never being paid any attention to.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless the replacement of the demNA by a defNA is free in none of the cases. Hirst (1981:24-26) does not mention the defNA-demNA variation either. Finally, in Lakoff's *anaphoric hierarchy* (1976:295) and in Givón's *coding scale of topic accessibility* (1983:17), both types co-occur in the class of *definite* or *full* NPs.



The interpretation of demNAs and defNAs as stylistic variants of each other seems justified in the light of examples such as the following, which often occur in discourse:

- (5) In de Verenigde Staten is gisteren *een kliniek*<sub>i</sub> geopend waar walvissen kunnen worden behandeld. {*De / deze / die*} *kliniek*<sub>i</sub> is een unicum in de wereld.

*Yesterday, in the United States a hospital was opened where whales can be treated. {The / this / that} hospital is unique in the world.*

- (6) De wereld is verdeeld in *werelddelen*<sub>i</sub>. {*De / deze / die*} *werelddelen*<sub>i</sub> zijn verdeeld in landen.

*The world is divided into continents. {The / these / those} continents are divided into countries.*

- (7) Gisteren is *de eerste informatie*<sub>i</sub> over *de ramp met de PanAm Boeing*<sub>j</sub> vrijgegeven. {*De / deze / die*} *informatie*<sub>i</sub> levert nog geen volledig beeld op van {*de / deze / die*} *ramp*<sub>j</sub>.

*Yesterday, the first information about the PanAm Boeing disaster was released. {The / this / that} information does not yet give a complete picture of {the / this / that} disaster.*

In these cases the substitution seems to be free; this means that it does not lead to ungrammaticality, nor to unacceptability or to another referential value. The difference seems to be based on a preference dependent on the genre of text or on the author's strategy or style.

The minimal interpretation however runs into two serious problems. Firstly, it does not really explain the facts: it says that there is a free variation, which however is subject to a certain preference. It does not explain how this preference can be determined, what its theoretical status is and how it could be integrated, for example, in the pragmatic component of language description, if it is clear that language description has to cope with this kind of little nuances and preferences as well.

In addition to this, the free variation interpretation involves an empirical problem. It forces us to interpret all demNAs and defNAs as free - or at the most as weak-pragmatic - variants of each other. This however is untenable in the light of examples

such as the following:

- (8) When *the washing machine*<sub>i</sub> first came on the market, {*this* / *?the*} [*my addition (A.M.)*] *fantastic and truly revolutionary aid for the housewife*<sub>i</sub> was available only to very few. (Bosch 1983:150)

- (9) *Bush*<sub>i</sub> heeft besloten om de belasting dan toch te verhogen. {*De* / *?deze*} *president*<sub>i</sub> deelde dat mee tijdens zijn wekelijkse perspraatje.

*Bush has decided to raise taxes after all. (The / this) president announced this during his weekly talk with the press.*

- (10) *Bush*<sub>i</sub> heeft besloten om de taxes dan toch te verhogen. {*De* / *deze*} *president*<sub>i</sub> denkt daarmee het Amerikaanse volk te redden.

*Bush has decided to raise taxes after all. (The / this) president thinks he can save the American people that way.*

- (11) *Bush*<sub>i</sub> heeft besloten om de taxes dan toch te verhogen. Het is de eerste keer dat {*de* / *deze*} *president*<sub>i</sub> een verhoging aandurft.

*Bush has decided to raise taxes after all. It is the first time (the / this) president has dared to do so.*

- (12) De Londense Times maakt vanochtend stukken bekend uit *het overheidsrapport over de salmonella-besmetting van de Britse eieren*<sub>i</sub>. {*Het* / *dit*} *vertrouwelijke rapport*<sub>i</sub> ...

*This morning, the London Times publishes extracts from the government report on the salmonella infection in British eggs. (The / this) confidential report ...*

- (13) Jan rijdt graag met *zijn fiets*<sub>i</sub>. {*Het* / *dat* / *dit*} *voertuig*<sub>i</sub> ligt hem na aan het hart.

*John likes to ride his bicycle. (The / that / this) vehicle is close to his heart.*

- (14) Gewetensbezwaarden beroepen zich vaak op *de Wet Gewetensbezwaren Militaire Dienst*<sub>i</sub>. Volgens {*deze* / *de*} *wet*<sub>i</sub> hoeft niemand echt in militaire dienst.

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*Conscientious objectors often appeal to the Conscientious Objectors to Military Service Act. According to [this / the] act nobody can be forced to do national service.*

A position of free variation does not enable us to account for the differences in adequacy and interpretation between the demNA-as opposed to the defNA-versions. In these examples three types can be distinguished:

- Type 1 - examples (8), (9)  
the replacement of a defNA by a demNA or vice versa leads to a difference in adequacy
- Type 2 - examples (10), (11) and (12)  
the replacement of a defNA by a demNA effects semantic nuances with regard to the discourse referent concerned.
- Type 3 - examples (13) and (14)  
the replacement leads to other referential possibilities for the NP concerned.

### 3.3 The identificational interpretation of defNA-demNA

#### 3.3.1 Introduction

In the literature on reference, the intuitive difference in identificational value between defNAs and demNAs has been treated in various - and often unclear - ways. I shall try to bring some order into this matter by looking upon the identificational value of defNAs and demNAs successively as a *difference in anaphoric value* (section 3.3.2) and as a *difference in markedness and focal value* (section 3.3.3). The proposals in this section all start from the same perspective on the difference between defNAs and demNAs: a demNA has to be interpreted as a 'stronger' identificational device than a defNA.

#### 3.3.2 The difference in anaphoric value

The difference between defNAs and demNAs in certain proposals is conceived of as a difference in anaphoric value, the difference being that the presence of a deictic element in demNAs is responsible for a greater anaphoric strength, i.e., a stronger stimulus to look for an antecedent in the given context.



A detailed analysis of the anaphoric function of demNAs and defNAs is given by Hawkins 1978. Hawkins does not confine himself to anaphoric NPs, nor to written context. Consequently, many uses of definite NPs which he distinguishes are irrelevant for our variation. Hawkins considers the uses of demonstrative NPs to be a reduction of the possible uses of definite NPs. Demonstrative NPs can only occur in two of the seven uses of definite NPs, i.e., in the *visible situation use* and in the *strict anaphoric use* (Hawkins 1978:149).

Hawkins clarifies the difference between the anaphoric function of defNAs and that of demNAs by indicating for both types of expressions what the speaker actually does when he uses such an expression. By using a defNA, the speaker, among other things, does the following:

*He instructs the hearer .. to pick out an object satisfying the descriptive predicate from within the set of objects which he has talked about with the hearer. He selects a descriptive predicate which will achieve uniqueness of the reference (with singular count nouns) within the relevant set, i.e., there must exist no other objects within this set of which the predicate holds. (1978:110)*

*The definite article merely tells the hearer that the object referred to is a member of one of these shared sets, and instructs him to find the right set and relate the object to it. (1978:154)*

Thus, the anaphoric use of a defNA is congruent with the general quality of definite NPs, i.e., the quality to locate an object (or more precisely: the inclusion of all relevant objects) within a so-called *shared set* of objects.

By using a demNA the speaker does the following:

*He (a) introduces a referent (or referents) to the hearer; and (b) instructs the hearer to match this linguistic referent with some identifiable object, where identifiability means .. known on the basis of previous mention in discourse. (1978:152)*

So, the difference between defNAs and demNAs can be found in the difference between the *location-constraint* and the *matching-constraint*. DemNAs cause a *match* between two linguistic

expressions, on the basis of which an object can be identified. A defNA is an expression that should create the possibility to identify the object within the set of objects dealt with in the text. This difference has to be seen as a difference in anaphoric value: the matching quality of a demNA indicates that a demNA - much more so than a defNA - is referentially dependent on another linguistic expression, a quality which represents the strict interpretation of anaphoricity (see the interpretation of NAs in section 1.3).

A similar interpretation can be found in Corblin 1983. Corblin looks for an explanation for the difference in acceptability between *le* and *ce* in *la reprise immédiate*, i.e., the direct re-mention of an indefinite NP, as in (15) and (16):

- (15) Tu verras un garçon et une fille. Tu dois donner une poupée à la (?cette) fille et une voiture au (?à ce) garçon. (Corblin 1983:125)

*You are going to see a boy and a girl. You have to give a doll to the (?this) girl and a car to the (?this) boy.*

- (16) Une femme entra dans la pièce. J'avais vu cette (?la) femme chez un ami. (1983:125)

*In the play a woman came on. I had seen this (?the) woman at a friend's place.*

To Corblin, these examples illustrate the so-called "*paradoxe de la reprise immédiate*". The essence of this paradox is that in (15) the demNA is not natural although there is a reason for using a stronger identificational device: in the preceding sentence two NPs were introduced. In (16) a demNA is acceptable but a defNA is not, even though only one NP is introduced in the first sentence. Corblin explains this paradox by putting different search procedures at the basis of defNAs and demNAs:

*Un sujet ne dira 'le' impossible dans la reprise immédiate d'indéfini que s'il se trouve mis dans l'incapacité de trouver dans le contexte (antérieur, interposé ou immédiatement postérieur) un SN offrant matière à contraste de domaine à domaines. (Corblin 1983:131)*

*A subject can only have the determiner 'le', used after*



*an indefinite antecedent, if in the context it can find an NP which makes a contrast between domains possible.*

*Pour que (le démonstratif) paraisse naturel, il est nécessaire que le contexte postérieur maintienne explicitement à 'ce N' sa valeur de contraste interne au domaine lexical N. (Corblin 1983:133)*

*In order for a demonstrative to be natural, it is necessary for the subsequent context to assign to 'that N' its quality of internal contrast within the lexical domain of N.*

What is essential in this difference is that the acceptability of defNAs depends on the presence in the text (or, as Corblin puts it "*dans la mémoire du texte*") of at least one other NP, which has installed a lexical domain with which defNAs can be contrasted ("*contraste de domaine à domaine*"). This is the case in (15). A demNA, on the other hand, only has to do with a contrast that is domain-internal, i.e., a contrast within the domain of one introduced lexical element. Applied to (16), the domain-internal contrast is the contrast between the woman in question and other elements denoted by the lexical item *woman*. Just as in Hawkins' location-constraint, the contrast between different domains implies a choice between various objects; on the other hand, the "*contraste interne au domaine lexical N*" implies the limitation of the interpretation of demNAs to one contextually present object.

So far the account of Corblin, like that of Hawkins, implies an anaphoric difference between defNAs and demNAs. Corblin, however, adds an important element: he makes it clear that a demNA implies more than simple matching. The demNA-characterisation in terms of a contrast within the domain of a lexical item fits in with the interpretation underlying one class of use of demNAs that I distinguish, i.e., the *classify*-interpretation (see section 3.4.2). The problem, however, is that this interpretation can by no means be assigned to all demNAs.

Finally, an anaphoric characterisation of the difference between definite and demonstrative NPs can also be found in Hartmann 1982. He formulates a difference between definite and demonstrative NPs in terms of *deictic space* and *basic reference point*. He discerns this difference in a systematic variation between two uses and phonetic realisation forms of the definite determiner in the German dialect of Mönchengladbach, a definite



use and a demonstrative one. He puts it as follows: demonstrative *der* 'the' necessarily requires an interpretation within the deictic space of the text, definite *der* 'the' does not. Put differently: demonstrative and definite *der* 'the' have different basic reference points. In the case of demonstrative *der* 'the', this necessarily is the non-verbal or verbal context, in the case of definite *der* 'the' that is not necessarily the case: there, the basic reference point can be provided by presupposed contexts, differing from text to text, in which the definite identifying NP has an unambiguous or uniquely identifying value that can be distinguished by reader and writer.

Although anaphorically inspired concepts like matching domain, internal contrast or basic reference point of the text no doubt tend to capture important and sound intuitions with regard to defNAs and demNAs, not all the differences in adequacy in (9)-(14) nor the various demNA-interpretations in section 3.4 can be characterised by means of these concepts.

### 3.3.3 The difference in markedness and focal value

In the literature demonstratives are regarded as typical representatives of marked referential expressions. These are expressions which are used - generally speaking - to identify elements which in the given discourse circumstances are difficult to identify. On the basis of the demonstrative determiner, demNAs rather than defNAs can be looked upon as marked expressions.

An important question is under which conditions marked referential expressions have to be used. To this question, answers of different import are given in the literature on anaphors. Firstly, answers are given merely in descriptive terms, i.e., by describing the referentially problematic text circumstances in which marked referential expressions are necessary to guarantee the identification. Secondly, answers can be given in more technical terms in terms of a focus component functioning in a certain way when texts are being processed, on the basis of which the markedness of referential expressions can be explained and predicted. In the following, I shall discuss the following three answers:

- (i) marked referential expressions are used to access a

- discourse referent which is a member of so-called 'competing candidates' (section 3.3.3.1)
- (ii) marked referential expressions are used to access a discourse referent which has a low degree of accessibility (section 3.3.3.2)
  - (iii) marked referential expressions are used to access a discourse referent with a low focal value or position or which is out of focus (section 3.3.3.3).

### 3.3.3.1 DefNA-demNA and competing candidates

Marked referential expressions can be used to access the intended referent in situations in which referents are contrasted, i.e., among members of competing candidates. This is certainly true for various marked pronominal anaphors, like demonstratives or stressed personal pronouns. In Linde 1979, for example, in which the use of *it* and *that* is investigated in apartment descriptions, it appears that in contrast situations the deictic *that* is used, rather than *it*, for example, when the apartment is contrasted with another apartment (1979:351).

This is clearly not the case with demNAs. In contrast situations a demNA is inadequate or redundant, which can be seen as paradoxical, at least from an identificational point of view. It is impossible to think of any written discourse context in which demNAs - better than other marked anaphoric NPs - can occur in contrast situation. In each case the contrast situation can be handled better by one of the following marked anaphoric devices:

- either by a pronominal anaphor, as in (17)
- (17) a. *The man<sub>i</sub> had a row with his girlfriend<sub>j</sub>, because SHE<sub>j</sub> wanted to go on to another pub and HE<sub>i</sub> didn't feel like it any more. (Bosch 1988:224)*
  - b. *The man<sub>i</sub> had a row with his girl friend<sub>j</sub>, because ?this girl friend<sub>j</sub> wanted to go on to another pub and ?that man<sub>i</sub> didn't feel like it any more.*
- or by a demonstrative pronoun, as in (18)
- (18) a. *Ik heb eerst met Vanslagmulders gebeld en daarna met Vanderveiren<sub>i</sub>. Deze<sub>i</sub> vertelde me dat hij .....*
  - b. *Ik heb eerst met Vanslagmulders gebeld en daarna*

met Vanderveiren<sub>i</sub>. ?Deze man<sub>i</sub> vertelde me dat hij .....

*First I gave Vanslagmulders a ring and then Vanderveiren. {This / this man} told me that he .....*

- or by an alternative definite nominal anaphor, as in (19)

- (19) a. Ik zag gisteren mijn vriend Jozef met zijn dwergpoedel<sub>i</sub>. De hond<sub>i</sub> bleek uitstekend in vorm te zijn.  
 b. Ik zag gisteren mijn vriend Jozef met zijn dwergpoedel<sub>i</sub>. ?Deze hond<sub>i</sub> bleek uitstekend in vorm te zijn.

*Yesterday, I saw my friend Jozef with his pygmy poodle. {The / this} dog turned out to be in great shape.*

- or by a repeated definite NA, as in (20)

- (20) a. Het gerecht houdt er over de verdwijning van Van den Boeynants twee hypotheses<sub>i</sub> op na: ontvoering of georchestreerde vlucht. De ene hypothese<sub>i</sub> is waarschijnlijker dan de andere (hypothese)<sub>j</sub>.  
 b. Het gerecht houdt er over de verdwijning van Van den Boeynants twee hypotheses<sub>i</sub> op na: ontvoering of georchestreerde vlucht. {?Die / ?deze} ene (hypothese)<sub>i</sub> is waarschijnlijker dan {?die / ?deze} andere (hypothese)<sub>j</sub>.

*The court have two hypotheses about the disappearance of Van den Boeynants: kidnapping or orchestrated flight. The one hypothesis is more probable than the other (hypothesis).*

Of course the b-examples are not necessarily inadequate. Still, they are less adequate than the a-versions, provided we take them as identificationally stronger variants of the a-versions, which are already identificationally marked.<sup>4</sup>

Finally, the fact that demNAs are not typical selecting devices in contrast situations certainly does not mean that they never occur in such situations. In (21), for example, the demNA clearly has a selecting function. Crucial for the adequacy of the demNA in this context is the inanimate character of the discourse referent concerned, a feature we shall encounter below as a factor favouring demNAs.



- (21) De meeste vluchtelingen uit *Boeroendi* komen in *Tsjaad*, terecht. *Dat land*<sub>i</sub> kan ze lang niet allemaal aan.

*Most of the refugees from Burundi end up in Chad. That country cannot cope with all these people.*

### 3.3.3.2 DefNA-demNA and accessibility

As was mentioned in section 1.2.1, the notion of accessibility of discourse referents is often used in recent research on reference to explain the form of referential expressions in texts. Based on the notion of accessibility it can be predicted that demNAs - as marked referential expressions - are used to access referents with a low degree of accessibility. Low accessibility can be due to various discourse factors. A factor taken as a major criterion for the accessibility of referents is the *distance* between antecedent and anaphor.

The analysis in Linde (1979:351) shows, for instance, that the marked demonstrative pronoun *that* is more distant from its antecedent than the unmarked definite pronoun *it*. More antecedents of *that*-forms than of *it*-forms are located in previous "discourse nodes".

For the defNA-demNA variation this correlation does not hold, however. In my own corpus, it appears that in the majority of the demNA-occurrences, the antecedent is one sentence back and within the same text segment (see table (3) in chapter 4). Given the fact that intrasentential NAs are infrequent, one sentence back is the smallest referential distance possible.

The inapplicability of the correlation between defNA-demNA and high-low accessibility becomes obvious from the analyses in Ariel 1988 as well. In a corpus of four texts - each containing 2200 words - she reveals that on average a demNA stands closer to its antecedent than a defNA. In her scheme in which anaphoric expressions are classified as high-, mid- or low-accessibility markers, the difference between defNAs and demNAs is expressed as follows:

- (i) DemNAs are mid-accessibility markers. Evidence for this is provided by the observation that most demNAs find their antecedents in the preceding sentence; in other words, demNAs rarely access discourse referents which

- have already been mentioned in the same sentence or discourse referents which are remote.
- (ii) DefNAs are low-accessibility markers. Within the class of low-accessibility markers, two subclasses have to be distinguished, i.e., proper names and definite descriptions: definite descriptions occur significantly more frequently with their antecedents in previous-sentence position, while proper names occur more often with their antecedents in the most distant position, namely in the previous paragraph.

Linking the defNA-demNA variation to different degrees of accessibility - as Ariel does - is problematic from our point of view. A major problem is that the descriptive difference between defNAs and demNAs is restricted to a difference in distance between antecedent and anaphor. The fact that such a criterion is too rough to determine the accessibility was already observed by Ariel herself (1988:69); yet, distance is the only criterion in her classification. Such a criterion is not meant to nor appropriate to distinguish between various contextual types of definite and demonstrative NAs. A qualitative typology of possible differences between defNAs and demNAs can never result from such an analysis, it can only yield tendencies or *central uses* (1988:76) of the types of referential expressions.

Furthermore, Ariel's characterisation of the notion of *mid-accessibility* indicates the inconvenience with which demNAs are interpreted identificationally. For Ariel, mid-accessibility is a characteristic of discourse referents which can be accessed by demNAs. DemNAs are expressions which are generally co-referential with an antecedent in the preceding sentence. This is the only characterisation which can be found of the notion of mid-accessibility. Low and high accessibility, on the other hand, are accounted for in a better way: Ariel (1988:80) indicates a plausible relationship between referents with a low degree of accessibility and long term memory on the one hand and highly accessible referents and short term memory on the other, which makes the dichotomy psychologically plausible and which at the same time weakens the psychological plausibility of the intermediary notion of mid-accessibility.

The final problem with the accessibility-view of defNAs and demNAs is that it does not apply to the many highly focal nominal anaphors in written discourse which not only access a



discourse referent but which also provide information on that referent (see chapter 2).

### 3.3.3.3 DefNA-demNA and focus

In various proposals marked referential expressions are characterised in terms of focal value, which in fact differs terminologically rather than conceptually from the accessibility view above. Focal value can be seen as a functional notion indicating the efforts a writer expects or a reader makes to access a certain referent. Focal value can be translated theoretically in terms of a focus component defined and functioning in a certain way in the representation a reader builds up of a text (Garrod & Sanford 1982, Bosch 1988, Sidner 1983, Grosz & Sidner 1986, Pinkal 1986). In this section I discuss different focus conceptions in which the defNA-demNA dichotomy is linked to differences in focal value.

The notion focal value is the basis for the distinction between the *anaphoric* and the *deictic* procedure which Ehlich (1979; 1982; 1983) attributes to anaphoric and deictic expressions respectively, i.e., also to defNAs and demNAs respectively. These procedures are to be looked upon as unmarked and marked linguistic devices respectively, directing the attention of the listener. The fundamental difference is that the first procedure should be conceived of as an instruction *to sustain the focus of attention, whereas the second should be conceived of as an instruction to alter his focus of attention* (Ehlich 1982:331) - for a similar vision see also Linde (1979:347), Cornish (1986b:153) and Lyons (1977:673). The distinction between the two procedures is not further elaborated upon; Ehlich gives no indication of how the procedures can be *predicted* on the basis of characteristics of the context in which the referential expressions occur.

A plausible relationship between markedness of referential expressions and differences in focus representation can be found in Garrod & Sanford 1982. They distinguish between two focus components: explicit focus and implicit focus. These two focus representations, can be regarded as collections of discourse referents which change during text processing. The implicit and explicit focus are presented as two registers within the *focussed memory*, which gives the distinction a psychological basis. Intuitively, the difference is justified on the basis of the



observation that, at a given moment in the discourse, certain referents are very easily accessible and others are less easily accessible. Empirically the dichotomy between implicit and explicit focus can be found in the distinction between marked and unmarked referential expressions. Garrod & Sanford link the distinction between marked and unmarked expressions to types of forms of referential expressions, i.e., the difference between pronouns (which can only access discourse referents that are in explicit focus) and full NPs (which can access referents that are in implicit focus as well), a correlation which is further refined in Bosch 1988:

*...we shall concentrate on the distinction between Explicit and Implicit Focus, and shall begin with the contention that full definite noun phrases (FDNP) and pronouns can be viewed as triggers to implement searches of memory, and that they differ in the partitions they address. (Garrod & Sanford 1982:27)*

The question now is whether the defNA-demNA variation can be based on a difference in focal value or representation, as is expressed above. The most plausible application consists in correlating defNAs with unmarkedness and demNAs with markedness. A correspondence like this, however, is based on an absolute correspondence between types of use (marked vs. unmarked) and types of form (pronouns vs. full NP, defNAs vs. demNAs etc.).<sup>5</sup> Yet, such a correspondence is untenable. With regard to anaphors vs. deixis in general the untenability is stated by Fillmore:

*A reason for needing to be clear about the distinction between the forms and the uses to which they can be put is the need to recognise cases in which elements which are prototypically deictic may also have non-deictic uses as well as cases in which basically non-deictically functioning elements can be used deictically. (1982:35-6)*

In Linde 1979 the untenability of such a *strong* or *absolute* correspondence appears from the fact that *it* and *that* are mainly, but not exclusively used in their typically unmarked and marked functions respectively. Against Ehlich's identity relation between anaphoric and deictic procedures (types of use) and anaphoric and deictic expressions (types of form) many examples of deictically used personal (not-demonstrative) pronouns can be put forward

(see Bosch 1983, Akmaijan & Jackendoff 1970). A strong correspondence between implicit-focus referents and full NPs on the one hand, and between explicit-focus referents and pronouns on the other is untenable in the light of the following two facts. Firstly, many full NPs (especially daNAs) access discourse referents which are in explicit focus. Secondly, there is the fact that pronouns can occasionally access *implicit focus referents*, as is shown in the following example:

- (22) Mark just got married. *She's* in the office next door.  
(Bosch 1988:210-212).

So, between demNA-defNA and marked-unmarked an *absolute* or *strong* correspondence between types of form and types of use is untenable. Nevertheless, a weak correspondence between marked and demNAs and between unmarked and defNAs can be justified since it is reasonable to assert that every demNA is marked, if only by the presence of a demonstrative element combined with the presence of a lexical content. A weak correspondence like this is also justifiable with regard to other types of referential expressions, such as accentuated and demonstrative pronouns for example.

The question then is whether this markedness can be interpreted in terms of focal value. I restrict this question to the question whether the markedness of a demNA corresponds to the meaning attached to focality by Ehlich and Garrod & Sanford. An answer to this can only be given if we go more deeply into the interpretation of Ehlich's and Garrod & Sanford's dichotomies.

Although Garrod & Sanford's and Ehlich's interpretations of the notion of focus differ from one another, they both look upon it in relation with referents which have to be accessed in locations indicating a certain degree of accessibility. The focal location (i.e., inside the focus of attention or the explicit focus) contains elements which have recently been mentioned in the discourse and which are accessible by a pronoun (though Ehlich also shows other ways to bring elements into focus). Ehlich's non-focal location (i.e., outside the focus of attention) contains elements which need the 'pointing force' of deictic expressions to get them back into focus, to (re)introduce them into focus. Garrod & Sanford's non-focal location (i.e., implicit focus) contains scenario-bound referents, representations of elements that are not explicitly mentioned in the text, as in (23):



- (23) Mary packed *the picnic supplies*. *The beer* was warm.

Applying Ehlich's and Garrod & Sanford's dichotomies to the defNA-demNA variation causes problems. Firstly, the defNA-demNA dichotomy cannot be reconciled with Garrod & Sanford's interpretation of explicit-implicit focus (referents). The difference between anaphoric NPs and scenario-related NPs is not analogous to the difference between defNAs and demNAs. DemNAs are unable to access typical scenario-related referents, no matter how much contextual help is offered:

- (24) I entered the restaurant. *{The / ?this} waiter* came up to me.<sup>6</sup>
- (25) John read a book about Schubert and wrote to *{the / ?this} author*. (Heim 1982:371)

Moreover, demNAs often occur when discourse referents are accessed which are not explicitly mentioned, but which are contextually predictable, as in (26) and (27):

- (26) *In 1989 zijn twee keer zoveel AIDS-gevallen gesignaleerd als in 1988<sub>i</sub>. {Dit feit<sub>i</sub> / Deze toename<sub>j</sub>} is verontrustend.*

*In 1989 twice as many AIDS-cases were signalled than in 1988. {This fact / this increase} is alarming.*

- (27) *Het gerecht denkt Van den Boeynants nooit meer terug te zien<sub>i</sub>. Dit vermoeden<sub>i</sub> wordt elke dag sterker.*

*The court think Van den Boeynants will never be seen again. This supposition is getting stronger every day.*

Secondly, the application of the defNA-demNA variation to Ehlich's dichotomy leads to the following remarkable conclusion: if demNAs possessed the quality to access referents *outside the focus of attention*, then they would have the same value as that which is regularly assigned to defNAs in the literature: it is well known that full-NP anaphors, especially literally repeated anaphors, are often used to access remote referents. This is proved by analyses of the distance between full NPs and their antecedents, see e.g. Ariel 1988, Givón 1983, Clancy (1980:174), Fox (1984:200). Also for Garrod & Sanford 1982 full NP is the *marked* referential expression, as opposed to pronouns.



If defNAs already possess this marked identificational function, why then would demNAs fulfill that function as well; it would be against the principle of markedness if demNAs were the marked variant in similar circumstances as defNAs.

### 3.4 The maximal interpretation of defNA-demNA

#### 3.4.1 The MOD-Proposal

We are inclined to think of demNAs as being referential expressions which are marked by default. However, identificationally inspired views on markedness prove unable to give an explanation for the behaviour of demNAs. The decisive factor here is the empirical evidence that demNAs generally are realisations of discourse referents which are highly focal, whatever definition is given to focus. This can be seen in the examples (5)-(7) and (8)-(14). With the identificational interpretation it is impossible for us to account for the role of the lexical content of demNAs with regard to the development of the text. Just like daNAs in chapter 2, demNAs do not just access established discourse referents, they also produce a kind of progress in the text. Accordingly, accounting for the function of demNAs primarily means accounting for their text developmental function. In order to do so, I put forward a proposal in which the markedness of a demNA with respect to the underlying discourse referent is interpreted as follows:

#### *The Markedness of DemNA (MOD)-Proposal*

The markedness of a demNA in written context effects a modification in the semantic representation of a highly accessible discourse referent by activating a non-default interpretation of the NP involved.

In this proposal, a demNA no longer exclusively enables us to access a 'same-number' DREF, it is also a signal to modify the representation of the referent in a certain way. This proposal is first of all based on the observation that demNAs predominantly find their antecedent in the immediate context.<sup>7</sup> Secondly, the proposal is supported by the observation that the co-referential link between anaphor and antecedent is self-evident, due to a combination of discourse position, contextual and factual information (see the analyses in chapter 4).

In the proposal the demonstrative is regarded as a signal not to assign a default interpretation to the anaphoric NP, i.e., - as we will see below - generally a purely *identify*-interpretation of the NP, but to activate a non-default interpretation based on the nature of the lexical content of the anaphoric NP. This activation then is a signal to modify the semantic representation of the referent concerned. The claim underlying the MOD-proposal, which states that the lexical content of demNAs is essential in the interpretation of the markedness of demNAs, in fact fits in with Bosch 1988, where this claim is made for marked NPs in general (see further section 3.5.2).

In the following sections different modificational types of demNAs are distinguished. Each of these modificational types will be described in terms of a coherence relation contained within an incremented discourse referent representation, i.e., the coherence relations *classify*, *attribute*, *contextualise* and *evaluate*. In the analysis of the different demNA-types I shall focus the larger part of my attention on the detection and interaction of contextual factors which determine (non-)default interpretations of demNAs.

### 3.4.2 Classifying the referent

#### 3.4.2.1 *Classify*-demNAs

A first class of demNA-occurrences causes an activation of the class of elements which the referent is a member of. Examples are (11) and (28):

- (11) *Bush<sub>i</sub> heeft besloten om de taxes dan toch te verhogen. Het is de eerste keer dat {de / deze} president<sub>i</sub> een verhoging aandurft.*

*Bush has decided to raise taxes after all. It is the first time {the / this} president has dared to do so.*

- (28) *De mus<sub>i</sub> komt in onze lage landen in groten getale voor. {De / deze} vogel<sub>i</sub> behoeft geen speciale bescherming.*

*The sparrow is very common in our low countries. {The / this} bird doesn't need special protection.*

In terms of the MOD-proposal we can describe the function of the





The difference between the demNA and the defNA also manifests itself in a different distribution of stress: in the defNA-version both determiner and noun are unstressed<sup>1</sup>, while in the demNA-version at least the demonstrative determiner is stressed.

The modificational effect of *classify*-demNAs stem from one identificational characteristic of discourse referents, i.e., the identification as an *individual* element vs. a *class* element, in these examples the classes of *birds* and (US)-*presidents*. This however does not mean that the demonstrative causes a change in the identification number of the underlying DREF. It only means that a particular semantic class (i.e., presidents of the US or birds) is activated or linked to the representation of the referent. Thus, the modification can be looked upon as a modification of the semantic representation of the discourse referent involved.

This demNA-interpretation prototypically applies to a large class of NAs, consisting of *pragmatic* or *factual* superordinates as in (11) and *semantic* superordinates as in (28). The difference between these anaphors is based on the kind of knowledge that is required to make the connection with the antecedent NP. With the factual anaphors, pragmatic or factual knowledge is required: the relationship between *Bush* and *president* appeals to *generalised factual knowledge* (Seuren 1985:287). Semantic anaphors are identified on the basis of the systematic relations between items in the lexicon. They appeal to *generalised categorical knowledge* (Seuren 1985:285).

In view of our analysis, the difference between semantic and pragmatic superordinates is considered to be irrelevant. Analytically, it is not that difficult to make a text-independent distinction between semantic and pragmatic superordinates. Typical examples of both classes can easily be given. For instance, the class of birds simply produces semantic-superordinate NAs, the class of US-presidents produces pragmatic-superordinate NAs. With regard to the reader's processing and the knowledge status, however, such a classification is not very interesting for our purposes. The subdivision of birds may well be generalised categorical knowledge and the subdivision of US-presidents may well represent factual knowledge. However, in a particular context which contains the superordinate NA *bird* - co-referential with *yellow warbler* - or the NA *president* - co-referential with *Andrew*

*Jackson* - the knowledge that a yellow warbler is one element of the class of birds, or that Andrew Jackson is one of the US-presidents (1829-1837), a reader will have to deduce from the same information sources, i.e., from his experience as an amateur ornithologist or a historian and from cues in the context in which the superordinates occur, the most important of which is the high-accessibility status of the DREFs YELLOW WARBLER or ANDREW JACKSON.

The conclusion is that dividing superordinates into a pragmatic and a semantic subtype does not necessarily have to be interesting for the processing, the functioning and the contextual value of superordinate demNAs. However valid these two types are from an analytical point of view, the relevance of the distinction (supposing it could be made in all cases) for the processing of demNAs is at least unclear.

#### 3.4.2.2 Other 'identificational' modifications

Apart from *classify*-demNAs, which are based on the identificational characteristic *individual* vs. *class* element, occasionally, demNPs can be found which are based on the modification of other identificational dichotomies, such as *generic* - *non-generic*, *specific* - *non-specific* and *quantified* - *instantiated*. Not all of these demNP-occurrences can be said to be co-referential in the strict sense of the word. It is clear, however, that they modify an identificational value of a discourse referent, as *classify*-demNAs do. The following modifications can be distinguished.

##### *Generic vs. non-generic*

This type of identificational modification can be found in (13):

- (13) Jan rijdt graag met *zijn fiets*. [*Het / dat / dit*] voertuig, ligt hem na aan het hart.

*John likes to ride his bicycle. [The / that / this] vehicle is close to his heart.*

The same interpretation as in (11) and (28) can be attributed to this example. However, a more complicated view is possible as well. In the demonstrative version of (13) not only the interpretation *element from the class of vehicles* can be assigned



to the DREF BICYCLE, the demNA can also convert the *individual* referent (JOHN's BICYCLE) into a generic one (THE BICYCLE; THE PHENOMENON BICYCLE), as appears from the following continuation of (13) in which only the demNAs remain fairly adequate:

- (13a) Jan rijdt graag met *zijn fiets*<sub>i</sub>. {*Dat / dit / ?het*} voertuig<sub>i</sub>,  
ligt hem na aan het hart. Hij heeft er dan ook een tiental  
in zijn bezit.

*John likes to ride his bicycle. {The / that / this} vehicle is close to his heart. He owns about ten of them.*

In this case the demNA signals the DREF's transition from uniquely identified individual referent (JAN's BICYCLE) to generic referent (THE BICYCLE AS VEHICLE).

A similar modification can be found in (29):

- (29) Visitation in *October*<sub>i</sub> [October 1988 (A.M.)] was the highest for *that month*<sub>i</sub> in park history. (National Geographic, vol.175, nr 2, p. 273)

In the following two examples, the shift from individual element to generic element is still more striking: it is marked by a shift from singular to plural; in fact, it is not a definite NP, but a bare plural (*acrobats* and *boys*) that in these examples offers the most adequate substitution variant of the demonstrative version.

- (30) *Een trapezist van het circus van Moskou*<sub>i</sub> heeft gisteren voor het eerst een driedubbele salto op 12 meter boven de begane grond uitgevoerd. Dat bewijst nog maar eens dat {*deze / ?de*} *acrobaten*<sub>i</sub> met hun leven spelen. (See for a similar example Corblin 1987:7).

*Yesterday, a trapeze artist of the Moscow circus performed for the first time a triple somersault 12 meters above the ground. This proves once again that {these / the} acrobats are playing with their lives.*

- (31) There is a *boy*<sub>i</sub> climbing that tree. *Those boys*<sub>i</sub> are always getting into mischief. (Halliday & Hasan 1976:283)<sup>8</sup>

According to my NA-definition, the NPs in these examples can be regarded as NPs accessing a DREF with the same identification number. This means that in fact the same referent or topic is



continued in the text, although the semantic content of the discourse referent changes drastically. The demonstrative determiner is then used as a device to consider the NP involved as a continuation of a previous referent. The demonstrative activates a generic NP-interpretation and as such modifies the semantic extension of the discourse referent from individual element to generic element. The peculiarity of these examples, however, lies in the fact that the modification in fact results in a different extension of the world referents denoted by the NPs: not one element or individual is addressed, but a whole class.

### *Specific vs. non-specific*

In the following examples the identificational modification is even more subtle:

- (32) *De rijkste zakenman van Amerika<sub>i</sub> heeft een privé jet. {De / deze / die} man<sub>i</sub> hoeft zich om de dagelijkse dingen des levens geen zorgen te maken.*

*The richest business man in America owns a private jet. {The / this / that} man doesn't have to worry about the daily things of life.*

- (33) *De moordenaar van Smit<sub>i</sub> moet wel gek zijn. {De / deze / die} man<sub>i</sub> heeft al meer moorden gepleegd.*

*Smit's murderer must be insane. {The / this / that} man has committed more murders.*

These examples - variations on well known examples that illustrate the distinction between specific and non-specific NP-interpretation - have two possible readings. These readings differ depending on whether the co-referential NPs are interpreted specifically or non-specifically. In the former case the writer has the intention of referring to a specific and existing man. In the latter case he uses the NPs in their attributive reading (Donnellan 1971). Even though both defNA and demNA are possible in these two readings, there are slight differences between the different readings.

Without further contextual information the defNA-variants of the examples suggest by default an actual *existing* interpretation of the NPs concerned. The simple co-referential reading of defNAs, together with the nature of the predicative information on the referent, causes an interpretation of specific and existing referent.

DemNA-substitution can be seen as a signal to overrule this default and to activate an attributive *whoever-fits-the-description* interpretation. More so than the defNA the demNA counters the suggestion of a specific referent, created in the first sentence. This intuition is supported by (32a) and (33a): if the continuation of the context excludes a specific interpretation, then the demNA is the most adequate variant:

- (32a) *De rijkste zakenman van Amerika<sub>i</sub> heeft een privé jet. {Deze / die / ?de} man<sub>i</sub> hoeft zich om de dagelijkse dingen des levens geen zorgen te maken. Als Fortune morgen met zijn lijst anno 1991 komt, zullen we eindelijk weten wie het is.*

*The richest business man in America owns a private jet. {The / this / that} man doesn't have to worry about the daily things of life. If Fortune's list for 1991 is published tomorrow, we will know who he is.*

- (33a) *De moordenaar van Smit<sub>i</sub> moet wel gek zijn. {Die / deze / ?de} man<sub>i</sub> heeft al meer moorden gepleegd. Toch heeft de politie nog geen enkel spoor van hem<sub>i</sub>.*

*Smit's murderer must be insane. {The / this / that} man has committed more murders. Still, the police have found no trace of him yet.*

If on the other hand the context confirms an 'existing' interpretation, then a defNA is preferred:

- (32b) *De rijkste zakenman van Amerika<sub>i</sub> heeft een privé jet. {De / ?deze / ?die} man<sub>i</sub> hoeft zich om de dagelijkse dingen des levens geen zorgen te maken. In zijn<sub>i</sub> riante villa in Dallas heeft hij<sub>i</sub> gisteren een exorbitant feest gegeven.*

*The richest business man in America owns a private jet. {The / this / that} man doesn't have to worry about the daily things of life. In his spacious villa in Dallas, he threw an exorbitant party yesterday.*

- (33b) *De moordenaar van Smit<sub>i</sub> moet wel gek zijn. {De / ?deze / ?die} man<sub>i</sub> heeft al meer moorden gepleegd. Dat heeft hij<sub>i</sub> gisteren voor de televisie toegegeven.*

*Smit's murderer must be insane. {The / this / that} man has committed more murders. He admitted that yesterday on television.*

Nevertheless, the demonstrative determiner is a weak signal in these cases. Although no conclusive evidence can be provided by

means of such examples, the tendency is obvious: demNAs - because of their signal function - turn out to be in a better position than defNAs to overrule a contextually preferent NP-interpretation. In any case, it has become clear from examples like the preceding ones that the behaviour of demNAs is more complicated than is claimed by Maclaran (1980:812):

*Used anaphorically, though, a demonstrative description can either be specific or non-specific, depending on the antecedent.*

### *Quantified vs. instantiated*

DemNAs often have quantified antecedents. In that case demonstratives can signal a transition from universally or existentially quantified referent to instantiated referent, as in (34), (35) and (36):

- (34) In mei van *ieder jaar* ontvangt u een vakantie-uitkering over de toeslag en over de loondervingsuitkering. Eindigt uw uitkering eerder, dan ontvangt u bij de laatste uitbetaling ook de vakantie-uitkering over de toeslag in *dat jaar* (2:0155)

*In May each year you receive a holiday benefit on the extra allowance and on the compensation for loss of wages. If your unemployment benefit ends earlier, then with the last payment, you also receive the holiday allowance on the extra allowance in that year.*

- (35) Heeft u recht op een *toeslag*? Hoeveel bedraagt dan *deze toeslag*? (2:0129)

*Are you entitled to an extra allowance? If so, what will this extra allowance amount to?*

- (36) We can therefore associate with *each point<sub>i</sub>* near the earth a vector **g** which is the acceleration that a body would experience if it were released at *this point<sub>i</sub>*. (Sidner 1983:325)



## 3.4.2.3 Conclusion

The effect of the classifying demNAs described in this section can be summarised as follows. The demonstrative determiner activates a non-default interpretation of the NP: a class interpretation of the head noun is activated, and this interpretation effects a modification in the semantic representation of the referent involved, i.e., the class involved is linked to the referent representation. In the other cases other identificational values of the referent are modified.

Although the classifying value of demNAs turns out to be typical of superordinate demNAs, this does not mean that all superordinate demNAs necessarily and automatically bring about a classifying modification. If this were so, it would mean that lexical, text-independent types of nominal anaphors (i.e., in this case superordinates) and contextual types of use (i.e., in this case *classify*-NAs) would coincide, which is not at all predicted nor prescribed by the MOD-proposal.

Empirical evidence for the distinction between superordinates and *classify*-NAs can be found first of all in the fact that not all demNAs containing a superordinate noun automatically yield a *classify*-interpretation, as is clear from (37) for example, where such an interpretation is neither relevant nor appropriate.

- (37) Yesterday, *Bush<sub>i</sub>* delivered his second State of the Union. *{The / ?this} president<sub>i</sub>* repeated he would not increase taxes.

Further evidence is provided by the fact that demNAs with no superordinate relation with their antecedents can get a classifying interpretation. Corblin (1983:125) gives the following example in which a literal repetition gets a *classify*-reading:

- (38) *Un prince<sub>i</sub>*, s'ennuyait dans son chateau; ni la chasse ni la pêche ni la danse ne pouvaient *le<sub>i</sub>* distraire. *Le prince<sub>i</sub>*, était triste et s'ennuyait de plus belle. *Il<sub>i</sub>*, alla voir ses conseillers. *Ce prince<sub>i</sub>*, n'avait confiance en personne, et voilà comment il s'y prit pour avoir leur avis.

*There was a prince who was bored in his castle; neither hunting nor fishing amused him. The prince was sad and got bored even more. He went to see his advisors. This prince didn't trust anyone. And that's why he was eager to hear their advice.*

Although the antecedent-demNA type suggests a so-called contextualising interpretation (see section 3.4.4), the most plausible interpretation is the *classify*-interpretation, inducing inferences such as *although you wouldn't expect it from a prince or unlike other princes*.

Thus, although superordinate nouns are typical in this first modificational demNA-type, there is no automatic identity between *contextual* modificational types and *lexical* types of NAs (see the discussion in section 1.4).

### 3.4.3 Attributing information to the referent

Many nominal anaphors add attributive information concerning the referent, which was not yet contained in the antecedent. In fact this was already the case in the examples of the previous section. However, there is still a difference in informative load between the preceding examples and the following ones:

- (8) When *the washing machine<sub>i</sub>* first came on the market, *{this / ?the} [my addition (A.M.)] fantastic and truly revolutionary aid for the housewife<sub>i</sub>*, was available only to very few. (Bosch 1983:150)

- (39a) Gisteren kwam *een man<sub>i</sub>* om het leven tijdens werkzaamheden aan de Kanaaltunnel. *{De / ?deze / ?die} 36-jarige man<sub>i</sub>* werd verpletterd door een betonnen segment van de tunnel.

*Yesterday, a man died while working on the Chunnel. {The / this / that} 36-year-old man was smashed by a concrete segment of the tunnel.*

- (39b) Gisteren kwam *een man<sub>i</sub>* om het leven tijdens werkzaamheden aan de Kanaaltunnel. *{Deze / ?de} 36-jarige vroegere eigenaar van de gronden die nu voor de tunnel zijn onteigend<sub>i</sub>* werd verpletterd door een betonnen segment van de tunnel.

*Yesterday, a man died while working on the Chunnel. {This / the} 36-year-old former owner of the grounds which were expropriated for the Chunnel was smashed by a concrete segment of the tunnel.*

- (40) *Warme Avonden<sub>i</sub>* kan rustig het beginpunt van een nieuw toneelgenre in Vlaanderen genoemd worden. *Het NTG-*

*stuk<sub>i</sub>* is spetterend. Komt daar nog bij dat {*deze* / ?*de*} *dolle komedie<sub>i</sub>*, helemaal in Belgische handen is.

*Warme Avonden* can be considered to be the starting point of a new genre in Flanders. The NTG-play is fabulous. Add to this the fact that {*this* / *the*} roaring comedy is a Belgian production.

- (41) *Een Belgisch vliegtuig met hulpgoederen voor de Afgaanse hoofdstad Kaboel<sub>i</sub>*, is vanochtend niet kunnen vertrekken. {*De* / ?*Deze*} *Boeing 747<sub>i</sub>*, moest aan de grond blijven omdat de toestand in Kaboel te gespannen is.

*A Belgian aeroplane with relief goods for the Afghan capital of Kabul couldn't leave this morning. {The / this} Boeing 747 had to stay on the ground because the situation in Kabul is too tense.*

- (42) *Minister Elens<sub>i</sub>*, heeft een pleidooi gehouden om alle Zairese leiders op te knopen. Van {*deze* / ?*de*} *vrede-lievende man<sub>i</sub>*, kan ik moeilijk aannemen dat hij dergelijke dingen meent.

*Minister Elens made a plea to string up all Zaïre leaders. I can hardly accept that {this / the} peace-loving man means what he says.*

- (43) Yesterday, a *Swiss banker<sub>i</sub>*, was arrested at Heathrow Airport. {*The* / ?*this*} [*my addition (A.M.)*] *53-year-old bachelor<sub>i</sub>*, declared that he had come to Britain to kidnap the queen. (Seuren 1985:33)

A proposal for the defNA-demNA variation in this type of nominal anaphors which deserves to be mentioned here is that by Bosch (1983:147-150). By way of a *reasonable guess* Bosch puts the necessary though not sufficient condition at the basis of defNAs that they must not ascribe any properties to their referent that are not already regarded as familiar. DemNAs on the other hand can - but not necessarily have to - ascribe new properties to their referents. Example (8) is introduced as an illustration of that condition.

If we can label the content of each nominal anaphor as either familiar or non-familiar information (and that is what such dichotomies were invented for, after all), this would mean that every defNA could be replaced by a demNA. Indeed, a demNA can contain either familiar or non-familiar information; a defNA can contain only familiar information.



There are three reasons why such a familiarity-view is not tenable. Firstly, there are examples - such as (39a), (41) and (43) - where the demonstrative variant is not acceptable although the NP contains information which may not be considered familiar. Secondly, there are examples - such as (8), (39b) and (40) - where the definite version is not acceptable. In these cases, however, the NP-information cannot just be designated as new. In (39b), the NP-information represents a remarkable coincidence in the given context. In (8) and (40) the information concerned can be characterised as evaluative information, expressing a viewpoint of the writer. This can be deduced, for instance from the fact that the demNA concerned can be followed by a parenthetical sentence in which this evaluative quality is made explicit:

- (8a) *When the washing machine<sub>i</sub> first came on the market, this fantastic and truly revolutionary aid for the housewife<sub>i</sub> - as it surely is - was available only to very few.*
- (40a) *Warme Avonden<sub>i</sub> kan rustig het beginpunt van een nieuw toneelgenre in Vlaanderen genoemd worden. Het NTG-stuk<sub>i</sub> is spetterend. Komt daar nog bij dat deze dolle komedie<sub>i</sub> - want zo zou je het toch kunnen noemen - helemaal in Belgische handen is.*

*'Warme Avonden' can be considered to be the starting point of a new genre in Flanders. The NTG-play is fabulous. Add to this the fact that this roaring comedy - for that is what you might call it - is a Belgian production.*

Thirdly, the dichotomy between familiar and new information does not shed light on examples in which both defNA and demNA are possible, as in (12):

- (12) *De Londense Times maakt vanochtend stukken bekend uit het overheidsrapport over de salmonella-besmetting van de Britse eieren<sub>i</sub>. (Het / dit) vertrouwelijke rapport<sub>i</sub> ...*

*This morning, the London Times publishes extracts from the government report on the salmonella infection in British eggs. (The / This) confidential report ...*

Both defNA- and demNA-versions are quite appropriate irrespective of the question whether the *confidentiality* of the report has to be regarded as known or as unknown.

Thus, the defNA-demNA distinction does not coincide with the familiar-new distinction. Rather, the difference between defNAs and demNAs intuitively has to be taken as a difference in prominence of the lexical content of the anaphoric NP, i.e., the importance the writer attaches to the information concerned. In the examples (39a), (41) and (43) the information has to be interpreted as non-prominent information or as information which cannot be related directly to the state of affairs expressed in the main proposition. In these cases demNAs would suggest prominence which could not be reconciled with the intention structure underlying the text: the anaphoric-NP information in these examples cannot but have marginal, non-central importance. In (12) the information - in view of the context - can be given both prominence and non-prominence status.

The prominence of the information can be expressed linguistically as a difference in predicative value: demNA-occurrences have a predicative reading; defNA-occurrences only have a referential reading. The difference can also be described in terms of the dichotomy between the referential and the attributive use of definite descriptions (Donnellan 1971). At first sight both defNAs and demNAs are used in the referential mode - since an essential condition of demNAs and defNAs is the same-number characteristic of their underlying referent. Still, they are not fully and exclusively referential by nature: given the high-accessibility status of the DREF concerned, the attributive information about the referent concerned is not necessary for an unambiguous identification of the referent. This information can even be extremely unsuitable when it is looked upon as information meant for an unambiguous identification of the referent, as in (8) for example, where the attributive information could equally well apply to irons, kitchen robots, etc. Thus, given the nature of the lexical content, defNAs and demNAs can also be interpreted as attributive. In view of this ambiguity, the difference between defNAs and demNAs can be regarded as a difference in accentuation between the two uses: the defNA-version accentuates the referential use; the demNA-version the attributive one.

Finally, in my framework, the difference between defNAs and demNAs can be expressed in terms of *implicit coherence relations*, i.e., as a difference between an *identify*-relation for defNAs and an *attribute*-relation for demNAs. For (12), for example, (12a) underlies the defNA-version and (12b) the demNA-version:



(12a) *defNA-representation*

REPORT<sup>n</sup> <--- CONFIDENTIAL REPORT<sup>n</sup>  
 (identify)  
 (the confidential report is the report in question.)

(12b) *demNA-representation*

REPORT<sup>n</sup> <--- CONFIDENTIAL REPORT<sup>n</sup>  
 (attribute)  
 (the report is confidential.)

There is enough empirical evidence for an *attribute*-interpretation of these demNAs:

- (i) In the first place there is the fact that the demNA-occurrences - but not or hardly the defNA-occurrences - can be paraphrased as in (42a) - see also (8a) and (40a):

- (42a) *Minister Elens*<sub>i</sub> heeft een vurig pleidooi gehouden om alle Zaïrese leiders op te knopen. Van *deze vredelievende man*<sub>i</sub> - want dat is hij toch - kan ik moeilijk aannemen dat hij dergelijke dingen meent.

*Minister Elens made a plea to string up all Zaïre leaders. I can hardly accept that this peace-loving man - for surely that's what he is - means what he says.*

Just like the demonstrative, such an addition emphasises the predicate underlying these NPs (*Minister Elens is a peace-loving man*).

- (ii) The fact that in uniquely identifying descriptions only a defNA is acceptable provides further evidence for the *attribute*-character of demNAs. See (44) and (45), in which epithetical anaphoric NPs occur, the title *the attorney from Flémalle* and the nickname *the little one* respectively. In both examples an identificational *be*-sentence lies behind the anaphor (*Cools is the attorney of Flémalle*; *Eddy Planckaert is the little one*), not a predicative *be*-sentence (*Cools is an attorney of Flémalle*; *Eddy Planckaert is a little one*). In (45), the nickname interpretation is stressed by the use of quotes:

- (44) In de Waalse regering heeft *Cools*<sub>i</sub> gisteren de strijd



aangebonden met zijn politieke tegenstanders. {*De / ?deze*} meester van Flémalle<sub>i</sub>, zoals hij in het Luikse wordt genoemd, had duidelijk gezworen eens en voor altijd met de Happartisten in zijn federatie af te rekenen. (Knack)

*In the Walloon government, Cools took issue with his political enemies yesterday. {The / this} attorney from Flémalle, as he is called in the region of Liege, had obviously sworn to get rid of Happart's companions once and for all.*

- (45) <Title: *Eddy Planckaert wint Parijs-Roubaix 1990*>  
 Je kon zo zien dat de brede glimlach die *Eddy Planckaert*<sub>i</sub> op zijn gezicht probeerde te toveren niet echt was. Hij was bang. "Bauer of ik? Ik weet het niet. Ik heb gespurt met mijn ogen toe." Broer-ploegleider Walter probeert met een washandje het gezicht van "{*de / ?deze / ?die*} kleine"<sub>i</sub> weer wat menselijker te maken. (De Morgen 9-4-1990)

<Title: *Eddy Planckaert wins Paris-Roubaix 1990*>  
*You could see that the bright smile on Eddy Planckaert's face wasn't real. He was afraid. "Bauer or me? I don't know. I sprinted with my eyes closed." His brother and team manager Walter tried to make the face of "{the / this / that} little one"<sub>i</sub> a little bit more human.*

- (iii) Attributive demNAs can only contain *non-restrictive* relative sentences, never *restrictive* ones, cf. (46):
- (46) Gisteren is er in de Antwerpse diamantwijk weer een man<sub>i</sub> vermoord. {*Deze man, die vorige week politiebescherming had gevraagd*<sub>i</sub> / *?deze man die vorige week politiebescherming had gevraagd*<sub>i</sub>} werd opgewacht in zijn garage.

*Yesterday, a man was killed in the Antwerp diamond district. This man(,) who had asked for police protection last week was shot in his garage.*

- (iv) Further evidence for the *attribute*-character of demNAs comes from the fact that demNAs are not adequate in identificational *be*-sentences such as (47), and that they cannot occur in identificational appositions, like the one in (48).

- (47) Jan is {*de / ?deze*} moordenaar

*John is {the / this} murderer*

- (48) We brengen als eerste een gedeelte van het dagboek van *Inti Peredo*, {de / ?deze} man die het *guerilla-werk* van *Che Guevara* overnam. (3:0505)

*We are the first to bring you a fragment from the diary of Inti Peredo, {the / this} man who took over the guerrilla-struggle from Che Guevara.*

However, this argument has to be handled with caution because structurally the NPs concerned are not anaphoric. It remains remarkable, though, that demNAs in these positions become much more acceptable when more than just identificational information is involved, as in (49), (50) and (51):

- (49) *Jan is nog altijd die onverbeterlijke leugenaar van vroeger.*

*John is still that hopeless liar he always was.*

- (50) Wij brengen u het integrale werk van *de onlangs overleden zanger Roy Orbison*, *deze onovertroffen meester van het melancholische lied.*

*We present you the complete work of Roy Orbison, this absolute master of melancholy.*

- (51) *Nasser is dood, die bevrijder en vader des vaderlands die ondanks alles toch 'links' dacht.* (3:1502)

*Nasser is dead, that liberator and pater patriae who in spite of everything had left-wing views.*

- (v) A final indication for the *attribute*-character of this demNA-type can be found in example (52) and in the following variants of (8) and (40):

- (52) Nadat in 1970 *het non-proliferatieverdrag (over de verspreiding van kernwapens)*, is ontworpen, hebben 141 landen *dit belangrijkste wapenbeheersingsverdrag*, ondertekend. (Knack, 29-8-1990)

*After the non-proliferation treaty (concerning the distribution of nuclear weapons) was drawn up in 1970, 141 countries have signed this most important arms control treaty.*

- (8b) When *the washing machine*<sub>i</sub> first came on the market, *this most fantastic and revolutionary aid for the housewife ever since*<sub>i</sub> was available only to very few.
- (40b) *Warme Avonden*<sub>i</sub> kan rustig het beginpunt van een nieuw toneelgenre in Vlaanderen genoemd worden. *Het NTG-stuk*<sub>i</sub> is spetterend. Komt daar nog bij dat *dit eerste vijfrollenstuk dat het NTG ooit op het programma heeft gezet*<sub>i</sub> helemaal in Belgische handen is.

*Warme Avonden can be considered to be the starting point of a new genre in Flanders. The NTG-play is fabulous. Add to this the fact that this first five character play that the NTG has ever staged is a Belgian production.*

In an identificational interpretation of these demNAs there would be a clear reason for predicting unacceptability, since the demNAs combine a *matching* determiner and a unique NP content, caused by the superlative - a combination which is ruled out, for example, in Maclaran (1980:809), Lyons 1977 and Hawkins 1978. In Maclaran's point of view (1980:813) an example like (40b) must be unacceptable, because the demNA involved is what she calls semantically specific: this means that the intrinsic meaning of the demNA is able to determine one specific referent. Examples such as (52) and (40b) also prove that not every demNA needs to be intrinsically ambiguous, as Löbner claims. He assumes that the use of a demonstrative in demNAs evokes alternatives of the same kind (1985:322), an assumption which cannot be upheld if the NP contains a superlative.

The *attribute*-character of these demNAs fits in with the MOD-proposal, in that the demonstrative determiner is a signal to interpret the lexical content of the NP not in the referential default, but in the attributing non-default. The question then arises under what conditions an attributive NP is by default identifying (and thus appears as a defNA), and under what conditions an attributing non-default is or can be activated by means of a demNA. The first question is answered in section 2.3.3.4, where the adequacy of the lexical load of defNAs is subjected to two pragmatic conditions, the *condition of centrality* and the *condition of relevance* respectively, which are repeated here. These conditions are applicable to the implicit coherence relations within the incremented DREF, underlying demNAs.



*The Condition of Centrality* as applied to implicit coherence relations underlying daNAs:

Implicit coherence relations should not be the specification of central text (segment) intentions.

*The Condition of Relevance* as applied to implicit coherence relations underlying daNAs:

Implicit coherence relations should be related in a relevant way to the intention of the text (segment) concerned.

In view of the defNA-demNA variation and the MOD-proposal, these conditions can be interpreted as follows: by default, a defNA has a simple *identify*-interpretation when its lexical content fulfills the two conditions. The effect of a demNA is that it activates a non-default interpretation. This means that demNA-replacement can have two effects. In the first place it can assign a more central place in the text to the NP-information concerned because of the relaxation of the centrality condition. In these cases, the demNA increases the prominence of the information. Note that demNAs of this type remain unacceptable when in the given text setting the NP-information concerned does not allow a central position, as is the case in (39a), (41) and (43). In the second place, it can smuggle less relevant information into the text, because of the relaxation of the relevance condition (see also Bosch 1983:150). This is the case for instance in (53), in which the demonstrative variant is not perfect but at any rate better than the definite version. The demNA produces a kind of 'aside', the equivalent of a parenthetical sentence:

- (53) *Anatoli Karpov<sub>i</sub> has been operated on. One day after the operation, {(?)This / ?the} stamp collector<sub>i</sub>'s medical condition is satisfactory.*

Furthermore, it goes for all 'informational' demNAs that they are often represented more elegantly in an explicit form. Although the demNA is more adequate in (39b) than in (39a), (39b) is clearly a stylistically less successful version than (39c) in which the information concerned is realised explicitly, (for the stilistics of nominal anaphors see Maes 1988b):

- (39a) *Gisteren kwam een man<sub>i</sub> om het leven tijdens*

werkzaamheden aan de Kanaaltunnel. {*De* / ?*deze* / ?*die*} 36-jarige *man*<sub>i</sub> werd verpletterd door een betonnen segment van de tunnel.

*Yesterday, a man died while working on the Chunnel. {The / this / that} 36-year-old man was smashed by a concrete segment of the tunnel.*

- (39b) Gisteren kwam een *man*<sub>i</sub> om het leven tijdens werkzaamheden aan de Kanaaltunnel. {*Deze* / ?*de*} 36-jarige vroegere eigenaar van de gronden die nu voor de tunnel zijn onteigend<sub>i</sub> werd verpletterd door een betonnen segment van de tunnel.

*Yesterday, a man died while working on the Chunnel. {This / the} 36-year-old former owner of the grounds which were expropriated for the Chunnel was smashed by a concrete segment of the tunnel.*

- (39c) Gisteren kwam een *man*<sub>i</sub> om het leven tijdens werkzaamheden aan de Kanaaltunnel. *De* 36-jarige *man*<sub>i</sub> werd verpletterd door een betonnen segment van de tunnel. Het toeval wil dat de man de vroegere eigenaar was van de gronden die voor de tunnel werden onteigend.

*Yesterday, a man died while working on the Chunnel. The 36-year-old man was smashed by a concrete segment of the tunnel. The man happened to be the former owner of the grounds which were expropriated for the Chunnel.*

In sum, attributive demNAs fit in with the MOD-proposal: the demonstrative determiner overrules a simple *identify*-reading of the NP involved and activates an attributive non-default. This activation results in a modification of the underlying representation of the referent: the demonstrative is a signal to complement the DREF with the attributive information contained in the demonstrative NP.

The *attribute*-interpretation is predominantly applicable to nominal anaphors with attributive pre- or postmodifiers, i.e., demNAs which contain an informational surplus compared to the antecedent NP.

### 3.4.4 Contextualising the referent

The most important test for the modificational character of demonstrative anaphoric NPs and for the MOD-proposal is constituted by the great many nominal anaphors which are a literal or partial repetition of their antecedents:

- (5) In de Verenigde Staten is gisteren een kliniek geopend waar walvissen kunnen worden verpleegd<sub>i</sub>. {De / deze / die} kliniek<sub>i</sub> is een unicum in de wereld.

*Yesterday, a hospital was opened in the United States where whales can be treated. {The / this / that} hospital is unique in the world.*

- (6) De wereld is verdeeld in werelddelen<sub>i</sub>. {De / deze / die} werelddelen<sub>i</sub> zijn verdeeld in landen.

*The world is divided into continents. {The / these / those} continents are divided into countries.*

- (7) Gisteren is de eerste informatie over de ramp met de PanAm Boeing<sub>i</sub> vrijgegeven. {De / deze / die} informatie<sub>i</sub> levert nog geen volledig beeld op van {de / deze / die} ramp

*Yesterday, the first information about the PanAm Boeing disaster was released. {The / this / that} information does not yet give a complete picture on {the / this / that} disaster.*

- (14) Gewetensbezwaarden beroepen zich vaak op de Wet Gewetensbezwaren Militaire Dienst<sub>i</sub>. Volgens {deze / de} wet<sub>i</sub> hoeft niemand echt in militaire dienst.

*Conscientious objectors often appeal to the Conscientious Objectors to Military Service Act. According to {this / the} act nobody can be forced to do national service.*

- (54) In de grote steden neemt de luchtvervuiling<sub>i</sub> toe. {Die / deze / de} (lucht)vervuiling<sub>i</sub> is het gevolg van wanbeleid.

*In the big cities, air pollution is increasing. {This / that / the} (air) pollution is a result of bad policy.*

- (55) MEVRA organiseerde vorige week een cursus voor professionele zeilers<sub>i</sub>. {De / die / deze} cursus<sub>i</sub> duurde 5 dagen.



---

*Last week, MEVRA organised a course for professional sailors. (This / that / the) course took 5 days.*

At first sight, only 'weak' substitution pairs are involved here: the replacement of demNAs by defNAs seems to make little difference. The difference between defNAs and demNAs can be described intuitively as a suggestion of referential autonomy connected with the defNA-versions. This suggestion corresponds to the well-known quality of definite NPs in texts to refer autonomously to referents i.e., without the intervention of an antecedent. This is obvious in so-called scenario-related referents, as in (24) and (25). This *autonomy*-characteristic can be found in various forms in the literature on reference. Hawkins 1978 & 1984 and Corblin 1983 attribute the following characteristic to a definite NP: it must offer the possibility to make a choice within a relevant set of objects. A demonstrative NP, on the other hand, unambiguously indicates that an element doesn't have to be identified within a set of elements, but that it has to be matched with one particular element.

In Seuren (1985:31) definite NPs are said to have the possibility of *post hoc* or *backward suppletion*. This is the possibility for a definite NP to create a new referent, after it has been checked whether the NP cannot land on the address of another referent. This - again - means that definite NPs and also defNAs intrinsically have the quality of autonomous reference.

At first sight a characterisation in terms of referential autonomy seems naturally applicable to (partially) repeated demNAs and this characterisation seems to imply a purely identificational interpretation of the defNA-demNA variation, the demNA being regarded as a means to eliminate the non-co-referential interpretation of the defNA-version. However, in these examples, there are sufficient indications for the applicability of the crucial elements of the MOD-proposal, i.e., non-default activation and DREF-modification.

An important condition for the acceptability of (partially) repeated demNA-cases is - expressed intuitively - that there is a *difference between the intrinsic meaning of the lexical item in demNAs and their contextual interpretation*. The intrinsic lexical meaning of the NP is the (text-independent) representation readers have available in their mental lexicon of the items involved. The context interpretation is the semantic representation a reader builds up of the referent in the course of

the text. This difference can be inferred in a text from the presence of two kinds of contextual information. Firstly, there is the contextual information linked to the 'antecedent' N, i.e., the pre- and postmodifiers in the antecedent NPs - as in (5), (7), (14) and (55). In these cases, demNAs of the type *partial repetition* are involved. Secondly there is contextual information *not* contained in the antecedent NP, as the italicized part of (54), in which case demNAs of the type *literal repetitions* are involved:

- (54) *In de grote steden neemt de luchtvervuiling toe.* (Die / deze / de) (lucht)vervuiling is het gevolg van wanbeleid.

*In the big cities, air pollution is increasing.* (This / that / the) (air) pollution is a result of bad policy.

Thus, what is typical of these demNAs is the contextualising value, which - in terms of the MOD-proposal - can be described as a difference between the intrinsic meaning of the lexical item in the demNA and the contextually defined non-default interpretation of the anaphoric NP, activated by the demonstrative. This contextualising value is essential for the adequacy of this type of demNA, as appears from the examples (54a) and (54b):

- (54a) *In de grote steden neemt de luchtvervuiling<sub>i</sub> toe.* {?Deze / de} *toenemende luchtvervuiling in de grote steden<sub>i</sub>* is het gevolg van wanbeleid.

*In the big cities, air pollution is increasing.* (This / the) *increasing (air) pollution in the big cities is a result of bad policy.*

- (54b) <title: *De luchtvervuiling*>  
In de grote steden neemt {de / ?deze} *luchtvervuiling<sub>i</sub>* toe.

<title: *Air pollution*>  
*In the big cities, [the / this] air pollution is increasing.*

In (54a) the anaphoric NP contains the contextual information contained in the proposition of the antecedent sentence. In this example there is no difference between the intrinsic meaning and the contextual interpretation of the demonstrative NP since the lexical content of the demonstrative NP contains all the ingredients the DREF concerned contains in the representation. Thus, the demonstrative cannot signal a contextual modification of the underlying DREF. Hence the demonstrative version is



unacceptable.

In (54b) the demonstrative version is unacceptable as well. This is partially due to the fact that demNAs are always difficult to link to text titles. Still, the demNA in (54b) in my opinion is less acceptable than in (54c):

- (54c) <title: *De luchtvervuiling in de grote steden*>  
(?) *Deze luchtvervuiling<sub>i</sub> is de laatste tijd een belangrijk aandachtspunt van de Vlaamse overheid.*

<title: *Air pollution in the big cities*>  
*This air pollution is an important issue for the Flemish government these days.*

The reason for the absolute unacceptability of (54b) is that the demNA there accesses a DREF which at that point of the text does not allow contextual modification yet, as the context has not yet provided any information about the referent. Therefore the effect of contextualisation cannot occur.

The difference between intrinsic meaning and context interpretation is a necessary condition for the acceptability of this type of demNA, but it is not a sufficient one. This is evident from an example like (54d):

- (54d) *In de grote steden neemt de luchtvervuiling<sub>i</sub> toe. Die luchtvervuiling<sub>i</sub> is het gevolg van gemeentelijk wanbeleid. ?Die luchtvervuiling<sub>i</sub> vereist dringende maatregelen. ??Die luchtvervuiling<sub>i</sub> ...*

*In the big cities, air pollution is increasing. This air pollution is a result of bad policy. This air pollution calls for urgent measures. This air pollution ...*

In each of the successive sentences contextual information on *air pollution* is given. The contextualising function of demNAs, as we have described it so far, would predict that in each of these successive sentences the demonstrative could have a contextualising effect. In (54d) gradually more contextual information is given on *air pollution* which leads to a gradual extension of the distance between the intrinsic semantic meaning of the lexical items concerned (*air pollution*) and the context interpretation as is represented in the underlying DREF. Evidently the prediction is not confirmed, however. As (54d)



progresses, the demonstrative becomes less acceptable.

An explanation for this phenomenon can be found in the fact that in the preceding examples only one specific type of information is contextualised, i.e., the information that is necessary for a satisfactory identification of the referent in the given text setting. Mostly this is antecedent-NP information, but it can also be other context information, such as the locative PP in (54). And in all these cases the contextualising value of the demNA coincides with the installation of a referent as highest focal element or topic in the text. This is evident from the following empirical characteristics of these demNAs.

- (i) They turn out to occur preferably in *post-first-mention position*, i.e., the second time the referent is mentioned in the discourse, as is apparent in my own demNA-data (see chapter 4).<sup>9</sup>
  - (ii) They are preferably used with so-called *non-animate referents*. Such referents - in contrast to proper nouns for instance - are harder to conceptualise and install as a referent in one referential expression. With *animate referents* a contextualising demNA is only adequate after an indefinite first mention, as appears from (56) and (57):
- (56) Yesterday, I saw a *man<sub>i</sub>* at the station. {*That / this / the*} *man<sub>i</sub>* looked ill.
- (57) *De paus<sub>i</sub>* heeft gisteren drie bisschoppen ontslagen. ?*Deze paus<sub>i</sub>* (i.e., de gisteren drie bisschoppen ontslagen hebbende paus) heeft dat vanochtend in een perscommuniqué meegedeeld.

*Yesterday, the pope dismissed three bishops. This pope (i.e., the 'yesterday three bishops dismissed having' pope) announced this this morning in a press release.*

The inadequacy of the contextualising reading of the demNA in (57) results from the fact that the contextual information in the antecedent sentence does not form part of relevant identificational information concerning the referent.

These descriptive features indicate that the contextualising value in these cases serves the installation of a referent, which often

may be hard to conceptualise, as highest focal referent.<sup>10</sup> This does not imply, however, that contextualisation and referent installation are identical or that they necessarily coincide. For a clear distinction between them, an indication can be found in the demNA-occurrences in which contextualisation does not co-occur with referent installation. Examples are (58), (59), (60) and (61):

- (58) *PSV<sub>i</sub> is de laatste weken in zeer slechte doen. {PSV<sub>i</sub> / Dit PSV<sub>i</sub> (i.e., het PSV-in-slechte-doen,)} is voor K.V.Mechelen dan ook geen partij.*

*PSV has been playing very badly these last few weeks. As a result {PSV / this PSV (i.e., the PSV playing badly)} is no match for K.V.Mechelen.*

- (59) *Ronald Reagan<sub>i</sub> heeft duidelijk last van geheugenstoornis. {Reagan<sub>i</sub> / Deze Reagan<sub>i</sub> (i.e., de Reagan-met-geheugenstoornis,)} zou geen belangrijke beslissingen meer mogen nemen.*

*Ronald Reagan is clearly suffering from memory disturbance. {Reagan / this Reagan (i.e., the 'Reagan suffering from memory disturbance')} should no longer be allowed to take important decisions.*

- (60) *De VVD<sub>i</sub> is vorige week zwaar uit de bocht gegaan. Als lid vraag ik me op zo'n moment af of ik wel goed zit bij die VVD<sub>i</sub>.*

*Last week, the VVD put their foot in it. As a member of this party I ask myself at moments like that whether that VVD really is my party.*

- (61) *De trainer van Anderlecht<sub>i</sub> heeft geen verstand van voetbaltechniek. De spelers van Anderlecht<sub>j</sub> hebben nauwelijks conditie. Het is onwaarschijnlijk dat {deze / die} traineri met {deze / die} spelers<sub>j</sub> in de eerste klasse overeind kan blijven.*

*The coach of Anderlecht doesn't know anything about the technical side of football. The Anderlecht players are in bad shape. It is unlikely that {this / that} coach with {this / that} team will be able to remain in the first league.*

In all these demNA-cases the contextualising MOD-interpretation is forced: the only reading applicable here is the one in which the demNA refers to the referent as it is presented in the preceding context, and not in its default interpretation. In the examples (58), (59) and (60) the anaphor is a repetition of a proper noun,

i.e., a referential type, which guarantees referential autonomy and unique identification, and which does not allow any demonstrative determiners (and no definite ones either). Still, the demonstrative version is acceptable, at least in its contextualising interpretation.

Moreover, the anaphoric NPs in these examples do not necessarily have to be in post-first-mention position. The examples can be preceded by many sentences in which NPs access the same referent, without the contextualising effect disappearing. Furthermore, (61) shows that the demNA can contextualise different referents in a sentence, exactly because the installation of the highest focal referent is not at issue here.

With this characterisation of contextualising demNAs Corblin's *paradoxe de la reprise immédiate* (see section 3.3.2), expressed in (15) and (16), disappears.

- (15) Tu verras un garçon et une fille. Tu dois donner une poupée à la (?cette) fille et une voiture au (?à ce) garçon. (Corblin 1983:125)

*You are going to see a boy and a girl. You have to give a doll to the (this/that) girl and a car to the (this/that) boy.*

- (16) Une femme entra dans la pièce. J'avais vu cette (?la) femme chez un ami. (1983:125)

*In the play a woman came on. I had seen this/that (the) woman at a friend's place.*

Both cases have to be situated in the context of referent introduction, given the indefinite first mention (cf. also Corblin 1983:131). The demNA in (16) fits in perfectly with the contextualising interpretation of demNAs. The contextual interpretation *la femme-qui-entra-dans-la-pièce* lies at the basis of the demNA. This contextualising value serves the installation of this discourse referent. Such an interpretation is not possible in (15). Firstly, two referents are involved here and they cannot possibly both be installed as highest focal referent. Besides, other referents than these two are potential candidates for highest focal referent, i.e., DOLL, CAR. Furthermore, contextualisation without referent installation, as in (61), is not under discussion in this context, given the indefinite first mentions. Hence the demonstrative version of (15) is inadequate.



The examples (58), (59) and (60) show that the default interpretation of a particular anaphoric NP need not necessarily be determined by the intrinsic meaning of the noun, as is the case in the other examples in this section, but can also be imposed by the type of referential expression (in this case the proper name character) of the anaphoric NP.

Other examples illustrate that the default interpretation of an NP can be based upon the interpretation an NP has in nearly all text settings - as in the examples (62) and (14) - or upon the interpretation a noun has in a certain scenario - as in (63):

- (62) *Het dochtertje van Jan, het zonnetje in zijn leven<sub>i</sub>, is overleden. {Dit / ?het} zonnetje<sub>i</sub> scheen van 's ochtends tot 's avonds.*

*John's daughter, the sun of his life, has died. {This / the} sun shone all day.*

- (14) *Gewetensbezwaarden beroepen zich vaak op de Wet Gewetensbezwaren Militaire Dienst. Volgens {deze / ?de} wet<sub>i</sub> hoeft niemand echt in militaire dienst.*

*Conscientious objectors often appeal to the Conscientious Objectors to Military Service Act. According to {this / the} act nobody can be forced to do national service.*

- (63) *Maria was verliefd geworden op een dokter<sub>i</sub>. {Deze / ?de} dokter (van Maria)<sub>i</sub> was een charmante man. (For a similar example, see Corblin 1987:153)*

*Mary had fallen in love with a doctor. {This / the} doctor was a charming man.*

Here, the contextualising effect can be described as the activation of a context specific interpretation in contrast to the default role these NPs play in the large majority of contexts.

In summary, contextualising demNAs activate a non-default interpretation of the anaphoric NP: the demonstrative is a signal not to assign a default interpretation to the anaphoric NP (based on intrinsic semantic meaning of the noun, referential type or default context interpretation) but to activate a non-default interpretation provided by certain contextual information in the antecedent-sentence.

As in the previous demNA-types, the non-default activation also causes a semantic modification of the referent representation. The demonstrative explicitly induces the assimilation of certain representational information of the discourse representation of the antecedent sentence into the DREF underlying the demNA, i.e., it induces a contextualising modification of the underlying DREF. The effect of the demNA in (54), for example, is as follows: the representational information IN THE BIG CITIES in the discourse representation of the antecedent sentence is explicitly linked to the DREF underlying the demNA, i.e., AIR POLLUTION, as identificationally relevant information, and thus modifies the representation of the referent. Congruent with the other demNA-types, this modification is looked upon as an implicit coherence relation within the DREF, underlying the demNA, yielding the following for (54):

- (54) In de grote steden neemt de luchtvervuiling<sub>i</sub> toe. {Die / deze / de} (lucht)vervuiling<sub>i</sub> is het gevolg van wanbeleid.

*In the big cities, air pollution is increasing. {This / that / the} (air) pollution is a result of bad policy.*

- (54e) *defNA-representation*

AIR POLLUTION<sup>n</sup> <--- AIR POLLUTION<sup>n</sup>  
(identify)  
(the air pollution is the air pollution in question)

- (54f) *demNA-representation*

AIR POLLUTION<sup>n</sup> <--- AIR POLLUTION IN THE  
BIG CITIES<sup>n</sup>  
(contextualise)  
(the air pollution is the air pollution in the big cities just mentioned)

For an example like (6) the *contextualise*-modification means that representational information included in the DREF WORLD in the representation of sentence 1, is included as identificationally relevant information in the DREF CONTINENTS in the representation of sentence 2:

- (6) De wereld is verdeeld in werelddelen<sub>i</sub>. {Deze / die} werelddelen (waarin de wereld is verdeeld)<sub>i</sub> zijn verdeeld

in landen.

*The world is divided into continents. [These / those] continents (in which the world is divided) are divided into countries.*

### 3.4.5 Evaluating the referent

The three preceding demNA-types find their stereotypical form in three formal-lexical classes of nominal anaphors, i.e., superordinate NAs (section 3.4.2), attributive alternative NAs (section 3.4.3) and (partial-)repetition NAs (section 3.4.4). Apart from that, demNA-substitution can also signal an evaluation of the referent concerned. Such an evaluation can be illustrated in (10):

- (10) *Bush<sub>i</sub>* heeft besloten om de taxes dan toch te verhogen.  
{*De / deze / die*} *president<sub>i</sub>* denkt daarmee het  
Amerikaanse volk te redden.

*Bush has decided to raise taxes after all. (The / this / that) president thinks he can save the American people that way.*

The normal interpretation of the defNA-variant is the simple *identify*-relation. The demonstrative version causes a *classify*-interpretation. Moreover, the demonstrative can lead to an evaluation of the referent, as can be seen in the following explicit version:

- (10a) *Bush<sub>i</sub>* heeft besloten om de taxes dan toch te verhogen.  
{Deze / die} zogenaamde 'president'<sub>i</sub> denkt daarmee het  
Amerikaanse volk te redden.

*Bush has decided to raise taxes after all. (This / that) so-called president thinks he can save the American people that way.*

In terms of implicit coherence relations the difference can be presented as follows:

- (10b) *defNA-representation*

BUSH<sup>n</sup> <--- PRESIDENT<sup>n</sup>  
(identify)  
(*Bush is the president in question.*)



(10c) *demNA-representation*BUSH<sup>n</sup> <--- NOT A PRESIDENT<sup>n</sup>

(classify --&gt; evaluate)

*(Bush is the 'so-called' president; Bush doesn't deserve to be rated among the presidents.)*

A similar effect can be found in (64), as is shown in the difference between *defNA-representation* (64a) and *demNA-representation* (64b):

(64) <*Pamflet Liberale partij (PVV) Zandhoven*>

Het hoofdthema van het CVP-programma bij de afgelopen verkiezingen was *de sanering van de gemeentefinanciën*. {Deze / de} *sanering*, heeft dit jaar een meerschuld opgeleverd van 45 miljoen. Bedankt CVP.

<*Pamphlet liberal party (PVV) Zandhoven*>

*The main theme of the CVP-programme [i.e., the catholic party (A.M.)] in the last elections was the reorganisation of the village finances. [This / the] reorganisation has saddled us with a debt of 45 million this year. Thank you CVP!*

(64a) *defNA-representation*REORG. VILL. FIN.<sup>n</sup> <-- REORGANISATION<sup>n</sup>

(identify)

*(the reorganisation is the reorganisation of the village finances.)*(64b) *demNA-representation*REORG. VILL. FIN.<sup>n</sup> <--- NOT A REORG.<sup>n</sup>

(contextualise --&gt; evaluate)

*(the reorganisation is the so-called reorganisation, i.e., no reorganisation at all.)*

The demonstratives in these examples effect a negative evaluation of the referent by the activation of a non-default interpretation, based on the negation of the lexical items used to access the referent (*this is not a president / reorganisation*).

Two context conditions are necessary for an *evaluate*-reading.<sup>11</sup> Firstly, as with the other *demNA*-types, the default reading of the definite NP has to be the simple co-referential *identify*-reading.

Secondly, there has to be some kind of conformity between semantic features of the anaphoric NP and descriptive features of the referent. It concerns here characteristics such as animate, human, male and other relations such as the *classify*-relation underlying the conformity between *Bush* and *president* in (10). Evidence for the significance of the second condition can be found in the behaviour of the class of epithets, which are typically characterised by their evaluative value (cf. e.g. Seuren 1985:348; Bosch 1983:149; Bolinger 1977:51-52; Droste 1977:182).

Although the intuitions are not always clear, evaluative epithets are more likely to be accompanied by a definite than by a demonstrative determiner, as is shown in (65).

- (65) When *Jones<sub>i</sub>* returned they ignored {*the* / *?this*} {*idiot<sub>i</sub>* / *bastard<sub>i</sub>* / *old goat<sub>i</sub>* / *pig<sub>i</sub>*}.

This does not mean that demNAs are absolutely unacceptable in these cases; it does mean, however, that demNAs are relatively less acceptable than defNAs, and at any rate that the demonstrative is not as necessary as an evaluative device as in cases like (10) and (64). This judgment is congruent with the fact that not only demonstrative epithets, but also accented epithets are unacceptable, as is shown by the accented counterpart of (65), given in Bosch (1988:213):

- (65) When *Jones<sub>i</sub>* returned they ignored *?(HIM<sub>i</sub> / the IDiot<sub>i</sub> / the BASTard<sub>i</sub> / the old GOAT<sub>i</sub> / the PIG<sub>i</sub>)*. [the capitalised syllables are accentuated (A.M.)]

This relative unacceptability of epithetic demNAs can be explained as follows. The lexical content of epithets has two characteristics: firstly, the features of the lexical items concerned are not congruent with descriptive features of the referent. For instance, the writer of (65) does not want to identify Jones with the semantic features of *old goat* (cf. also Bosch 1988:215). That is why the lexical content of the anaphoric NPs does not allow a simple co-referential link with the antecedent NP. Secondly, the lexical items belong to a text-independent class of *semi-stereotypical* lexical items with evaluative value with respect to human referents.

Both characteristics of epithetic NPs provide a default interpretation which is already evaluative in itself. This means

that there is no more need for a demonstrative to trigger an *evaluate*-interpretation.

Semantic conformity and simple *identify*-default are essential but by no means sufficient as conditions for the use of evaluative demNAs. Whether a demonstrative nominal anaphor has evaluative value in a certain context not only depends on this kind of textual factors, but also on the *attitudes underlying a text*, which are rather hard to formalise in the representation. They determine what lexicalisations of referents in what texts can be introduced as simple or as evaluative anaphors. I try to make this clear by means of (66):

(66a) <Press release of the human rights committee Nicaragua>  
*De Nicaraguaanse contra's*, hebben aangekondigd dat zij een wapenstilstand van twee maanden in acht zullen nemen. {Deze / ?de} *vrijheidsstrijders*, zullen daarna echter doorgaan met de strijd.

(66b) <Press release of the contra leaders>  
*De Nicaraguaanse contra's*, hebben aangekondigd dat zij een wapenstilstand van twee maanden in acht zullen nemen. {De / deze} *vrijheidsstrijders*, zullen daarna echter doorgaan met de strijd.

(66c) <article in a newspaper>  
*De Nicaraguaanse contra's*, hebben aangekondigd dat zij een wapenstilstand van twee maanden in acht zullen te nemen. {Deze / de} *vrijheidsstrijders*, zullen daarna echter doorgaan met de strijd.

*The Nicaraguan contra rebels have announced that they will observe a suspension of hostilities for a period of two months. After this, however, [these / the] freedom fighters will continue their struggle.*

Given the source of (66a), the definite version, which implies a simple *identify*-relation (i.e., *the Nicaraguan contra rebels are the freedom fighters in question*) is unlikely. In (66a), the demonstrative version is selfevident, implying a negative evaluative modification of the referent concerned (*the Nicaraguan contra rebels are 'so-called' freedom fighters, i.e., no freedom fighters at all*). The demonstrative is a signal of the writer that he does not commit himself to the given qualification.

In (66b) - given the source again - a simple *identify*-interpretation



yields a natural interpretation, hence the acceptability of the defNA. DemNA-substitution is also acceptable, but its value then has to be found in its attributive function, (*we present the Nicaraguan contra rebels as freedom fighters*), or it implies a positive evaluation (*the Nicaraguan contra rebels are real freedom fighters*).

In a newspaper article, subsequently, both variants would be possible. If a newspaper opts for a demNA, this could be congruent with its progressive tendency (*the Nicaraguan contra rebels are 'so-called' freedom fighters, i.e., no freedom fighters at all*). In a so-called 'quality paper' which prefers a neutral position on this subject, a demNA can present a neutral position taken up by some other party (*in the press release / in certain circles... the Nicaraguan contra rebels are looked upon as freedom fighters*).

So far, no complete description of the relationship between the defNA-demNA variation and evaluation has been given.<sup>12</sup> The only thing that has been discussed is that the evaluative demNAs in the examples above fit in with the basic mechanism of the MOD-proposal, in that the representational effect of these demNAs is congruent with the other demNA-types. As I will demonstrate in the following chapter, this semantically defined *evaluate*-modification, empirically based on the defNA-demNA variation, has to be distinguished from pragmatic evaluative effects, empirically based on the *dezeNP*-*dieNP* variation.

Although the *evaluate*-demNAs include non-default interpretation and DREF-modification, they are subordinated to the other demNA-types in that the *evaluate*-relation necessarily implies one of the other three coherence relations, as is shown in the representations of (10) and (64).

So, in the processing of the demNA in an example like (10), it is reasonable to assume a *roundabout* via the self-evident *classify*-reading of the NP. The *evaluate*-reading can be said to 'come on top' of the classifying interpretation. The same relation can be seen between the *attribute*- and *evaluate*-reading in (8) and the *contextualise*- and *evaluate*-reading in (64)

The intuitions concerning the subordinate character of these *evaluate*-demNAs provide good reasons for assuming the following system of the semantic processing of demNAs (see further chapter 6).

Figure (1): *The relational hierarchy in the semantic processing of demNAs*

	→ <i>classify</i>	→ <i>evaluate</i>
<i>identify</i>	→ <i>attribute</i>	→ <i>evaluate</i>
	→ <i>contextualise</i>	→ <i>evaluate</i>

### 3.5 Conclusion

#### 3.5.1 MOD and the processing of demNAs

In the preceding sections, I have proposed one interpretative mechanism for demNAs in written texts: demNAs activate a non-default interpretation of the NP concerned and thus modify the underlying DREF. Demonstratives induce the reactivation of a referent in a representation format which differs from the DREF in preceding discourse representations. I have distinguished four modificational types of demNAs, i.e., *classify* (section 3.4.2), *attribute* (section 3.4.3), *contextualise* (section 3.4.4) and *evaluate* (section 3.4.5).

In order to account for the MOD-Proposal in general and for the four modificational types in particular, we discovered the essential contextual clues and the use conditions of demonstrative anaphoric NPs in written discourse. These clues and conditions enable us to formulate a number of plausible heuristics which play a role in the processing of demNAs. The empirical evidence in this chapter strongly suggests the following processing heuristics of demNAs:

- (i) *While processing a demNA, the reader by default assumes that the underlying referent is highly accessible.*

This heuristic is in accordance with the analysis in this (and the following) chapter, in which the referents accessed by demNAs are always in explicit focus or - in the case of contextualising post-first-mention demNAs - install the referent in explicit focus. This does not imply that demNAs will never occur in discourse contexts in which selection or search is under discussion. This does mean, however, that the genuine function of demNAs does not consist in searching or selecting.

- (ii) *While processing a demNA, the reader considers the demNA to be the non-default variant of the corresponding defNA-version.*
- *While processing a defNA, the reader by default assigns an identify-reading.*
  - *While processing a demNA, the reader by default assigns more than just an identify-reading.*

The availability of the defNA-demNA variation has been the major factor determining demNA-interpretations in the previous sections. It implies both a strong resemblance and a clear distinction between defNA- and demNA-processing. The processing of both defNAs and demNAs always implies an *incremented DREF* with a *same number* as a referent in a previous discourse representation. DREFs underlying both defNAs and demNAs contain implicit coherence relations expressing the contribution of the anaphors in the development of discourse. The difference between the processing of defNAs and demNAs has to be interpreted as a difference in default and non-default or potential coherence relations: by default, defNAs favour a simple *identify-reading*, demNAs favour the processing of other coherence relations underlying NAs.

This means that with the processing of defNAs the lexical content concerned is available in a different way than with the processing of demNAs. If a reader, for example, wants to be able to put a *classify-interpretation* at the basis of a demNA, then he has to activate the category concerned. Such an activation is not necessary in processing the defNA-version.

- (iii) *In determining the modificational type of a demNA, the reader depends on the formal-lexical relationship between antecedent and anaphoric NP as an initial and crucial trigger.*

The lexical relationship provides the reader with the information given in figure (2):



Figure (2): *Formal-lexical triggers in processing demNAs*

superordinate demNA	→	<i>classify</i> -inferencing
attributive demNA	→	<i>attribute</i> -inferencing
(lit.) repeated demNA	→	<i>contextualise</i> -inferencing

Although it is clearly stated that the MOD-Proposal does not predict a one-to-one relationship between modificational, i.e., contextual types of demNAs and lexical, i.e., text-independent types of nominal anaphors, the lexical type of the antecedent-anaphor relation cannot be but an important initial trigger in the processing of demNAs. The fact is that the information about the relationship between antecedent and demNA is always available while processing a demNA and that the given correspondence of lexical and modificational types mostly comes out.

- (iv) *Other contextual clues can add supplementary evaluate-inferences to the classify-, attribute- and contextualise-inferences.*

This processing heuristic states that *evaluate*-inferences are based on one of the three other modificational types. This, however, does not necessarily mean that, while processing, *evaluate*-inferences come after the other inferences in real processing time.

So far, the processing heuristics can be pictured as in figure (3). In view of the results in the next chapter, these processing heuristics will be repeated and complemented in the concluding chapter.

Figure (3): *Processing hierarchy of NAs*

<i>defNA</i>	<i>demNA</i>		
<i>identify</i>	superordinate demNA	<i>classify</i>	<i>evaluate</i>
	attrib. mod. demNA	<i>attribute</i>	<i>evaluate</i>
	(lit.) repeated demNA	<i>contextualise</i>	<i>evaluate</i>

## 3.5.2 MOD and the theory of markedness

The given demNA-interpretation can be considered as an instantiation of the interpretation of demNAs as marked referential expressions. Not only is the MOD-interpretation problematic for all exclusively identificational interpretations of referential expressions, it is also problematic for all theories of markedness which regard markedness exclusively as functioning for the identification of referents. In process-oriented discourse representation theories marked referential expressions are seen as identificational devices used to search or select referents which are identificationally problematic. A plausible way in which marked referential expressions fulfill their search function can be found in the *Descriptive Content Hypothesis* of Bosch 1988.

*Whenever the interpretation of a definite referential expression requires search or selection, i.e., when there is currently no unique prominent referent, then markedness of the referential expression indicates that the descriptive content of the expression is used literally as a criterion for determining the intended referent.*  
(Bosch 1988:214)

Applied to the descriptive content of pronouns, this hypothesis claims that "*whenever search or selection of referents is at issue, the gender of marked pronouns is descriptive of their referents, whereas the same is not necessarily true of unmarked pronouns*" (Bosch 1988:218), a claim that becomes acceptable in the light of examples such as (67):

- (67) Das Mädchen kam noch einmal zurück. {Sie / es / SIE / \*ES} hatte den Regenschirm vergessen. (Bosch 1988:217)

*The girl came back again. She had forgotten the umbrella.*

Thus, marked pronouns 'search' and identify by means of object properties of referents (such as gender). This notion is linked to a hypothesis on the format of the representations to which marked vs. unmarked referential devices give access. That is the so-called Form-of-Representation hypothesis, part of which is given here:

*Representations that are typically accessed by marked referential devices either do not contain linguistic expressions for the referents represented, or at least are not indexed - and hence cannot naturally be accessed -*

*according to formal properties of such expressions, but only according to a classification of the objects represented. (Bosch 1988:219)*

Bosch, however, recognises that marked pronouns not only imply the search or the selection of a referent, an idea which becomes highly relevant in the light of our MOD-proposal. His crucial example is (68):

- (68) Fred can't complain. It's HE who was late. (Bosch 1988:224)

Marked pronouns like in (68) annihilate any view in which search or selection is a necessary and satisfactory condition for the occurrence of marked referential expressions. According to Bosch, this is indeed a satisfactory condition, but not a necessary one:

*Although deviation from referential continuity implies markedness, the converse is not true. (1988:213-214)*

Bosch's explanation of marked pronouns which does not imply search or selection is the following:

*An identificatory construction [as in (68) (A.M.)] excludes search or selection and thus, despite the markedness of its referential expression, does not make use of the descriptive content of that expression. (Bosch 1988:227)*

So, according to Bosch, the descriptive content hypothesis is not applicable to marked cases like these. However, Bosch puts cases like (68) in line with the identificational function of marked referential expressions: at the basis of the marked pronoun in (68) - as in all other marked referential expressions - lies a contrast with possible alternatives, in this case with any potential competitors in implicit focus, i.e., type b from the following list:

- a. *Marked reference to 'one of several objects in explicit focus' contrasts the intended referent to its actual competitors in explicit focus*
- b. *Marked reference to 'a unique referent in explicit focus' contrasts the intended referent to 'any' potential competitors, that is, to anything in implicit focus.*
- c. *Marked reference to 'an object in implicit focus'*



*contrasts the intended referent to a more expectable and currently more prominent referent in explicit focus. (Bosch 1988:227)*

The question is whether or not this characterisation of marked pronouns, not implying search or selection, can be applied to demNAs, for which I defended a basic function including both markedness and the absence of search and selection. There are striking parallels between Bosch's interpretation of marked pronouns and my interpretation of demNAs. Let us compare the interpretation of HE in (68) with the interpretation of demNAs in my examples (11), (12) and (54):

- (68) Fred can't complain. It's HE who was late. (Bosch 1988:224)

- (11) *Bush<sub>i</sub>* heeft besloten om de taxes dan toch te verhogen. Het is de eerste keer dat {de / deze} *president<sub>i</sub>* een verhoging aandurft.

*Bush has decided to raise taxes after all. It is the first time {the / this} president has dared to do so.*

- (12) De Londense Times maakt vanochtend stukken bekend uit *het overheidsrapport over de salmonella-besmetting van de Britse eieren<sub>i</sub>*. {Het / dit} *vertrouwelijke rapport<sub>i</sub>* ...

*This morning, the London Times publishes extracts from the government report on the salmonella infection in British eggs. {The / this} confidential report ...*

- (54) In de grote steden neemt *de luchtvervuiling<sub>i</sub>* toe. {Die / deze / de} *(lucht)vervuiling<sub>i</sub>* is het gevolg van wanbeleid.

*In the big cities, air pollution is increasing. {This / that / the} (air) pollution is a result of bad policy.*

In all cases the referent can be said to be contrasted to a set of potential competitors. In (68), this set most plausibly includes all referents that could have been too late. In the other examples the set is constituted by all relevant presidents (most plausibly the set of presidents of the US), the set of all confidential reports and the set of events or situations which can be indicated by air pollution. In none of the cases, the activation of the descriptive content of this set is required in order to identify the intended

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referent.

As was said, the Descriptive Content Hypothesis does not claim that markedness is always used to search or select the referent (Bosch 1988:213-214). But neither does the DC-hypothesis prohibit that markedness of referential expressions may fulfill other functions (1988:225). The DC-hypothesis is not even in conflict with the fact that the descriptive content of marked referential expressions can be regarded as performing other markedness-functions than the search and selection function. As such, the interpretation of the markedness of demNAs in terms of the modification of DREFs can be seen as an implementation and a corroboration of Bosch's DC-hypothesis and - more generally - of a theory of markedness which does not hinge ultimately on the identificational function of marked referential expressions.

## Notes to chapter 3

1. Strictly speaking, literally repeated demNAs can hardly be found in discourse, since the large majority of demNAs repeating their antecedent literally differ from their antecedent at least in that they have a demonstrative determiner.

Although the analysis of demNAs will be mainly restricted in the first place to anaphoric demonstrative NPs with NP-antecedent (*demNAs*), other demonstrative nominal NPs (*demNPs*) are paid some attention to as well.

NPs with the determiners *zo'n*, *zulke*, *dergelijke* 'similar', as in (a), are not taken into consideration:

- (a) *Carlo de Benedetti heeft zich een weg gebaand in de Belgische zakenwereld. (Dergelijke / zulke) industriëlen zullen we met het oog op 1992 vaker op bezoek krijgen.*

*Carlo de Benedetti has pushed his way into the Belgian business community. Industrialists like him will be visiting us more often with 1992 coming up.*

2. In a sample of 154 demNAs with NP-antecedent (from corpora 1, 2 & 4), the replacement of the demonstrative by the definite determiner results in referential ambiguity or obscurity in only 18 cases (12%). Of course, this proportion of incoherence would be higher if non-anaphoric demonstrative NPs or demNAs with sentential antecedents had been taken into account. A lot of these demonstrative NPs do not tolerate defNA-replacement. This is especially clear in examples which have to be regarded almost as fixed expressions, as *in die zin dat* .. 'in that sense that', *in dat/dit opzicht* 'in that/this respect', *op die manier* 'that way'.

3. In one example, though, Cornish 1986b mentions the defNA-demNA variation:

- (a) "We do not undertake repairs without dry-cleaning the (#this/that -FC) garment" (notice in a Dry Cleaning shop) (Cornish 1986b:157)

With this example Cornish illustrates the fact that the markedness of anaphoric expressions is determined by the accessibility of the discourse referent involved. The anaphor *the garment* accesses to the slot of the frame *dry cleaning*. Cornish



argues that in this case *they* or *it* would be referentially insufficient, and he suggests - although he does not state it explicitly - that the demNA-variant would be too strong a referential device in this case.

The tendency of this explanation is clear: the deictic force of demNAs is used when a defNA is referentially insufficient. However, the explanation is not valid, since the impossibility of the demNA-variant is due to the simple fact that the underlying referent has not yet been mentioned in previous discourse representations: scenario-related entities cannot be realised in demNA-format, a fact which was already noted and explained by Hawkins 1978.

4. It should be noted here that in these kinds of examples the proximate-distal dichotomy of demonstratives does not bring about an adequate contrast either (see for a further analysis of the contrast function of demNAs section 4.2.2.1).
5. The difference between types of form and types of use is comparable with the difference between lexical and contextual classes, as is pointed out in section 1.4.
6. If the demonstrative version in this sentence is acceptable, then the demNA is not the variant of a defNA, but of an indefinite NP. In that case *this waiter* is not meant to denote a particular waiter, but a member of the class of waiters, who are known to be functioning in restaurants (see Prince 1981a and Maclaran 1980 for the analysis of indefinite *this*). In Dutch this functional value can be effected by *zo'n* (literally 'such a', idiomatically 'this'), as in (a):

- (a) Toen we daar aankwamen, kwam daar zo'n kelner  
naar ons toegestapt.

*When we arrived, this waiter came up to us.*

7. In my own demNA-data, about 75% of the demNAs find their antecedent in the same or in the previous sentence, as is noted in section 4.2.1.1.
8. Of course, *those acrobats* and *those boys* could refer to a particular group too, if such a group were activated in the context involved.
9. This demNA-characteristic is mentioned in Corblin (1983:125) too:

*Dans une chaîne de coréférence, 'ce N' occupera très souvent la seconde place.*

*In the chain of co-reference, 'this/that N' often occupies the second place.*

10. A restriction on the use of contextualising demNAs is that the anaphoric noun should have *cue validity* (Rosch 1977:29) regarding the category which is described in the antecedent, or that it should represent a classificatory criterion of the antecedent, which is not the case in the following examples:
  - (a) *The United Nations<sub>i</sub> took a decision about the debts of the third world<sub>j</sub>. (?These / ?those) Nations<sub>i</sub> did that without consulting (?that / ?this) world<sub>j</sub>.*
  - (b) *Een walvis<sub>i</sub> is gisteren aangespoeld in Oostende. ?Deze vis<sub>i</sub> bleek te zijn verdwaald.*  
*Yesterday, a whale was washed ashore at Ostend. This fish appeared to be lost.*
11. Note that we are only interested in evaluating interpretations in written language, in which the arsenal of evaluative devices is more restricted, as a result of the absence of stress and gestures for example.
12. Neither has it been claimed that demNA-substitution is the only linguistic means to signal evaluation of discourse referents. It is not even the only anaphoric device which can be used for evaluative purposes. In Maes 1987 I show how cataphors can be used to get a certain perspective on discourse referents.

## Chapter 4

### *Deze/dit- and die/dat-demonstrative NPs*

#### 4.1 Introduction

##### 4.1.1 DezeNPs and dieNPs in Dutch

Demonstrative nominal NPs in Dutch can be divided into two classes, i.e., NPs with *deze* or *dit* as demonstrative determiner (henceforth *dezeNPs*) and NPs with *die* or *dat* as demonstrative determiner (henceforth *dieNPs*). The variation of demonstrative determiners *within* each class is the result of superficial congruence rules of gender and number: *deze* and *die* cover all plural nouns and singular masculine and feminine nouns. *Dit* and *dat* cover singular neuter nouns. The difference *between* the two classes has been accounted for in various proposals in terms of anaphoric distance (o.a. Pinkal 1986, Ariel 1988, Lichtenberk 1988, Halliday & Hasan 1976 and many others), focal value (Sidner 1983; Kryk 1987) or deictic force (Kirsner 1979).

Within the scope of this study, there are two reasons for a further investigation of the variation between *dezeNPs* and *dieNPs* (henceforth the *DD-variation*).

- (i) In the literature, various proposals can be found to account for the difference between the two classes of demonstrative NPs. They include contradictory predictions about the function and the use of these, which means that the proposals cannot all be empirically adequate at once. In this chapter an evaluation will be given of these proposals.
- (ii) The analysis of the difference between *defNAs* and *demNAs* in chapter 3 led to a clear claim regarding the functioning of *demNAs* in written discourse: the function of *demNAs* has been described in terms of semantic modifications of discourse referents. At this semantic level of language description it is assumed that there is



no difference between the two subclasses of demonstrative NPs. This means that the DD-variation is not considered to be a decisive element either in determining the modificational character of demNAs as such, or in determining the semantic type of the modification (*attribute, classify, contextualise, evaluate*).

Thus far, this implies only a negative characterisation of the DD-variation. In this chapter then, a positive characterisation of the DD-variation is proposed which is congruent with the semantic function of demNAs proposed in chapter 3. In contrast to the semantic nature of demNAs, differences between *deze/dit-* and *die/dat-*NPs will be described in pragmatic terms, all concerning the relation between the discourse referent involved and coordination points of referential domains evoked in the discourse.

In accordance with chapter 3, the proposal focusses mainly on anaphoric demonstrative NPs in written discourse (indicated as demNAs, *deze*NAs and *die*NAs). However, many arguments are applicable to all uses of demonstrative NPs. In those cases, the terms demNPs, *deze*NPs and *die*NPs will be used.

#### 4.1.2 Corpus and method

In this chapter, both the evaluation of existing proposals and my own proposal are based on a corpus of written texts, consisting of the following parts:

- COR 1-2 a compilation of 18 informative/instructive leaflets  
number of words 28.424  
number of demonstrative NPs 222
- COR 3 excerpts from political journals, coming from subcorpus  
2 of the so-called Eindhoven-corpus (see Uit den  
Boogaert 1975)  
number of demonstrative NPs 665
- COR 4 a compilation of 22 popular scientific texts (500 to  
1000 words each)  
number of words 15.000  
number of demonstrative NPs 104
- COR 5-8 a compilation of book reviews, tv reviews,  
autobiographical columns and personal comments from  
the magazine *Vrij Nederland*

number of words 28.961

number of demonstrative NPs 262

- COR 9 excerpts from popular scientific texts, coming from subcorpus 5 of the Eindhoven-corpus.<sup>1</sup>

Except for those in corpus 9, all demonstrative NPs, anaphoric as well as non-anaphoric ones, are encoded according to a number of variables. The variables encoded can be classified as follows:

- (i) *formal-morphological variables*
  - the class of the demonstrative NP (*die/dat* vs. *deze/dit*)
  - the form/structure of the demonstrative NP (demonstrative determiner + N vs. complex NPs)
  - the number of the demonstrative NP (singular vs. plural)
- (ii) *structural / syntactic variables*
  - the syntactic function of the demonstrative NP (subject vs. object vs. prepositional phrase)
  - the position of the demonstrative NP in the clause (first constituent in the clause vs. not first constituent)
  - the position of the demonstrative NP in relation to other demonstrative NPs (whether it is the only demonstrative NP in the sentence or not)
- (iii) *structural / relational / anaphoric variables*
  - the form of the antecedent (NP-antecedent vs. not-NP antecedent vs. no antecedent)
  - the position of the antecedent in terms of *intervening sentences* (same sentence vs. previous sentence vs. earlier)
  - the focal position of the antecedent (first mention vs. second mention vs. >second mention)
- (iv) *semantic / relational / anaphoric variables*
  - the type of referent involved (human vs. object vs. situation/fact vs. event/proces)
  - the lexical relation between the antecedent and the demonstrative NP (repetition vs. partial repetition vs. several types of synonyms and superordinates)
  - the semantic modificational type of the demonstrative NP (*classify* vs. *attribute* vs. *contextualise* vs. *evaluate*).

The quantification of these demonstrative-NP variables is used as

a method for evaluating the existing DD-variation proposals as well as for testing my own proposal. Given the subtlety of the differences between *deze*NPs and *die*NPs, it is necessary to use quantificational evidence from the corpus. However, this does not mean that arguments are exclusively based on quantificational results. Evidence is also produced from constructed examples and examples used in other proposals.

In section 4.2 existing proposals concerning the DD-variation are evaluated; in section 4.3 my own DD-proposal is developed. Conclusions follow in section 4.4.

## 4.2 Different proposals for the DD-variation

### 4.2.1 Distance: proximate vs. distal

#### 4.2.1.1 Strict interpretation of distance

A proposal which could explain the difference between *deze*NPs and *die*NPs in an easy and straightforward way, is the explanation in terms of the so-called proximate-distal dichotomy. Applied to Dutch this 'localistic' proposal can be formulated as follows: *deze*NPs carry the semantic substance *near* or *proximate*; *die*NPs carry the semantic substance *remote* or *distal*. The advantage of such a proposal is that it is based upon a criterion that is known to be useful in describing deictic systems of languages: the distance-dichotomy is often used as a classifying tool in mapping out the system of deictic expressions in languages (see for a concise survey Rauh 1983:15-16).

The prototype of demonstrative expressions for which the localistic explanation is self-evident, is the use of deictic demonstrative pronouns in contrastive spoken context, as in (1):

- (1) Ik wil niet *deze* (hier), maar *die* (daar).

*I do not want this one (here), but that one (there).*

In an example like (1) the locality hypothesis can be described as follows: the features *proximate* and *distal* are part of or identical with the semantics of the lexical items *deze/dit* and *die/dat* respectively. This semantic value determines to which referent - in the given situation of speech - the demonstrative gives access.



As the features *proximate* vs. *distal* are relative concepts, the use of *deze/dit* or *die/dat* implies a contrast between the intended referent and other possible referents. More precisely formulated: if in some context the semantic value *proximate* is assigned to referent x by means of *deze/dit*, then the semantic value *distal* can be assigned to some explicitly present or implicitly derivable referent y, and vice versa.<sup>2</sup>

In terms of an incremental discourse representation the locality view can be formulated as follows:

- (i) A demonstrative is a marked referential expression the semantic value of which represents one pole on the dichotomic distance axis *proximate* vs. *distal* and implies the presence of the other pole on the axis.
- (ii) The effect of the demonstrative is that the spatial position of the referent with regard to (a) contrasting referent(s) becomes part of the semantic representation of the referent involved.
- (iii) The spatial position of the referent has to be regarded as information enabling the reader to access the intended referent, by way of explicit or implicit contrast with other referents.

A strict interpretation of locality like the one above is not applicable to demNAs. The fact is that demNAs differ from demonstratives as in (1) on three crucial points:

- (i) Unlike purely deictic demonstratives, demNAs refer to linguistic elements, antecedents. This means that distance should not be conceived of as the 'literal' distance between writer and object or between reader and object, and that demNAs do not imply a literal, spatial localisation of the referents involved. Thus, it is not plausible to derive the basic meaning of demonstratives in demNAs from the distance meaning of deictic demonstratives.
- (ii) Anaphoric demonstrative NPs in written discourse are not referential expressions naturally occurring in contexts in which two referents are contrasted. This is shown in the acceptability judgments of the examples in

section 3.3.3.1. Hence, it is not plausible to derive the basic meaning of demonstratives in demNAs from an (implicit or explicit) contrast between competing referents.

- (iii) Unlike anaphoric demonstrative pronouns, demNAs are not only co-referential with an antecedent, but also introduce the content of the following NP: this characteristic is the essence of the MOD-hypothesis, which implements the markedness of demNAs (see chapter 3). If the demonstrative determiner is looked upon as indicating what follows rather than what precedes, then the notion of (anaphoric) distance may well be irrelevant in distinguishing *deze*NPs and *die*NPs, the distance between the *deze*-determiner and the *die*-determiner and their following NP being the same.

These crucial differences indicate that the markedness of anaphoric demonstrative NPs and the markedness of deictic demonstratives pronouns function differently. This has already been pointed out frequently, as e.g. in Kirsner (1979:356; 1987:81), Wierzbicka (1980:37) and Lyons (1977:671).<sup>3</sup>

However, distance is often used as the central notion applicable to all demonstrative uses. With anaphoric demonstratives, this notion is implemented as *anaphoric distance*, i.e., the distance between anaphor and antecedent, which is mostly indicated as the number of intervening clauses between antecedent and anaphoric demonstrative.

A first characterisation of the DD-variation in terms of anaphoric distance can be found in Pinkal 1986. Pinkal amends Kamp's 1981 proposal for the treatment of definite NPs in Discourse Representation Theory (DRT). The functional value Pinkal assigns to *complex demonstratives* (i.e., both classes of demonstrative NPs) is "*that they direct the hearer's focus of attention to a new reference object that was not in focus before*" (1986:372). Pinkal's rule, expressing this focal function of both classes of demonstrative NPs, is the following:

- (2)
  - (i) Add a new DR to  $CF_k$
  - (ii) replace the  $\alpha$  in the constituent under consideration by  $x$
  - (iii) Add  $x=y$  to  $K$  where  $y \notin CF_k$  and  $y$  is the most

salient satisfier of  $\alpha$  in  $U_k$

This rule regulates (i) that a demNA adds a new discourse referent (DR) to the current focus ( $CF_k$ ); (ii) that the NP involved ( $\alpha$ ) is replaced by  $x$ ; (iii) that the equality  $x=y$  is added to the current discourse representation structure (K), provided that  $y$  not yet occupies a position in the current focus of K ( $y \notin CF_k$ ) and that  $y$  is the most salient satisfier of the NP involved in the universe of discourse ( $U_k$ ).

In Pinkal's view, the function of focus shift, formalised as in (2) is the same for both classes of demonstrative NPs. The only difference is that there is an additional requirement underlying *this*  $\alpha$ , as opposed to *that*  $\alpha$ , "*that the antecedent must have been uttered in the immediate pre-context... 'this' has a yet more restricted anaphoric range, which seems to depend on proximity in the uttered string, in a very basic sense*" (1986:372).

Furthermore, in proposals with a totally different orientation, anaphoric distance again is considered as accounting for the DD-variation, i.e., in corpus research by Ariel and Lichtenberk 1988. They investigate the relationship between different types of anaphoric expressions and anaphoric distance. Both Ariel (for English) and Lichtenberk (for To'aba'ita) have found a relationship between anaphoric distance and classes of demNAs. In both cases proximate demNAs (*this/these-NP* for English; *eri-NP* for To'aba'ita) are more frequent in short-distance positions, i.e., when the antecedent is near, than distal-demNAs (*that/those-NP* for English; *baa-NP* for To'aba'ita). Ariel does not give quantitative evidence, in support of the relationship, but restricts herself to the formulation of the following tendency:

*When anaphoric, distal demonstratives tend to refer to more remote entities, while proximal demonstratives refer to more immediate antecedents. (...) It is the distal demonstrative, an already lower Mid Accessibility marker, that tends to develop into a full-fledged Low Accessibility marker. (1988:76)*

Unlike Ariel, Lichtenberk offers quantitative evidence for the relationship mentioned: the average anaphoric distance in his corpus is 3.4 clauses for *proximate*-demNAs and 8.6 clauses for *distal*-demNAs (1988:323). However, little value should be attached to the two localistic interpretations. In Ariel quantitative evidence is absent, which makes it impossible to



judge the correctness of the relationship. Lichtenberk's evidence has to be looked upon as an artefact, i.e., it is the result of a strange way of interpreting his data. This becomes clear in table (1), which contains the distribution of *proximate*- and *distal*-demNAs with an anaphoric distance between 1 clause and 6 clauses in Lichtenberk's corpus:

Table (1): *The relationship between proximate-distal and anaphoric distance in Lichtenberk (1988:323)*

anaphoric distance	<i>eri</i> (prox)		<i>baa</i> (distal)		total	
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%
1	129	77.7	37	22.3	166	100
2	37	67.3	18	32.7	55	100
3	30	69.8	13	30.2	43	100
4	25	67.6	12	32.4	37	100
5	8	53.3	7	46.7	15	100
6	10	58.8	7	41.2	17	100

The percentages in this table should be read from left to right, i.e., 100 per cent for each anaphoric distance (1 to 6 clauses). The conclusion Lichtenberk draws with regard to this table is the following "*..as the distance increases the percentage of the use of *eri* decreases while that of *baa* correspondingly increases*" (1988:323), which he regards as a clear indication for the relevance of anaphoric distance in the DD-variation.

Assuming that the regularity Lichtenberk mentions is indisputable, this would not yet be a reason for labelling *baa* the *distal*-form and *eri* the *proximate*-form. The following three facts provide arguments against such a labelling. Firstly, in all anaphoric distance positions *proximate*-demNAs are more frequent than *distal*-demNAs. Secondly, a high proportion of *distal*-demNAs ( $n=37$ , i.e., 39.3% of all *distal*-demNAs) find their antecedent in the preceding clause, i.e., at anaphoric distance 1. This proportion (39.3%) is at least twice the percentage of *distal*-demNAs in all the other anaphoric distance positions taken separately. Finally, for both demonstrative classes, the demNA-frequency decreases as the distance from the antecedent

increases. This comes out in table (2) in which column-percentages are given, which are more relevant than the row-percentages in table (1).

Table (2): *Reanalysis counts Lichtenberk (1988:323)*

<i>anaphoric distance</i>	<i>eri (prox)</i>		<i>baa (distal)</i>		<i>total</i>
	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>
1	129	53.9	37	39.3	166
2	37	15.5	18	19.1	55
3	30	12.6	13	13.8	43
4	25	10.5	12	12.8	37
5	8	3.3	7	7.5	15
6	10	4.2	7	7.5	17
total	239	100.0	94	100.0	333

Apart from this, the regularity itself is disputable. The fact is that it is based on a relatively small number of demNA-occurrences. Especially in classes 5 and 6 the number of demNAs is very low. However, it is exactly these few demNAs that play an important role in the correspondence Lichtenberk observes: in the anaphoric distances 4, 5 and 6 in table (1) the percentages show the strongest fluctuation.

A further indication against distance as an explanatory notion for the DD-variation can be found in my own corpus. This corpus (henceforth the *DD-corpus*) contains 1259 demonstrative NPs, 837 of which are anaphoric. For these anaphoric demonstrative NPs the relationship between anaphoric distance and demonstrative class is shown in table (3):

Table (3): *Relationship between dezeNAs / dieNAs and anaphoric distance in the DD-corpus (n=837)*

	<i>same s.</i>		<i>prev. s.</i>		<i>earlier</i>		<i>total</i>
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>
deze	42	9.6	325	74.0	72	16.4	439
die	81	20.4	234	58.8	83	20.8	398
total	123		559		155		837

In the position *earlier* a slight preference can be found for dieNAs (16.4 % vs. 20.8%). However, the *deze/die*-difference in this position is smaller than in the other positions. In table (3) there are at least three indications that disprove the distance hypothesis. Firstly, there is the striking fact that dieNAs more often than dezeNAs occur together with the antecedent in the same sentence. Secondly, as in Lichtenberk's corpus, the majority of both classes of demNAs are located in the category *previous sentence*. Thirdly, if we consider the positions *same* and *previous sentence* as being proximate, and the position *earlier* as distal, then the following, non-significant differences ( $\chi^2=2.74$ ,  $df=1$ , ns) between dezeNAs and dieNAs emerge:

Table (4): *Relation deze/die vs. anaphoric distance (proximate = same or previous sentence; distal = earlier) in the DD-corpus (n=837)*

	<i>proximate</i>		<i>distal</i>		<i>total</i>
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>
deze	367	83.6	72	16.4	439
die	315	79.1	83	20.9	398
total	682		155		837

Finally, the whimsicality of the relation between anaphoric distance and the class of demNA is apparent in the corpus analysis of Kirsner 1979. In a small Dutch written expository corpus containing 113 demNAs, with a same-head noun as the antecedent noun, he finds the following *deze/die*-distribution with respect to anaphoric distance:



Table (5): *Deze/die and anaphoric distance in Kirsner (1979:365) (n=113)*

	(a) same s	(b) 1 s back	(c) earlier	n
deze	15	38	8	61
die	35	16	1	52
total	50	54	9	113

The result turns out to be fully inconsistent with the distance hypothesis, in that *deze*NAs in this table on the average are more remote from their antecedent than *die*NAs. The same correlation between referential distance and *deze*NAs/*die*NAs is found in other corpora-samples (n=108 and n=360 *dem*NAs) in Kirsner & van Heuven (1988:217-220). In all these samples, a strong association was found between *deze*NAs and the referential distance  $\geq 1$  on the one hand, and between *die*NAs and the referential distance 0 on the other.

Although a larger number of intrasentential *die*NAs is undeniable, both in Kirsner's data and in mine, this cannot be taken to be conclusive evidence for an association of *deze*NAs with *distal* and of *die*NAs with *proximate*. If not only (a) in table (5) is interpreted as *proximate*, but (a) and (b), and if the occurrences under (c) are left out of consideration, given their low number (n=9), the difference between *deze*NAs and *die*NAs in *same + previous sentence position* is negligible, which would no longer support Kirsner's 'contra-localistic' view but which is consistent with the counts in table (4).

Differences in interpretation of the notion of referential distance - Kirsner qualifies as *distal* what Lichtenberk and I qualify as *proximate*, i.e., *dem*NAs with an antecedent one sentence back - demonstrate how difficult it is to use the relative notion of referential distance in the analysis of the DD-variation. This, however, does not alter the fact that there are strong reasons for preferring my implementation of referential distance, i.e., it is plausible to consider the position one sentence back as *proximate*, not just for *dem*NAs, but for anaphors in general. Firstly, where the simple maintenance or remention of discourse referents is concerned, the antecedent one sentence back is a position that is both likely and easily processable, regardless whether the anaphor is pronominal or nominal, as is shown in Clark & Sengul (1979:40). Secondly, it turns out that pronouns, i.e., anaphoric

devices which are known to be positioned near to their antecedent, are frequently used with the antecedent one sentence back. This is clear in the data-analysis of Fox (1984:293). In her written expository, conversational and narrative corpus, the percentage of pronouns with the antecedent in the preceding clause is 84%, 49% and 62% respectively. Thus, if this position is standard for semantically empty anaphoric expressions such as pronouns, it would be highly implausible to label it distal for demNAs.

In sum, we can say that Kirsner's referential-distance analysis invalidates the localistic analysis of *deze*NAs and *die*NAs, without offering strong evidence, however, for a contra-localistic analysis. It only shows a tendency which can be found in the DD-corpus as well, i.e., the high proportion of *die*NAs with an antecedent in the same sentence, a phenomenon for which I will give an explanation in section 4.4.3.

#### 4.2.1.2 Derived interpretations of distance

The preceding section made it clear that a strict version of locality, in which demonstratives necessarily carry the meaning of proximity or distance, is not a fruitful starting point for the explanation of the difference between *deze*NPs and *die*NPs. This does not mean however that locality as an explanatory principle necessarily has to be abandoned. There are two ways in which the localistic view can be kept applicable to the DD-variation: (i) by expanding the dichotomic distance values by other semantic values and (ii) by going beyond the literal interpretation of the notion of distance in explaining functions and effects of the DD-variation, that is, by tolerating metaphorical interpretations of distance in explaining differences between *deze*NPs and *die*NPs.

The first solution is supported by non-binary descriptions of deictic systems as the one in Hauenschild 1982. For demonstrative pronouns in Russian and Czech, she distinguishes a tripartite meaning system. Applied to Dutch demonstrative NPs, this would result in the following classes of demonstratives: proximate (*deze*NPs), distal (*die*NPs), neutral (*deze*NPs/*die*NPs).

The application of this tripartition to demNAs is problematic, however, since it is unclear under what conditions demNAs have to be assigned a localistic or neutral interpretation: literal



distance is hardly ever there; anaphoric distance on the other hand - the only implementation of the notion of distance in the case of demNAs - is always at issue. So, if anaphoric distance is the determining criterion, then all demNAs have to be assigned a localistic interpretation. The decision as to when to assign a localistic or neutral interpretation is all the more difficult since it is difficult to describe the content of the qualification *neutral*. For Hauenschild, *neutral* only has a negative content, meaning *not-distal nor proximate* (see also the critique in Kirsner 1979:357).

Hauenschild does not support her proposal by empirical corpus evidence. Even though it is difficult to imagine how her tripartition could be tested in my corpus, we might nevertheless give it a try. I assume that in my corpus two classes of demNAs can be distinguished, only one of them requiring a distance interpretation. This *distance*-class of demNAs is considered to have a purely identificational function. I further assume that this class is implemented as the class of demNAs with the same head noun as the antecedent (SHN-demNAs), literal and/or partial repetition being the simplest device enabling the reader to access the intended referent. In view of Hauenschild's tripartition, the hypothesis could be formulated that SHN-demNAs show a clear relationship between anaphoric distance and DD-variation, a relation which is absent in the class of non-SHN-demNAs.

However, in my corpus, SHN-demNAs do not show a significant relation between *deze*NAs vs. *die*NAs on the one hand, and proximate (i.e., antecedent in the same or in the previous sentence) vs. distal (i.e., earlier) on the other ( $\chi^2=.34$ ,  $df=1$ , ns), as is apparent in table (6):<sup>4</sup>

Table (6): *Relationship same-head demNAs and anaphoric distance in the DD-corpus (n=378)*

	<i>proximate</i>		<i>distal</i>		<i>total</i>
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>
<i>deze</i>	130	80.2	32	19.8	162
<i>die</i>	168	77.8	48	22.2	216
<i>total</i>	298		80		378

The second solution can be found for example in Halliday & Hasan 1976 and Lakoff 1974. Halliday & Hasan indicate that



"the uses of *this* and *that* in endophoric reference are explainable by reference to their exophoric meanings; so it is important to start from the general concept of proximity" (1976:59). Lakoff classifies all uses of demonstratives lacking a spatio-temporal meaning as forms of *emotional deixis*. In all these uses of demonstratives, she recognises "*a clear linguistic link between emotional, and spatial 'closeness' and 'distance': these are not mere accidental metaphors*" (Lakoff 1974:355). I.e., *this*-demonstrative NPs of emotional deixis can be assigned the meaning of metaphorical proximity, *that*-demonstrative NPs of emotional deixis the meaning of metaphorical distance.

Although Lakoff makes valuable observations with regard to the relationships between *this/that* and pragmatic discourse circumstances, the linking between *this/that* and mental distance remains arbitrary. Three of Lakoff's examples (8), (10) and (45) - repeated here as (3), (4) and (5) - illustrate that she refers to the notion of the reader's involvement in explaining *this*-demonstratives as well as *that*-demonstratives:

- (3) I see there's going to be peace in the mideast. This Henry Kissinger really is something!

*This is used when the speaker wishes to allude to something. Its most natural use seems to be with proper names that the speaker expects the hearer to be familiar with. (Lakoff 1974:347)*

- (4) There was this traveling salesman

*This seems to give greater vividness to the narrative, to involve the addressee in it more fully. (Lakoff 1974:347)*

- (5) That Henry Kissinger sure knows his way around Hollywood.

*That appears to establish emotional solidarity between the two [i.e., the speaker and the addressee (A.M.)]. (Lakoff 1974:352)*

However plausible it may be to assign such pragmatic effects to the demonstrative NPs involved, it remains highly arbitrary to ultimately classify (3) and (4) as *emotionally close* and (5) as *emotionally distal*.<sup>5</sup> The emotional solidarity in (5) can be conceived of as a form of emotional closeness as well. Moreover,

the relationship between the basic meaning of distance and such emotional effects remains unclear.

The descriptive or explanatory value of the notion of metaphorical distance becomes even more precarious if we take into consideration the fact that in written discourse not only the distance or the relation between the writer and the referent is at issue, but also the distance or the relation the writer wants to suggest between the reader and the referent and between himself and the reader. So, it is always possible to consider *this/that* in written context somehow as close or distal with respect to writer or reader.

Finally, Lakoff deals only with conversationally marked demonstrative NPs, in which metaphorical distance is intuitively acceptable. However, extrapolating this notion to all demonstrative NPs lacking a literal distance interpretation would be psychologically very implausible. For a great number of demonstrative NPs, e.g. in non-narrative and non-conversational context, the (metaphorical) distance dichotomy is not acceptable as a basic interpretation heuristic.

#### 4.2.2 Focal value: Sidner 1983

A second interpretation assigned to the difference between *deze*NPs and *die*NPs has been given in terms of focal value. Sidner (1983:320-328) discusses the deictic pronouns and the deictic determiners *this* and *that* as part of her focus theory, regulating the resolution of definite anaphoric expressions in discourse. She distinguishes two possible uses, i.e., the use of demonstratives in *co-present foci* discourse situation and in *focus-movement* discourse situation. Sidner's proposal is meant to be applicable to English; in my evaluation of Sidner, I shall act as if it holds for Dutch and especially for my Dutch data as well.

##### 4.2.2.1 Co-present foci

Co-present foci demonstratives are used "*to talk about two objects of the same type*" (1983:321). This is the case when in the same discourse unit a *this*- as well as a *that*-form is used with a contrastive effect. Sidner's co-present example is the following:

- (6) I'm having a party tomorrow night. It will be like the one I had last week. That party was a big succes, because everyone danced. This one will have better food. I've asked everyone to bring something special. Want to come? (Sidner 1983:321)

In cases like this, according to Sidner, the notion of proximity offers too vague an explanation for the behaviour of *this* and *that*. Instead, Sidner attributes the following difference in focal value to co-present *this/that*:

*'This' is a determiner used for main focus, that is, 'this' + <noun phrase> determines main focus, while 'that' + <noun phrase> co-specifies with a potential or old focus. (Sidner 1983:322)*

Demonstrative *this* indicates referents with main or discourse focus, which in Sidner's proposal is the focus in which other foci (e.g. actor foci) can be embedded. According to Sidner, main or discourse focus reflects the prominence assigned by the writer or speaker to the referent involved:

*In the case where the speaker wants to indicate that one of the two is more important, it will be co-specified using 'this'; when 'this' is used to mark relative importance, it will be referred to as primary focus. (Sidner 1983:321)*

A special case of prominence is found in conversational co-present cases, where *this* and *that* reflect the difference in speaker's and hearer's focus:

*When speaker and hearer (as a second speaker) have different focus, use 'that' as the determiner of a definite noun phrase that co-specifies the hearer's focus, and use 'this' for the speaker's focus. (Sidner 1983:323)*

In Sidner's resolution mechanism, the proposal for co-present foci is meant to act as a procedural resolution instruction: if *this* and *that* are used co-presently, then (i) assign main/discourse focus to the referent underlying *this* and a focal position which is less central to the referent underlying *that*, and (ii) assign higher prominence and/or speaker's focus to the referent underlying *this*.

However, this proposal shows the same drawbacks as the



distance proposal in section 4.2.1, although it pretends to be a less vague alternative for that (1983:321). Just as it is arbitrary to qualify the difference between co-present *this* and co-present *that* as a difference in distance, it is equally arbitrary to qualify it as a difference in focal status. This can be shown easily by examples in which real (7) or anaphoric (8) distance is decisive in choosing *this* vs. *that*:

- (7a) Ik heb gisteren een werkaanbieding gekregen uit Australië<sub>i</sub>, en nu heb ik hier net een aanbieding uit Antwerpen<sub>j</sub>. Dat verre aanbod<sub>i</sub> lijkt me aantrekkelijker dan dit Belgische<sub>j</sub>.

*Yesterday, I got an Australian job proposal and I just got one from Antwerp. That distant proposal seems more attractive than this Belgian one.*

- (7b) Ik heb gisteren een werkaanbieding gekregen uit Australië<sub>i</sub>, en nu heb ik hier net een aanbieding uit Antwerpen<sub>j</sub>. ?Dit verre aanbod<sub>i</sub> lijkt me aantrekkelijker dan ?dat Belgische<sub>j</sub>.

*Yesterday, I got an Australian job proposal and I just got one from Antwerp. This distant proposal seems more attractive than that Belgian one.*

- (8) Ik heb al mijn gehele leven in New York<sub>i</sub> willen wonen, maar ben nooit verder geraakt dan Antwerpen<sub>j</sub>. Deze stad<sub>{j|n}</sub> is (...) dan die ((andere) stad)<sub>{i|t}</sub>.

*My whole life, I've wanted to live in New York, but I never got beyond Antwerp. This city is (...) than that (other) city.*

The choice for *dat* or *dit* in (7a) is based on the distance in place and time, possibly on anaphoric distance, but certainly not on the focal status of the referents involved, both referents having equal focal status at the beginning of the second sentence. However, (7a) is certainly not less acceptable than (7b), on the contrary. In (8), *deze* more naturally denotes the city last mentioned, i.e., *Antwerpen*, although *New York* rather than *Antwerpen* can be assigned main focus. The focal interpretation becomes even more arbitrary if focal status should coincide with the pragmatic values *importance* and *the locus of the speaker's concern*, which is the way Sidner sees it. In (7a) and (8) the locus of the speaker's concern certainly coincides with the *dat/die*-referent. Whether the referents underlying *dat/die* are relatively more important

than the referents underlying *deze/dit* is difficult to say, because importance in examples like these is difficult to evaluate. So, in examples with a clear distance interpretation like (7) and (8) the notion of proximity overrules the notions of focal status and speaker's concern.<sup>6</sup>

According to the interrelation between *this*, *main focus* and *importance or speaker's concern* then, the same can be said as for the interrelation between *this*, *proximate* and *emotionally close* in Lakoff 1974. The link is analytically legitimate in the examples Sidner provides, but an absolute coupling is arbitrary, and cannot be conceived of as a basic interpretation or resolution mechanism.

Moreover, the link between main focus and speaker's concern or importance is exceptional in the light of Sidner's anaphora resolution algorithm. It is the only time she relates the notion of focus (being a technical concept, looked upon in terms of the position of referents in the focus stack) to such pragmatic notions. In the whole of her focus algorithm, it is strange that she doesn't indicate the function of these pragmatic concepts in the resolution of anaphors.

Apart from counterexamples of distance, co-present examples can be found in which intuitively a difference in focal value or prominence between the demNAs can be assumed, but in which both referents are realised by the same demonstrative class, as in (9):

- (9) Voor het broeikaseffect zijn er twee verklaringen: *ontbossing*<sub>i</sub> of *vervuiling*<sub>j</sub>. *Die eerste verklaring*<sub>i</sub> is plausibeler dan *die tweede*<sub>j</sub>.

*There are two explanations for the greenhouse effect: deforestation and pollution. That first explanation is more plausible than that second.*

And, of course, there are demNPs expressing a contrast between referents in which only one referent is expressed by a demonstrative NP, as in (10):

- (10) .. *Dan*<sub>i</sub> bestrijdt de KRO (alweer) de EO met een film. Om acht uur Amos, in het Nederlands 'Nachtmerrie in Sunset-home' geheten. En op vrijdag 10 april is het (opnieuw) de KRO weer met 'Zorba de Griek', *dit keer*<sub>j</sub>, van zeven tot halftien. (6:0057)



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.. Then (again) the KRO fights the EO with a film. At eight o'clock 'Amos', called 'Nachtmerrie in Sunset-home' in Dutch. And on Friday, April 10th, there is the KRO again with 'Zorba the Greek', this time from seven to nine thirty.

In short, two conclusions can be drawn: (i) if *this* and *that* are used co-presently, they do not necessarily reflect the difference in focal value, importance or speaker's concern, as Sidner claims. (ii) If two or more demonstrative NPs are used co-presently, the contrast between these NPs does not necessarily have to be expressed by *this* vs. *that*, as is shown in (9).

In the foregoing we started from constructed examples in which demNAs were used co-presently, as Sidner does. Given the subtle differences between *deze*NPs and *die*NPs, it is not that difficult to invent examples that counter the co-present interpretation in terms of distance or focality. This, however, does not alter the fact that the DD-variation is not naturally associated with the phenomenon of contrastive referents in discourse and that demonstrative NPs do not answer real use conditions in written discourse. In other words, in discourse situations in which referents are contrasted, *deze*NPs vs. *die*NPs are hardly used to indicate this contrast, in spite of the acceptability of the constructed examples above.

This is supported by the following two observations. Firstly, as was shown in section 3.3.3.1, there are many other anaphoric devices (e.g. marked pronouns, demonstrative pronouns, alternative definite NPs, repeated definite NPs) that are more suitable to access co-present referents than demonstrative NPs. Incidentally, the two co-present demNAs SIDNER mentions herself are not genuine demNAs either: in both cases the anaphoric NP is elliptical, as in (6). Furthermore, the unproductivity of co-present demNPs becomes obvious in the analysis of co-present demNPs in the DD-corpus. In the corpus all demonstrative NPs co-occurring in the same sentence with other demonstrative NPs are examined. These cases prototypically are candidates for co-present interpretation of demNPs, although co-present demNPs occasionally occur in different sentences as well. 106 demNPs in the corpus occur together with another demonstrative NP in the same sentence. This results in 53 *demNP-duos*. 9 demonstrative NPs co-occur with two other demonstrative NPs in the same sentence, resulting in three *demNP-trios*. The *deze*/*die*-distribution for these demonstrative NPs is as in table (7):



Table (7): *Distribution of demNP-duos and -trios in the DD-corpus (n=115)*

	<i>duo</i>	<i>trio</i>
deze	18	0
die	23	2
deze+die	12	1
total	53	3
	(x2)	(x3)

It is striking that most of the demNP-duos and -trios belong to the same demonstrative class, i.e., either *deze* or *die* (n=88, 76.5%), and cannot be looked upon as co-present demNAs in the sense of Sidner. Co-present demNAs have to be looked for in the 12 *deze+die*-duos and the one *deze+die*-trio. In these cases it turns out that only in one case the DD-variation is used to access referents in such a way that the first referent is "*discussed relative to the other or relative to a class in which both occur*" (Sidner 1983:320). That is example (11), in which an explanation is possible in terms of distance as well as in terms of focality:

- (11) Want *achterop die pakken Uncle Ben's rijst*, staan recepten en *op dit pakje*, stond een recept van chefkok Hans de Bruin van restaurant 'Barbara' in Zwolle. (7:093/094)

*For, on the back of those packs of Uncle Ben's rice there are recipes and on this packet there was a recipe by chef Hans de Bruin from restaurant 'Barbara' in Zwolle.*

Furthermore, in all duos and trios of the same demonstrative class, there is only one example for which Sidner's co-present characterisation holds, although the DD-variation is not used:

- (12) En meteen was het vechten, wat *die grote*, won, dus *die slungel*, had bloed op zijn neus en stapte in en reed weg. (7:123/124)

*And straight away they started fighting. That big one won, so that lout had blood on his nose and got in and drove away.*

In short, the proposal for co-present demonstratives in terms of

focal value is empirically problematic for various reasons: (i) co-present demNPs need not reflect focal differences; (ii) co-present demNPs do not necessarily show the *deze/die*-dichotomy and (iii) co-present contrastive referents in discourse are realised by referential devices other than demNAs.

#### 4.2.2.2 Focus movement

Apart from co-present demonstratives Sidner distinguishes non-co-present demonstratives, i.e., cases in which either *this* or *that* is chosen as a demonstrative. Sidner's claim with respect to these cases is that only some classes of *this*-NPs cause focus movement, while *that*-NPs only remention an element without causing a focus movement (1983:323-325).

Sidner distinguishes four uses of *this*:

- type 1: *this* with same head noun (henceforth *SHN*) as the cospecifier (i.e., the antecedent):
- (13) *Man's longest axon<sub>i</sub> runs for several feet, from the spinal column to muscles that control movements of the toes. In spite of its great length, this axon<sub>i</sub>, like all nerve fibers, is a part of a single cell. (1983:324)*
- type 2: *this* with different head noun:
- (14) *Consider the roomful of electronic equipment that makes up a modern, high-speed digital computer. .. Imagine the room<sub>i</sub>, and everything in it, shrunk to about the size of a cigarette package. Now suppose we give this marvellous box<sub>i</sub> to a clever electrical engineer.. (1983:324)*
- type 3: *this* with empty head (i.e., substantival *this*):
- (15) *Since, however, the interpretation has been put forward as a hypothesis, some weight will be added to it if it can be shown to have an antecedent probability. This is what I shall endeavor to do in the remaining pages. (1983:325)*
- type 4: *this* with quantified antecedent:
- (16) *We can therefore associate with each point<sub>i</sub> near the*

earth a vector  $\mathbf{g}$  which is the acceleration that a body would experience if it were released at *this point*.

According to Sidner in type 1 and in type 3 the focus is moved to whatever is specified by the head noun of the *this*-NP, whereas in type 2 and in type 4 no focus movement is involved.<sup>7</sup>

In my demNA-analysis in chapter 3, some support can be found for this proposal. Contextualising demNAs the prototype of which are same head demNAs (i.e., Sidner's type-1 demNAs) are often - but not exclusively - conceived of as a mechanism for the installation of a referent as highest focal referent in the discourse. Attributive demNAs, the prototype of which are alternative NPs with attributive addition (i.e., Sidner's type-2 demNAs) only modify explicit focus referents, or, as Sidner describes it "*the same element is specified but from a different perspective*" (1983:323).

The problem however is that Sidner reserves these types exclusively for *this*-demNAs, anaphoric *that*-demNAs doing no more than "*re-mention without causing a focus movement*" (1983:325). For such a claim, the analysis in chapter 3 offers no evidence: in all types of use of demNAs - classify, attribute, contextualise - *deze*NAs as well as *die*NAs are possible, although there are preferences (see section 4.4.2).

However, given the subtlety of the differences between *deze*NPs and *die*NPs, it is necessary to confront Sidner's proposal not only with constructed examples, but also with characteristics of demNAs in the DD-corpus. Sidner presupposes that focus movement is effected by type-1 demonstratives, i.e., *deze*NAs with the same head noun as the antecedent. The other demonstrative *this*-type causing focus movement are demonstrative pronouns (type 3), which are not at issue here, as they are not demNPs at all.

If my data showed that there are hardly any SHN-*die*NAs, or none at all, this could be interpreted as lending support to Sidner's focus-movement proposal, and more specifically to her association of focus movement with same-head noun, for the small number of SHN-*die*NAs could then be interpreted as an indication in favour of this association: in that case SHN-*die*NAs would be rare because of the conflict between the SHN-characteristic indicating focus movement and the formal class of



dieNAs, that do not tolerate focus movement. However, this hypothesis is not supported in the DD-corpus: table (8) shows that SHN-dieNAs are even significantly more frequent than SHN-dezeNAs ( $\chi^2=23.73$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p < .05$ ).

Table (8): *Relationship deze/die and same head noun as antecedent (+SHN) in the DD-corpus (n=1259)<sup>8</sup>*

	+SHN		rest		total
	n	%	n	%	n
deze	183	27.1	492	72.9	675
die	234	40.1	350	59.9	584
total	417		842		1259

These results do not confirm Sidner's focal interpretation, but they do not disconfirm it either. The fact is that Sidner does not claim that there are no or only few SHN-dieNAs. SHN-dieNAs could have other functions than dezeNAs. What Sidner claims is that SHN-dezeNAs, unlike SHN-dieNAs, cause focus movement. In order to be able to test this claim I translate it as follows: dezeNAs are associated more with characteristics indicating focus movement than dieNAs.

The demNA-characteristics taken to be the strongest indicators of focus movement are (i) *post first mention position* and (ii) *the antecedent in the previous sentence*. This means that the referent involved is realised first in the antecedent in the preceding sentence and that the demNA installs it as main-focus referent. Focus movement was already associated with these characteristics in the analysis of contextualising demNAs in section 3.4.4, but it also fits in with Sidner's own characterisation of focus movement:

*Focus movement is recognised in a manner which is akin to initial focus recognition. Any new term in the discourse is a 'potential focus'. The sentence following its introduction may contain either an anaphor which can be confirmed as co-specifying with the potential focus or an anaphor which co-specifies with the element already in focus. If the anaphor co-specifies with the potential focus, the co-specification causes the potential focus to become the discourse focus. (Sidner 1983:296)*

There are also other characteristics that can be considered to be associated with focus movement: *same head noun as the antecedent* is a characteristic which is congruent with Sidner's type-1 *this*-NPs. Furthermore, we noted in section 3.4.4 that contextualising demNAs - excellent candidates for focus movement - predominantly have *the format of a simple NP*, i.e., an NP consisting of a demonstrative determiner plus a noun. Finally, two characteristics are generally acknowledged as being associated with focality, i.e., *subject function* and *the position of the NP as first constituent in the clause*. Two corpus examples containing all focal characteristics and showing clear examples of focus movement are (17) and (18):

- (17) Voor mensen met een ziektebewijzing bestaan een aantal aparte regels. Deze regels kunt u vinden onder het kopje ziektewet. (2:0133)

*For people on sick leave, there are a number of separate rules. These rules can be found under the heading Health Law.*

- (18) De mechanische klep is tot nu het meest toegepast. Die klep moet aan hoge eisen voldoen. (4:0043)

*The mechanical valve so far has been applied in most cases. That valve has to meet high standards.*

The relationship between these characteristics and the DD-variation in my corpus is given in the tables (9) - (13).

- (i) There is no significant relationship between *deze/die* and *post-first-mention position (+/- PFM)* of the demonstrative NA, as table (9) shows ( $\chi^2=.67$ ,  $df=1$ , ns):

Table (9): *Relationship deze/die and post-first-mention position (PFM) in the DD-corpus except subcorpus 3 (n=588)*<sup>9</sup>

	+PFM		rest		total
	n	%	n	%	n
deze	177	62.1	108	37.9	285
die	198	65.3	105	34.7	303
total	375		213		588

- (ii) As is shown in table (10), the *deze*NAs in the DD-corpus

significantly more often occur with their *antecedent one sentence back* (+1SB), which supports the focal hypothesis ( $\chi^2=8.28$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p < .05$ ):

Table (10): *Relationship deze/die and the antecedent 1 sentence back (1SB) (n=1259)*

	+1SB		rest		total
	n	%	n	%	n
deze	324	48.0	351	52.0	675
die	234	40.1	350	59.9	584
total	558		701		1259

(iii) Table (8) above shows that significantly more often than dezeNAs dieNAs have the *same head noun as their antecedent*, a result which counters the focal hypothesis ( $\chi^2=23.73$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p < .05$ ).

(iv) In accordance with the focal hypothesis, significantly more dezeNPs than dieNPs have *simple-NP format* (simple/complex) ( $\chi^2=21.32$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p < .05$ ), as table (11) shows:

Table (11): *Relationship deze/die and format of the demonstrative NP (n=1259)*

	simple		complex		total
	n	%	n	%	n
deze	543	80.4	132	19.6	675
die	404	69.2	180	30.8	584
total	947		312		1259

(v) Table (12) shows that dieNPs significantly more often occur in *subject position* than dezeNPs, which counters the focal hypothesis ( $\chi^2=9.56$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p < .05$ ):



Table (12): *Relationship deze/die and +/- subject function of the demonstrative NP (n=1259)*

	+subject		-subject		total
	n	%	n	%	n
deze	214	31.7	461	68.3	675
die	234	40.1	350	59.9	584
total	448		811		1259

(vi) Finally, table (13) shows that dezeNPs do not significantly more often occur as *first constituent in the clause* (+/-FCC) ( $\chi^2=.055$ ,  $df=1$ , ns)

Table (13): *Relationship deze/die vs. +/- first-constituent position of the demonstrative NP (n=1259)*

	+FCC		-FCC		total
	n	%	n	%	n
deze	347	51.4	328	48.6	675
die	288	49.3	296	50.7	584
total	635		624		1259

The focal analysis is summarised in table (14):

Table (14): *Survey of the results of the focal analysis of the DD-variation in the DD-corpus*

post-first-mention position	<i>not significant (wrong direction)</i>
antecedent 1 sentence back	<i>significant</i>
same-head noun as the antecedent	<i>significant (wrong direction)</i>
simple-NP format	<i>significant</i>
subject position	<i>significant (wrong direction)</i>
in first-constituent position	<i>not significant</i>

Although there are two variables that support Sidner's focal interpretation, there is no general tendency at all to associate *deze*NPs with focal characteristics rather than *die*NPs. The most important characteristics associated with focus movement do not support the focus-movement claim - in fact, the opposite is true.

Moreover, *deze*NPs - as in (17) - in which all these focal characteristics are combined (21 occurrences; 3.1% of all *deze*NPs) are not more frequent than *die*NPs - as in (18) - which contain all these characteristics (21 *die*NPs; 3.6% of all *die*NPs).

Although *deze*NAs do not occur significantly more often in post-first-mention position - the opposite is true - it is possible that post-first-mention *deze*NAs are associated with the other focal characteristics rather than post-first-mention *die*NAs. If this were the case, it could reasonably be seen as support for the fact that the post-first-mention characteristic only signals focus movement in the case of *deze*NAs and that it has to be assigned another value in the case of *die*NAs. In order to check this hypothesis, the focal analysis of the post-first-mention *dem*NAs is summarised in table (14a) which, however, differs only on minor points from table (14):

Table (14a): *Summary of focal analysis of post-first-mention demNAs in the DD-corpus (n=375)*

	<i>deze</i> %	<i>die</i> %	<i>significance</i>
+ 1 sentence back	68.9	55.1	<i>significant</i>
+ same head noun	79.1	87.4	<i>significant</i> ( <i>wrong direction</i> )
+ simple-NP format	83.1	78.8	<i>not significant</i>
+ subject position	33.9	40.1	<i>not significant</i> ( <i>wrong direction</i> )
+ first-const. position	68.9	53.0	<i>significant</i>

In sum, the analysis of the focal variables in the DD-corpus do not support the difference between *deze*NPs and *die*NPs in terms of focus movement.

So far, we have looked upon Sidner's *this/that*-claim as an

empirical claim. But her computational reference resolution framework involves more than simply this weak empirical claim, the *this/that*-rule being part of the input of the focussing algorithm determining *the specification* (i.e., the resolution) of definite NPs. Since focus is the basis of her anaphor resolution system and since *this* and *that* imply a different focal value, Sidner in the first place attributes an identificational difference to *this* vs. *that*, the difference being that *this* and *that* in principle activate a different set of possible referents. As to focus-movement *this*, the activated set contains all candidates for main focus; in the case of *that*, it is the set of non-candidates for main focus. Thus, *this* and *that* imply a different search heuristic in accessing the intended referent and in resolving reference. However, if empirical evidence for such a difference in searching procedure is lacking, as is shown in this section, then automatically the implementation of this difference cannot be maintained either.

#### 4.2.3 High vs. low deixis: Kirsner

In several articles Kirsner proposes a treatment of the difference between *deze*NPs and *die*NPs in Dutch in terms of deixis (1979, 1987, 1989, 1991; Kirsner & van Heuven 1988; Kirsner, van Heuven & Vermeulen 1987). Although subsequent articles add refinements to the deixis-proposal, its core has remained unchanged since 1979. I will concentrate upon his 1979-article and mention only substantial amendments drawn from later papers. Kirsner's 1979 proposal for the demonstrative determiners *deze* and *die* in Dutch starts from the idea that Dutch demonstratives "*are organised into a grammatical system (...) that exhaustively subclassifies a semantic substance that we may call "deixis" and define as "the force with which the hearer is instructed to find the referent (Garcia 1975:65)" (1979:358). Deze means high deixis, greater urging that the hearer find the referent; die represents low deixis, lesser urging that the hearer find the referent.*<sup>10</sup> Deixis is used in relation with the following three use conditions (1979:358-59):

- (a) When there is a suggestion that there is a specific existing referent, that it is a localisable entity rather than a disembodied general concept.
- (b) If the hearer has not yet differentiated (distinguished) the referent from all other possible ones of the noun in



question; when it is harder to select the referent in question.

- (c) If the referent - for some other reason - requires special highlighting.

In view of these characteristics of deixis, Kirsner assumes that *"deze will be used when the hearer's task is more difficult (i.e., when it is harder to select the referent in question) and that it will suggest more forcefully than die that a specific referent exists"* (1979:360). Kirsner generalises this assumption as follows:

*More generally, three strategies suggest themselves, each of which is consistent with deixis as defined above:*

- 1. NOTEWORTHINESS. The speaker will direct attention strongest to entities that he, the speaker, is most interested in talking about.*
- 2. GIVENNESS. The speaker will direct the hearer's attention strongest to entities that are not given, "in the hearer's consciousness" (Chafe 1974).*
- 3. FOREGROUNDING. The speaker will use more than one means of drawing the appropriate amount of attention to the noun's referent, so that strong urging of the hearer to find it will be coupled with devices for foregrounding the noun in question and weak urging will be coupled with devices for backgrounding.* (1979:360)

Kirsner implements these strategies in objective and measurable discourse characteristics, enabling him to put the high/low deixis hypothesis to the test in a corpus of two texts: an essay by H. Haasse (i.e., corpus H: number of demNAs = 257; dezeNAs = 104; dieNAs = 153) and a chapter from a philosophical book by Nuchelmans (i.e., corpus N: number of demNAs = 367; dezeNAs = 252; dieNAs = 115). With respect to each of these characteristics, Kirsner finds significant differences between dezeNAs and dieNAs in favour of his deixis hypothesis, in one corpus (H or N) or in both. Kirsner's results are shown in table (15):

Table (15): *Survey of the results of the quantitative analysis of demonstrative NPs in Kirsner's 1979 corpora H and N*

H	N	<i>Discourse characteristics associated with noteworthiness</i>
F	nf	DEZE-referents refer to <i>human entities</i> more often than DIE-referents
F	F	DEZE concerns <i>singular NPs</i> more often than DIE
F	nf	DEZE refers to <i>named people</i> more often than DIE
nf	F	DEZE occurs in <i>subject position</i> more often than DIE
H	N	<i>Discourse characteristics associated with givenness</i>
nf	F	DEZE refers to <i>new nouns</i> more often than DIE
nf	F	DEZE refers to <i>decayed entities</i> (in terms of intervening sentences) more often than DIE
H	N	<i>Discourse characteristics associated with foregrounding</i>
na	F	DEZE occurs in <i>main clause</i> more often than DIE
na	F	DEZE occurs in <i>first three words</i> of sentence more often than DIE
nf	F	DEZE occurs in <i>first sentence of paragraph</i> more often than DIE
F:	<i>statistically significant skewing in support of ("for") the hypothesis</i>	
nf:	<i>NONsignificant skewing in support of ("for") the hypothesis</i>	
na:	<i>NONsignificant skewing "against" the hypothesis</i>	

Kirsner certainly offers the most thorough analysis of the DD-

variation, involving a variety of discourse factors sensitive to this variation and resulting in lots of valuable observations. However, his proposal is problematic with respect to the following two points: the characterisation of the difference between high and low deixis is ambivalent and Kirsner's quantitative results are not supported sufficiently in my data.

*The ambivalence of the notion of deixis*

Although Kirsner determines the function of the DD-variation ultimately as "*greater/lesser urging that the hearer find the referent*", in the determination of the conditions of use, the strategies and the discourse characteristics implementing them, a paradoxical ambiguity can be noticed between an identificational/semantic and a non-identificational/pragmatic function of *deze/die*:

- (i) The characterisation of use condition (b) and the givenness strategy, together with the discourse characteristics *decay* and *new noun* fits in clearly with an identificational function of demNAs: *deze*NAs are better able to access identificationally problematic referents than *die*NAs. As far as anaphoric distance is concerned, Kirsner's identificational analysis of demNAs leads to a 'contra-localistic' view: *deze* is associated with distal and *die* with proximate.
- (ii) The characterisation of use condition (a) and the noteworthiness strategy, together with the discourse characteristics *human*, *singular referents*, *named entities*, *subject* does not fit in with an identificational function of demonstrative NPs: from the viewpoint of identificational difficulty or economy, it is paradoxical that the deictic force of *deze*NAs should be brought into action to resolve a simple identificational problem, i.e., to access a referent with features which are conceptually simple, such as *singular*, *human* and *named*. One would expect these referents to be accessible more easily than *disembodied general concepts* for example. For the use of the deictic force in cases like these, a non-identificational characterisation is needed: *deze*NAs indicate a certain status of the referent (existing, human...) and they indicate the importance of the referent for the speaker (noteworthy, important...). It is this prominence-



interpretation which in Kirsner & van Heuven (1988:235-236) is taken to be the guiding principle in choosing between *deze* and *die*.

- (iii) The characterisation of condition (c) and the foregrounding strategy, together with the discourse characteristics *main clause, sentence position, paragraph position*, fits in with an identificational as well as with a non-identificational function of demonstrative NP. The fact is that referents can be highlighted or foregrounded because they are difficult to access or because they carry pragmatic values of importance or speaker's concern.

*The application of Kirsner's characteristics to the DD-corpus*

Most of Kirsner's quantitative analyses are replicated in the DD-corpus. If his DD-claim is correct, then the discourse characteristics in my corpus should show a similar relation to the DD-distribution as in Kirsner's corpus. However, the tables (16) - (19) show a low correspondence with Kirsner's quantitative results.

(i) *Noteworthiness*

Kirsner's significant result concerning *human deze*NPs is not supported in our data (+/-HUM). Table (16) shows the opposite: *human die*NPs are significantly more frequent than *deze*NPs ( $\chi^2=12.34$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p < .05$ )

Table (16): *Relationship deze/die vs. human referents (n=1259)*

	+HUM		-HUM		total
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>
deze	67	9.9	608	90.1	675
die	97	16.6	487	83.4	584
total	164		1095		1259

In the DD-corpus as well as in Kirsner's corpora *deze*NPs more often are *singular NPs* (+/- sing) than *die*NPs ( $\chi^2=5.18$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p < .05$ ), see table (17):

Table (17): Relationship *deze/die* vs. *singular/plural* ( $n=1259$ )

	+SING		-SING		total
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>
deze	522	77.3	153	22.7	675
die	419	71.7	165	28.3	584
total	941		318		1259

Whether *deze*NPs more often access *named referents* than *die*NPs, is not investigated in the DD-corpus.

Table (12) in section 4.2.2.2 shows that in the DD-corpus *die*NPs significantly more often occur in *subject position* than *deze*NPs ( $\chi^2=9.56$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p < .05$ ), which counters Kirsner's hypothesis.

(ii) *Givenness*

In the DD-corpus as well as in Kirsner's data, *deze*NAs contain significantly more *new nouns* compared to their antecedents (+/- NN) than *die*NAs ( $\chi^2=12.59$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p < .05$ ), see table (18):

Table (18): Relationship *deze/die* vs. *new noun* ( $n=1259$ )

	+NN		rest		total
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>
deze	122	18.1	553	81.9	675
die	64	11.0	520	89.0	584
total	186		1073		1259

Whether *deze*NAs in the DD-corpus more often access *decayed referents* than *die*NAs, depends crucially on the implementation of distance or decay. If we adopt Kirsner's implementation (proximate = referential distance 0; distal = rest) then my data support Kirsner's hypothesis ( $\chi^2=19.37$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p < .05$ ), as is shown in table (19). However, according to the considerations in section 4.2.1.1, I prefer to interpret distal demNAs as *further than 1 sentence back*. In that case, Kirsner's hypothesis is not supported, as is seen in table (4) in section 4.2.1.1.

Table (19): *Relationship between deze/die and anaphoric distance (same sentence vs. earlier) for the demNAs in the DD-corpus (n=837)*

	same s.		earlier		total
	n	%	n	%	n
deze	42	9.6	397	90.4	439
die	81	20.3	317	79.7	398
total	123		714		837

(iii) *Foregrounding*

Whether dezeNPs more often occur in the *main clause* than dieNPs is not examined in our corpus.

Whether dezeNPs more often occur in the *first three words* of the sentence than dieNAs is not analysed as such, but in the DD-corpus it is analysed whether the demonstrative NP is the first constituent in the clause or not (+/-FCC). The (non-significant) results support Kirsner's hypothesis, as is seen in table (13) in section 4.2.2.2.

DezeNPs more often occur in the *first sentence of the paragraph* than dieNPs. This characteristic is not analysed, but an indication of the correctness is the fact that, unlike dieNAs, dezeNAs can refer to 'antecedents' in titles. These dezeNPs are mostly located in the first sentence of the paragraph.

The replication in this section results in the following table, comparable with table (15):



Table (20): *Survey of results of quantitative analysis in the DD-corpus compared with Kirsner's results*

	<i>DD-cor</i>	<i>H-cor</i>	<i>N-cor</i>
<i>Noteworthiness</i>			
human entities	A	F	nf
singular NPs	F	F	F
named people	-	F	nf
subject position	A	nf	F
<i>Givenness</i>			
new nouns	F	nf	F
decayed referents	na	nf	F
<i>Foregrounding</i>			
main clause	-	na	F
first clause position	nf	na	F
first sent. of par.	-	nf	F
<i>F: statistically significant skewing For the hypothesis</i> <i>A: statistically significant skewing Against the hypothesis</i> <i>nf: NONsignificant skewing For the hypothesis</i> <i>na: NONsignificant skewing Against the hypothesis</i>			

Significant support for Kirsner's hypothesis is only found in the variables *number* and *new nouns*. Significant non-support is found in the variables *humanness* and *subject position*.

In view of the non-replicability of his implementation of deixis, Kirsner's 1979-proposal has to be qualified as empirically inadequate, despite its intuitive plausibility. In view of the ambivalence of the notion of deixis, his proposal has to be qualified as theoretically intransparent, being located on different levels of language description.

In later articles (especially 1987, 1989 and Kirsner & van Heuven 1988), mainly two of the 1979-list of discourse characteristics are taken to be central in the interpretation of the DD-variation. Firstly, there is the difference in anaphoric or referential distance between *deze*NAs and *die*NAs, a characteristic whose validity I have contested sufficiently. Secondly, there is the association of

dezeNAs with new nouns, which is consistent with my data. Mainly on the basis of these characteristics Kirsner associates dezeNAs with reinterpreting (summarising, reformulating) referents and dieNAs with simply repeating referents (e.g. 1987:107; 1989:169; Kirsner & van Heuven 1988:223). The validity of this association will be discussed in section 4.4.2.

#### 4.2.4 Conclusion

Two conclusions can be drawn from the preceding evaluations:

- (i) Proposals founding the variation between dezeNPs and dieNPs on elements indicating the accessibility of referents - such as anaphoric distance, givenness, focal value - turned out not to be satisfactory. Firstly, they lead to contradictory predictions: in focal and deictic proposals dezeNAs are stronger identificational devices; in localistic proposals dieNPs are looked upon as strong devices capable of accessing remote referents. Secondly, the implementation of these proposals in measurable variables does not (sufficiently) sustain the test of my corpus.

So, dezeNPs and dieNPs cannot be looked upon merely as two different values on a scale on which referential expressions are classified according to their identificational force, or according to the accessibility status of the referents involved, such as the *anaphora hierarchy* of Lakoff (1976:295), the *accessibility hierarchy* in Ariel (1988:81) or the *topic accessibility scale* in Givón (1983:17). Put in different terms: *deze* and *die* cannot be attributed different, scalar search instructions, such as *search far away vs. close, search for a focal vs. non-focal referent* or *search harder/less hard* etc.

- (ii) Proposals founding the DD-variation on the qualitative relationship between writer and referent (noteworthiness, emotional closeness etc.) offer partially plausible explanations for certain DD-variations in certain contexts. But so far the qualitative notions have been too vague (noteworthiness) or too specific (emotional closeness) to be able to act as an interpretative heuristic for the DD-variation.

### 4.3 DemNPs and referential domains

#### 4.3.1 The presence-presupposition-proposal (PPP)

In characterising the DD-variation in written discourse I start from the intuition connected with the use of each demonstrative determiner that the accessed referent has to be *present in the discourse*, i.e., that it is related to the context or situation of discourse. In fact, this intuition hinges on a minimal interpretation of the deictic quality associated with each demonstrative determiner, being that deixis not necessarily implies *contrast*, *monstration* or *pointing* but only the presupposition of being present. This minimal interpretation of demonstratives is convincingly argued for in Kleiber 1983. He claims that neither the meaning of *doigt tendu* (i.e., the locality interpretation), nor the meaning of *monstration* (the 'demonstration') of the referent can be assigned to demonstratives, not even in spoken context. The only thing which can be postulated is that "*leur objet de référence doit être présent dans la situation d'énonciation*" ('their object of reference has to be present in the utterance situation'). Furthermore, the presence intuition is congruent with the empirical fact and the adequacy condition that the referent underlying demonstrative NPs always has focal, marked value in the discourse.

Needless to say, most of the demonstrative proposals take basic ideas as their starting point which are more specific than the presence intuition. This is so with all identificationally inspired proposals in which demonstratives are seen as *search instructions* to find the referent somewhere (near/far) or in relation to other referents, i.e., all localistic proposals and also Hawkins (1978:152), Löbner (1985:321). But it also applies to *qualificational* proposals, especially proposals in which demonstratives necessarily imply attitudes of or towards discourse participants (emotional closeness, importance, speaker's concern etc.).

Instead of casting the presence-intuition in such a specific theoretical mold and thereby jeopardising the general validity of the demonstrative proposal, I will implement the presence intuition in the following way: the use of a demonstrative simply implies the association of the underlying referent with a particular referential domain which is present in the text. This is



considered to be the only pragmatic presupposition underlying demonstratives. The *presence* or *P-Presupposition* (PP) of demonstratives is defined as follows:

*Presence-Presupposition of Demonstratives*

A demonstrative NP expresses the association of the underlying referent with a referential domain evoked in the discourse.

In order to be able to handle the different functions and uses of demonstrative NPs, and in line with the dichotomic nature of Dutch demonstratives (*deze/dit* vs. *die/dat*), I will distinguish two types of referential domains with which referents can be associated. Firstly, in each written text a *deictic reference domain* [DRD] can be discerned. This simply means that each text is embedded in its speech situation. DRD is constituted by the coordination points Bühler (1982:11) distinguishes in his *deictic field of human language*, i.e., *here, now* and *I*. The adaptation of these DRD-coordinates for written language yields four deictic reference points, entailed minimally in a discourse, i.e., *place, time, writer* and *discourse/text*. In every discourse, each of these reference points can be made explicit by means of referential-deictic expressions. Secondly, in texts referential domains *can* be established the coordination points of which are clearly different from DRD. The coordination points of these other referential domains [ORD] can be defined as *place, time* and *reader*.

The presence-presupposition, combined with the postulation of the two types of referential domains, produces the following characterisation of the DD-variation:

*Deze-Presence-Presupposition*

A *deze*NP expresses the association of the underlying referent with one or more coordination point(s) of the deictic reference domain (DRD) of the discourse involved: the underlying referent is assigned the pragmatic value [DRD].

*Die-Presence-Presupposition*


A *die*NP expresses the association of the underlying referent with one or more coordination point(s) of an

other referential domain (ORD) in the discourse involved: the underlying referent is assigned the pragmatic value [ORD].

Given the distinct coordination points in DRD and ORD, mentioned above, the pragmatic values [DRD] and [ORD] are subdivided into distinct subvalues, which can be dichotomised as follows: on the one hand the association with actor-coordinates in the referential domains, i.e., writer and reader respectively, resulting in the pragmatic values [DRDw] and [ORDr]; on the other hand the association with other coordinates, i.e., place, time and discourse, resulting in the pragmatic values [DRDt], [DRDd], [ORDp], [ORDt]. As such, the different types of coordination points in a referential domain are a fruitful starting point in coming to grips with the problem of the relationship between 'literal', spatio-temporal uses of demonstratives and 'relational', actor-oriented uses of demonstratives.

In summary, the subdivision of the pragmatic values DRD and ORD on the basis of writer/reader and other coordination points results in the following figure:

Figure (1): *Pragmatic referential-domain values*



Below, I will substantiate the PP-proposal, focussing especially on the following merites:

- (i) The pragmatic values, based on the different coordination points of referential domains, yield natural classes of demonstrative NPs.
- (ii) There is empirical evidence to dichotomise the use of demonstratives into classes associated with *actor-coordinates* (writer and reader) and classes associated with *spatio-temporal coordinates*.

- (iii) The analysis of demonstratives in terms of the PP-proposal does not relapse into metaphorical or conceptual extensions which are irretraceable and hence intuitively or psychologically implausible.
- (iv) The PP-proposal does not require the postulation of different (homonymic or polysemic) meanings of the demonstrative determiners.<sup>11</sup>

In the corroboration of the PP-proposal the following line will be pursued. Firstly, in section 4.3.2, the proposal will be matched against a number of demNPs which constitute distinct demonstrative types, either because they are felt to be so intuitively, or because they are according to other demonstrative proposals. Secondly, in section 4.3.3, the PP-proposal is tested against my corpus.

#### 4.3.2 Referential domains and demonstrative use

##### 4.3.2.1 Spatio-temporal coordination points

The intuitive relevance of the relationship between referential domains and the DD-variation in written discourse is demonstrated most easily by the following two types of demonstrative NPs, representing broad classes of use of *deze*NPs and *die*NPs respectively, i.e., so-called *selfreferential deze*NPs, as in (19) and so-called '*diegetic*' narrative *die*NPs as in (20).<sup>12</sup> The demonstratives in both classes are characterised by the fact that they cannot or hardly be replaced by the other variant.

- (19) Er zijn *dit* jaar [DRDt] in *dit* land [DRDp] vierhonderdtwintig moorden gepleegd.

*This year, four hundred and twenty murders have been committed in this country.*

- (20) Er was eens een prins. {*Die* / ?*deze*} prins [ORDt/p] had een kasteel.

*Once upon a time there was a prince. [That / this] prince had a castle.*

The *deze*NPs in (19) obligatorily associate the referents with the deictic reference domain of the text, more precisely with the coordination points of *time* and *place*. Changing *deze*NPs into



dieNPs necessarily results in the interruption of this association. The dieNP in (20) associates the referent with the coordination points *time* and *place* of a referential domain [ORD] evoked by the content of the text, i.e., the story told.<sup>13</sup> Again, the replacement of *die* by *deze* disturbs this association: the referent would no longer be associated with the referential domain of the story. The inadequacy of the *deze*-variant results from the fact that it is difficult in this example to associate the story-referent with the *hic et nunc* of the text, i.e., DRD.<sup>14</sup>

According to PPP, selfreference *deze*NPs and diegetic narrative dieNPs constitute natural correlates. In both cases, there is an association with spatio-temporal coordinates of a referential domain, i.e., DRD or ORD. This is extremely clear in selfreference *deze*NPs, which simply access these coordinates in the text. In these cases the association with DRD is obligatory, i.e., the *deze*NPs in (19) cannot but be interpreted as expressing DRD-association. But this does not alter the fact that in (20) too the ORD-association is clear. This is indicated by the fact that the presence-presupposition underlying *die prins* in (20) has to be made explicit as in (20a) and not as in (20b), which would be the explicit version of the presence-presupposition underlying *deze prins*, provided we qualify this variant as adequate:

- (20a) De prins die eens ergens was.

*The prince who was somewhere once.*

- (20b) De prins waarover ik hier en nu vertel.

*The prince about whom I'm telling you here and now.*

The relevance of [ORDt/p] can be illustrated by a discussion of (21), an example from Anne Frank's 'Het Achterhuis', which is used by Kirsner as a convincing counterexample against the localistic hypothesis:

- (21) Het is smoorheet, iedereen puft en bakt en in {die /  
?deze} hitte moet ik alles belopen.

*It is boiling hot, we are all positively melting, and in [that / this] heat I have to walk everywhere.*

About this example, Kirsner notices the following:

*Even though Anne Frank is directly experiencing the heat (in the here-and-now), informants agree that deze is much less likely than die. (Kirsner 1979:357)*

This example is indeed very damaging to the locality hypothesis, but at the same time it shows that Kirsner's notion of deixis in this case runs into trouble. The demonstrative NP involved is extremely foregrounded: changing the demonstrative NP to a less foregrounded clause position decreases the acceptability drastically, as is seen in (21a). According to Kirsner, foregrounding as in (21) should be a clear indication for the use of the high-deixis variant.

- (21a) Het is smoorheet, iedereen puft en bakt en ik moet alles belopen in {die / ?deze} hitte.

*It is boiling hot, we are all positively melting, and I have to walk everywhere in [that / this] heat.*

In PPP-terms, the pragmatic value [ORDp/t] is assigned to the referent underlying the demonstrative NP in (21). This means that the referent is associated with the coordination points of another referential domain. The postulation of such a domain becomes plausible in view of the context of (21), given in (21b):

- (21b) Woensdag, 24 juni 1942

Lieve Kitty,

Het is smoorheet, iedereen puft en bakt en in die hitte moet ik alles belopen. Nu zie ik pas hoe fijn een tram toch is, vooral een open, maar dat genot is voor ons Joden niet langer weggelegd, voor ons is de benenwagen goed genoeg. Gisteren moest ik tussen de middag naar de Jan Luykenstraat naar de tandarts. ... (Frank 1979:30)

*Wednesday, June 24th 1942*

*Dear Kitty,*

*It is boiling hot, we are all positively melting, and in that heat I have to walk everywhere. Only now do I see how nice it is to have a tram, especially an open one, but that delight is no longer reserved for us Jews, for us shanks's pony is good enough. Yesterday at noon I had to go to the Jan Luykenstraat to the dentist. ...*

In the setting of Anne Frank's autobiography it makes sense to distinguish DRD, including the 'writing I', from ORD. ORD contains the story, in which the writer plays the part of the main actor. Given the postulation of these two referential domains, the fragment can be said to be poised between them: in sentences 1 and 3 the level of the story is explicitly present. The first clause of the second sentence contains the writer's reflection on the narrative. So, the *die*NP in sentence 1 reflects the referential level of the content/story. Although the *die*-version is the most adequate by far, the replacement by *deze* is not excluded at all. The effect would then be that the writer reports from within the story, i.e., that he chooses to let ORD and DRD coincide.

Although the [ORDt/p]-association is the most indisputable in diegetic story-telling discourse, it is by no means restricted to these cases. In non-diegetic discourse, in which the 'real world' referential domain is evoked, *die*NPs carrying the pragmatic value [ORDt/p] often suggest *factivity*, i.e., the demonstrative choice expresses or is at least congruent with the factual nature of the referent, existing and observable in the real world which is evoked in the discourse. The difference between 'factual' ORD-association and DRD-association is shown in (22), as the explicit versions in brackets make clear: the *die*-version provides the referent with a factual connotation, resulting from the [ORDp/t]-value, whereas the *deze*-version reflects the expository character of the text in which referents are exposed 'on the spot', i.e., within DRD.<sup>15</sup>

- (22a) In de grote steden neemt *de* luchtvervuiling<sub>i</sub> toe. *Die* luchtvervuiling (i.e., *de* luchtvervuiling die in de grote steden werkelijk toeslaat)<sub>i</sub>, [ORDp] is het gevolg van wanbeleid.

*In the big cities air pollution is increasing. That air pollution (i.e., the air pollution which really hits the big cities) is a result of bad policy.*

- (22b) In de grote steden neemt *de* luchtvervuiling<sub>i</sub> toe. *Deze* luchtvervuiling (i.e., *de* luchtvervuiling in de grote steden waarover deze tekst handelt)<sub>i</sub>, [DRDd] is het gevolg van wanbeleid.

*In the big cities air pollution is increasing. That air pollution (i.e., the air pollution in the big cities which this text deals with) is a result of bad policy.*



As we saw above, selfreference-dezeNPs do not allow for the strategic variation between *deze* and *die*. This disparity generates interesting cases, like the following variant of (19):

- (19a) *Er zijn dit jaar in dit land vierhonderdtwintig moorden, gepleegd. Die moorden, zijn grotendeels in de grote steden gepleegd.*

*This year four hundred and twenty murders have been committed in this country. Those murders were committed predominantly in the big cities.*

In the first sentence *deze*NPs stake out real-world coordination points which are obligatorily associated with DRD, whereas the *die*NP in the second sentence is associated with the same real-world coordinates, but this time conceived of as a referential domain which is distinct from the *hic et nunc* of the text. These cases result from the difference between anaphoric demonstratives in which the DD-variation is in principle available, and selfreference-*deze*NPs, which do not allow this variation.

Within the perspective of the presence-presupposition, selfreference *deze*NPs constitute a strong indication to consider *deze*NPs as the basic class of demonstrative NPs. They are associated with DRD, being the only referential domain in discourse which has to be presupposed obligatorily. Support for the 'basicity' of *deze*NPs can be found in the fact that so-called selfreference demonstratives in Dutch discourse - see e.g. (19) - inevitably take the form of a *deze*NP. Further support comes from the fact that in principle in every discourse the coordination points of DRD can be made explicit by means of *deze*NPs. Finally there is a cross-linguistic argument for the basic value of *deze*NPs: in languages in which there is in written non-contrastive context only one demonstrative-NP form available - as in French *ce(tte)* and in German *dies-* - it is always the same demonstrative NP-form as that which is used in selfreference-demonstrative NPs.

However, the basicity of *deze*NPs with regard to the presence-presupposition neither means that *deze*NPs in Dutch discourse are most frequently used nor that demonstrative NPs should be *deze*NPs by default. It will be shown that different discourse conditions can result in the use of *deze*NPs as well as *die*NPs as default demonstrative class in a text.

In sum, within the PP-proposal, the association with spatio-temporal coordinates of referential domains yields correlative classes of demonstratives, i.e., selfreference *deze*NPs [DRDt/p/d] vs. narrative/factual *die*NPs [ORDt/p]. As is clear from the examples above and as will be confirmed by my corpus, ORD turns out to be an effective tool in explaining demonstrative uses in at least two respects: (i) it enables us to simply associate *die*NPs with the ORD of the content of the text, thus refraining from making specific claims about relations between discourse participants and (ii) it enables us to elucidate the strategic use of referential domain shifts in discourse.

#### 4.3.2.2 Actor-oriented coordination points

While the demonstrative NPs above were considered to be expressing a 'neutral' association with spatio-temporal coordinates of referential domains evoked in the discourse, the effect of other demonstrative NPs has to be described in terms of associative relations between referent, writer and reader. In fact, there are lots of typical demonstrative uses which can be accounted for, intuitively as well as theoretically, in terms of pragmatic relations between writer and reader. As a shorthand, I will call these uses *relational*.

Basically, there are two relational types of demonstrative NPs: those bearing the pragmatic values [DRDw] and those bearing the value [ORDr]. Each type is claimed to reflect one basic relational mode between writer and reader, i.e., (i) [DRDw] reflects the *unequal relational mode* and (ii) [ORDr] reflects the *equal/mutual relational mode*. Both modes have to be considered the result of a writer's strategic choice. Generally speaking, in the first mode the writer chooses to establish his own coordination point or viewpoint independent of the reader's in order to realise his plans and goals, whereas in the second mode he chooses to adapt himself to the coordination point or viewpoint of the reader. A first impression of both modes is given in (23) and (24).<sup>16</sup>

- (23) *Deze sprankelende wereld van passie* [DRDw], zoals ik dat zou willen noemen, is eigen aan de schrijver.

*This sparkling world of passion, as I would like to call it, is peculiar to the writer.*



- (24) *Die spanning van die twee werelden* [ORDr], begriip je.  
(3:4155)

*That tension of those two worlds, you understand.*

It is plausible to capture the different effects of both demonstratives in these examples in terms of DRD/ORD-association and in terms of a different basic relational mode between writer and reader. This does not alter the fact that the notions of reader/writer-association and relational mode cannot fully account for the inferences connected with these demonstratives. Thus, in (23), the pragmatic value [DRDw] underdetermines interpretative aspects of the *deze*-demonstrative, signalling for example the fact that the writer wants to be responsible for the way he describes the referent. In (24), the notions of [ORDr] and equal/mutual relational mode do not spell out the inference that *die* can plausibly be seen as an invitation or appeal to the reader to understand what the writer says or to agree with it.

This underdetermination is no problem, however; on the contrary. Firstly, these relational inferences associated with demonstratives are natural extensions of the pragmatic values. Secondly, it would be descriptively incorrect to incorporate these specifications into the basic pragmatic values underlying demonstratives, since it is not plausible to assume that the demonstrative determiner is entirely responsible for these specifications. If demonstratives give rise to complicated inferences in terms of notions such as reader's appeal or writer's responsibility, this is never or hardly ever caused only by the demonstrative choice. In the examples above the explicit mention of writer and reader and signals like *begriip je* 'you understand' and *zoals ik dat zou willen noemen* 'as I would like to call it' help the reader to make such inferences. Apart from such contextual signals there are also more global discourse clues which cause such relational inferences. In an expository text, for example, the writer normally establishes another relation with the reader than in a conversational or narrative text. Consequently, it is more accurate to say that the use of a demonstrative, with its pragmatic value, is *congruent with* writer/reader-inferences resulting from local contextual clues and global discourse conditions, than to say that these inferences are *inherent in* the semantics or pragmatics of demonstratives.



In order to shed light on the relation between pragmatic values, relational modes and relational inferences, I shall now present a number of relational dieNPs and dezeNPs.

### *Relational dieNPs*

Consider first the following relational *die*-examples:

- (24) *Die spanning van die twee werelden* [ORDr], begriip je. (3:4155)

*That tension of those two worlds, you understand.*

- (25) *Hoe zat dat trouwens met die eerste Sonsbeek-expositie in 1949* [ORDr]? (3:1595)

*Come to think of it, how did that first Sonsbeek exhibition go in 1949?*

- (26) Ik heb bijvoorbeeld iets met hem meegemaakt, we speelden met Johnny Griffin en die speelde ontzaglijk hoge tempo's. Dat is voor een pianist in de eerste plaats ontzettend moeilijk, om *van die hoge tempo's* [ORDr] te spelen. (3:3886)

*I remember him, we were playing with Johnny Griffin and he was playing incredibly high tempos. First of all, it is very difficult for a pianist to play those high tempos.*

- (27) Ze knielden voor hem neer *met die typisch Braziliaanse aanhankelijkheid* [ORDr]. (9:1211)

*They kneeled down in front of him with that typical Brazilian devotion.*

- (28) *Met al die ellende in de wereld* [ORDr/t/p], moeten we het hoofd koel houden.

*What with all that misery in the world, we have to keep a cool head.*

- (29) Als getuige moet je een eed afleggen dat je aanwezig was *op die en die plaats* [ORDr/p] en *op dat en dat tijdstip* [ORDt/r]. (Kirsner 1991)

*As a witness you must swear an oath that you were present in such and such a place and at such and such a time.*

- (30) Eindelijk wordt eens bewezen dat *al dat geklaag* [ORDr]

over het onderwijs niet helemaal klopt. (7:0158)

*Finally it is proved that there is something wrong with all that complaining about education.*

- (31) Je kunt je toch niet voorstellen dat *dat* soort vrouwen [ORDr] bij Sonja Barend zou gaan zitten. Dan zouden ze even korte metten met *al dat gezeur van inspraak en praatgroepen en klachten over onbegrip* [ORDr] maken. (7:0130-0131)

*You cannot imagine women like that appearing on Sonja Barend's show. They would give short shrift to all that bellyaching about participation and talk groups and those complaints about lack of understanding.*

- (32) "Ha {*die* /\**deze*} Frits [ORDr]!" zei de jongen, gaf hem een harde klap op de schouder, bleef voor hem staan en zei... (Van Het Reve 1961:35, cited in Kirsner 1979:357).

*"Ah, Frits!," the boy said, slapped him on the shoulder, remained standing right in front of him and said...*

As was noted before, the relational inferences we are interested in are largely dependent on global discourse conditions. Therefore, in order to be able to draw legitimate inferences, it is important to recognise that all 'local' sentences presented above are considered to fit in with conversational discourse. The examples fit in to texts in which it is the writer's purpose to establish a mutual, equal relation with the reader. This mode is mostly active in spoken discourse, which is known to contain far more *die*NPs than *deze*NPs.<sup>17</sup>

In all the examples above we can discern a general writer's strategy which is consistent with both [ORDr] and the equal/mutual relational mode, i.e., the speaker wants to make an explicit appeal to the reader, as an attempt to secure the reader's collaboration, agreement, collegiality and mutual understanding about the referent.

The invitation to mutual understanding is expressed explicitly in the inviting phrase *begrijp je* 'you understand' in (24) - as was already mentioned above - and in the question-format in (25). Also the rephrasing clause *om van die hoge tempo's te spelen* 'to play those high tempos' in (26) can be interpreted that way. Note, that *die*NPs in both (26) and (27) can be followed easily by

the added appeal *weet je wel* 'you know'.

By using dieNPs in these cases the writer implicitly credits the reader with a certain familiarity with the referent, although the reader need not be 'really' familiar with the referent at all. For example, the reader of (27) need not be familiar with the devotion of Brazilians for the writer to use the *die*-variant.

In (28) and (29) the aim of the writer's appeal for collaboration is the reader's acceptance of the referent in all its vagueness (see also Kirsner 1991). The use of dieNPs here is meant to preclude questions like *what misery / place / time do you exactly mean?* In my view, what imprecise dieNPs do is not so much signal referential vagueness, as indicate the writer's attempt to obtain the reader's acceptance of this vagueness.

Not only the acceptance of referential vagueness is at stake in relational dieNPs, but also the acceptance of the writer's opinion about referents, as is clear in (30) and (31). By using dieNPs the writer appeals to the reader to agree with the writer's opinions that *one should not complain about education* in (30) and that *women's talk about participation etc. is bullshit* in (31).

Finally, the *salutatory* demonstrative use, as Kirsner 1991 calls dieNPs like the one in (32), fits in most naturally with the equal/mutual relational mode. These dieNPs are used conventionally in face to face greetings. *Ha, die x* has to be considered prototypically an autonomous speech act. Including only a vocative address of the referent, it can hardly be used to convey information. Rather, it functions purely as a relational marker, signalling the writer's move towards the reader and inducing a relationship of solidarity and familiarity. Expressions that most naturally accompany such greetings are relational questions like *how are you*. The interpretation of the greeting in such *mutual* relational terms is congruent with the fact that the replacement of *die* by *deze* is absolutely excluded. In my view, the relational interpretation given here is more plausible than the interpretation Kirsner 1991 gives within the cognitive grammar framework:

*In fact, the meaning postulated for 'die' (namely DIFFERENTIATION REQUIRED AND MADE, NOT NEAR) seems quite appropriate when one considers that, in contrast to 'Ha Bob', which merely greets Bob, 'Ha die Bob!' communicates an additional modicum of*



*surprise either at Bob himself or what he has just said. This surprise or unexpectedness seems maximally congruent with NOT NEAR (interpreted perhaps "epistemically" as a lack of familiarity) as opposed to the NEAR of 'deze' or the total absence of locative information signaled by 'de'. (Kirsner 1991:27-28)*

This explanation, which forces us to interpret *Ha, die x* as a reaction to something surprising and which associates *die* with a lack of familiarity, is incompatible with the equal/mutual relational mode and is highly counterintuitive.

### *Relational dezeNPs*

Consider the following *dezeNPs*:

- (33) Zo beschouwd is het ABN dus een standaardtaal die persoonlijk bezit van een spreker is; het is niet een geografisch af te grenzen verschijnsel... Ook Nederlanders in dialectgebieden kunnen ABN-sprekers zijn; sommigen hanteren uitsluitend *deze standaardtaal* [DRDw/d] ... (Kirsner 1987:90)

*Viewed in this way, ABN is a standard language which is the personal property of a speaker; it is not a geographically delimited phenomenon... Dutch people in dialect areas may also be ABN-speakers; some use this standard language exclusively...*

- (23) *Deze sprankelende wereld van passie* [DRDw], zoals ik dat zou willen noemen, is eigen aan de schrijver.

*This sparkling world of passion, as I would like to call it, is peculiar to the writer.*

These examples fit in with discourse conditions that incite the speaker to establish an unequal relation with the reader. Both examples occur in texts which are - broadly speaking - expository. The relational mode between writer and reader in such texts can best be described as a relation between teacher and pupil, the purpose of the writer being to instruct or teach the reader or to expound something to him. In my corpus, as well as in other corpora (e.g. Kirsner's 1979:368), *dezeNPs* are dominant in expository texts. In my view, the basic discourse conditions responsible for this are the unequal relational mode and the association with the writer's perspective, both congruent with the [DRDw]-value.

Example (33) is just one example taken from an expository context, in which *deze* basically expresses the teacher-pupil relational mode which has to be postulated in expository context. Furthermore, in this example, the same effect as in the *deze*-version of example (22) can be discerned, i.e., the effect associated with the pragmatic value [DRDd], which can be made explicit by the following inference: *the standard language with which I'm dealing here and now*. So, both the unequal relational mode [DRDw] and the handling of the referent 'on the spot' [DRDd] account for the demonstrative choice in this and in many other expository *deze*NPs.

### *Relational modes vs. deictic regions*

The idea of connecting demonstrative choice with referential domains and basic relational modes is supported by the demonstrative proposal of Janssen (1991a,b,c). Janssen's proposal starts from the differentiated relation between the speaker's vantage point towards referents and different deictic regions within the writer's mental field of vision:

*When using a demonstrative, the speaker has a vantage point in mind from which he surveys a mental field of vision. (...) the speaker conceives the field as being divided into distinct parts, here indicated as region A and region B. (...) By using the deictic 'this', the speaker indicates that he envisages the entity involved as being located in the region that is of 'central referential concern' to him. By using the deictic 'that' the speaker indicates that he envisages the entity involved as being located in the region that is indeed of referential concern to him, but is not his central referential concern. Even though the entity involved is in the speaker's focus of attention, it's not in the focus of his referential concern. (...) The two different types of referential concern will be termed 'focal' and 'disfocal'. (Janssen 1991a:12)*

It is obvious that this proposal supports the interpretation of demonstratives in terms of referential domains and relational modes: (i) In my view as well as in Janssen's demonstratives necessarily express that referents are located in or associated with a deictic region or referential domain. (ii) Janssen's mental field of vision and the vantage point of the speaker can be looked upon as the most important components in determining the relational mode between writer and reader. It seems to me to be



fully consistent with his view to interpret the relational examples above in terms of the natural connection of discourse referents with the speaker's or the reader's vantage point.

However, there is one element Janssen associates with deictics which in my view endangers the general applicability of the proposal. For Janssen the most general facet in the meaning of a demonstrative is the notion of *centrality of referential concern*, focal referential concern and disfocal referential concern being necessarily part of the meaning of *deze* and *die* respectively. It is difficult both to accept intuitively that and to determine whether all referents underlying *deze*NPs are of central referential concern, whereas all referents underlying *die*NPs "*are indeed of referential concern to the speaker, but are not his central referential concern*". The intrinsic meaning of disfocality, affiliated with each referent underlying a *die*NP, suggests either that by using *die* other referents are more central in the speaker's referential concern or that, for some reason or other, the referent underlying a *die*NP does not deserve the speaker's central referential concern. Either possibility is improbable, if only in the light of most of the non-contrastively used factual, conversational or narrative *die*NPs presented above. If the speaker tells us a story about a prince, as in (21), what referent can be more central to the speaker than the main character in the story, i.e., the prince? Or, even more clearly, if the speaker greets Frits, as in (32), it is implausible either to assume another referent being more central than Frits, or to presuppose reasons why Frits should not be central in the speaker's referential concern.

If the notion of referential (dis)focality is not meant to be implemented that way, at least it means that a referent is connected with a region which referentially is or is not (i.e., not yet or no longer) of central concern to the writer. And this alone is problematic in view of texts in which highly accessible referents, embedded in the context of a conversation or story, can repeatedly be accessed by *die*NPs. Furthermore, such a minimal interpretation is hardly tenable in view of the considerable differences across text types in the percentages of *die* vs. *deze*. If conversational discourse contains almost exclusively *die*-demonstratives, what exactly does it mean then that all these referents are located in a region which is referentially disfocal?



## 4.3.2.3 Mixed uses of demonstratives

In the analysis of spatio-temporal and relational demonstrative uses it has already become clear that these uses do not have to be discriminated neatly in all demonstrative occurrences. In fact, there are natural combinations between them which are often united within the same demonstrative occurrence. For example, notions such as narrativity [ORDt/p] and reader's appeal [ORDr], as well as exposition on the spot [DRDd] and unequal relational mode [DRDw] can be combined in the same demonstrative, as can already be seen in examples like (28) and (33).

A clear combination of spatio-temporal and relational use can be found in the following two correlative uses of demonstrative determiners, which I will call *announcing demonstratives*. Consider the following examples:

- (34) Bij dit alles even *deze kanttekening* [DRDd/w]: ... (3:2143)

*Here I would like to add this marginal note: ...*

- (35) Toen ik deze maand dacht dat ik dood zou gaan, was ik ten diepste verbaasd over *deze openbaring* [DRDd/w]: dat ik geen pijn had, en geen angst ook. (3:2613)

*When I thought this month that I was going to die, I was really very surprised at this revelation: that I had no pain, and no fear either.*

- (36) Ik wil nu *deze opmerking* [DRDd/w] maken: .. (Kirsner 1991)

*I now want to make this remark: ...*

- (37) De toeslagenwet moet ervoor zorgen dat *die mensen die een loondervingsuitkering ontvangen en waarvan hun totale inkomen onder het voor hun geldende sociale minimum ligt* [ORDt/p(r)] een extra bijdrage krijgen, .. (2:0126)

*The allowance law is meant to give an extra allowance to those people who receive a compensation for loss of wages and whose total income is lower than the social minimum applicable to them.*

- (38) Het aanvullingsfonds geeft namelijk vergoedingen voor *die onkosten die niet (of slechts gedeeltelijk) door de*

*gewone ziekenfondsverzekering worden vergoed*  
[ORDt/p/(r)]. (2:0156)

*The fact is that the supplementary fund pays compensation for those expenses which are not (or only partially) refunded by the normal health service.*

- (39) *Die enkele keer dat ik naar de kerk ga* [ORDt/p/(r)] ..  
(Kirsner 1991)

*Those rare few times that I go to church ...*

- (40) *Het doet denken aan die keer dat Den Uyl de zendtijd vorderde om het volk kond te doen van dat de olie op was..* [ORDt/p/r] (7:0178)

*It reminds one of that time that Den Uyl claimed time on radio and television to announce to the people that there was no more oil.*

Both demonstrative-NP types are correlative in that they both announce something which follows, and in that they are both restricted to particular syntactic conditions: the *deze*NPs, as in (34) - (36), naturally occurring before a colon, precede and announce an independent clause. The *die*NPs, as in (37) - (40) announce restrictive relative clauses. Their relevance, although not as correlative classes, is acknowledged by Kirsner (1991). The *deze*NP-type coincides with what he calls the *information status use*, the *die*NP-type with his *emphatic use*. Also Maclaran 1980 discusses the use of restrictive *that* in English.<sup>18</sup>

The superficial correlations mentioned thus far do not yet make an explanation possible in terms of PPP. However, other, more fundamental characteristics have to be mentioned. The *deze*NPs in (34) - (36) have to be classified as propositional cataphors. They access a discourse segment, i.e., a referent which only exists within the referential domain of the text. Moreover, they qualify the speech-act status of that discourse segment: the proposition expressed in that segment is qualified as a note, a revelation and a remark respectively. This qualification presupposes an overt, pragmatic action of the writer, who takes the responsibility for this qualification. Thus, it is normal that in the texts in which these examples occur the coordination point of the writer should be explicitly present.

On the other hand, *die*NPs as in (37) - (40) typically access

referents with the connotation of referents existing in the outside world or associated with a referential domain which is distinct from DRD. In all cases, there is a clear place and/or time association, located outside the text. Apart from its spatio-temporal connotations, *die* can also be said to 'rouse' familiarity with the referent or to stimulate collaboration in resolving this peculiar (non-)anaphoric use of *die*. More about these announcing dieNPs and the relational inferences associated with them can be found in the following section, see example (58).

#### 4.3.3 PPP and the DD-corpus

In this section evidence will be provided in favour of the presence-presupposition proposal on the basis of the analysis of the DD-corpus. Although the analysis will mainly corroborate the descriptive ideas of the previous section, its surplus value is twofold: (i) analysing real-life data forces us to deal not only with 'clear-effect' demonstrative uses but also with weak uses of demonstratives and (ii) corpus analysis shows how different uses of demonstratives can be discriminated and/or combined.

The starting point of the analysis is table (21), which shows the percentages of *deze*NPs vs. *die*NPs in the different subcorpora I analysed. The survey shows the striking fact that the *deze*/*die*-ratio differs considerably over the different subcorpora. It has already become clear in the preceding section that this result is highly consistent with my view of demonstrative choice being determined to a large extent by global discourse conditions, i.e., conditions determining the type of discourse involved, such as content and relational mode.

Table (21): *DD-distribution per corpus*<sup>19</sup>

	cor1		cor2		cor3		cor4		cor5		cor6		cor7		cor8		total
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n
<i>deze</i>	84	85.9	99	80.5	390	58.1	55	52.9	9	23	7	20.6	12	10.3	19	23.2	675
<i>die</i>	15	14.1	24	19.5	281	41.9	49	47.1	30	77	27	79.4	95	89.7	63	76.8	584
total	99	100	123	100	671	100	104	100	39	100	34	100	107	100	82	100	1259

In the analysis of the DD-variation of the DD-corpus, I will restrict myself to the two extremes: firstly, the corpora 1 and 2 with an exceptional number and percentage of *deze*NPs and secondly the corpora 5, 6, 7 and 8, with the exceptional number of



dieNPs. Subsequently I will analyse the *deze/die*-ratios in the *deze*-corpora (i.e., the corpora 1 & 2) and in the *die*-corpora (i.e., the corpora 5, 6, 7, 8).

#### 4.3.3.1 The *deze*-corpora (1, 2)

##### *DezeNPs*

The corpora 1 and 2 each contain 9 leaflets with instruction or information about an official body (library, hospital, school...) or a regulation (allowance law, custody, health insurance, supplementary fund). In view of their informational/instructional function, the brochures can be said to be expository. With respect to the DD-distribution the following expository discourse characteristics are relevant:

- (i) In the leaflets the text itself is explicitly present as a coordination point in DRD: in 14 of the 18 texts selfreference demonstratives [DRDd] explicitly access this coordination point, as in (41). 62 of the *dezeNPs* in these corpora (28%) are selfreference demonstrative NPs.

- (41) *Deze brochure* [DRDd] geeft u informatie over kleine handigheidjes bij problemen in en om het huis. (2:0211)

*This brochure offers you handy tips to solve problems in and around the house.*

- (ii) The information in leaflets typically describes possibilities, conditions, activities of an organisation or regulation. The information does not contain facts or events, instantiated in space and time, but general information applicable to all interested readers. The 'potentialis' character of the information is congruent with the informational or instructional purpose of leaflets. In most of the leaflets, this purpose is explicitly expressed, as in (42) and (43):

- (42) *In deze folder* kunt u algemene informatie vinden over *deze toeslagenwet*. (2:0127-0128)

*In this leaflet you can find general information on this allowance law.*

- (43) Wij willen u *in dit boekje* meer informatie geven over het

functioneren van Sportgroep Gehandicapten Goirle.  
(1:0037)

*In this booklet, we want to give you some more information about the functioning of the Sports Group for Disabled People Goirle.*

- (iii) Most of the leaflets are in the relational mode which is prototypical for expository texts: the writer presents himself as the informer of the reader and thus creates the unequal teacher-pupil mode, as is clear in (43).

These characteristics, annex examples, fit in with use conditions imposed on dezeNPs by the PP-proposal, thus providing strong support for the high ratio of dezeNPs in the subcorpora 1 and 2:

- (i) The explicit presence of the text and the 'text moment' ensures an easily accessible association point for [DRDd]-dezeNPs.
- (ii) The 'potentialis' character of the content of leaflets provides referents with the connotation of 'non-factivity', or at least the presupposition of not being instantiated within a particular scenario or referential domain, thus providing a strong counterindication for the use of dieNPs.
- (iii) The expository mode induces two discourse conditions facilitating dezeNPs, i.e., the unequal teacher-pupil relational mode and the 'on-the-spot effect' cited above. An indication for this effect is the fact that the demonstrative determiner in this expository context can naturally be replaced by *{under consideration / at issue}* in this leaflet.

In sum, in terms of PPP, there is no reason for establishing another referential domain by default with which referents have to be associated. It is natural to associate referents with the coordination points DRDw and DRDd, thus expressing the unequal relational mode and the 'on-the-spot effect' associated with expository discourse.

### *DieNPs*

These conditions facilitating dezeNPs do not alter the fact that in a limited number of demonstrative NPs (n=39) the *die*-variant is

chosen, as is seen in table (21). The majority of dieNPs are located in three leaflets (leaflet 6, 12 and 16: 27 dieNPs, i.e., 69%). The question now is how these dieNPs can be accounted for. Qualitative analysis makes it clear that for all dieNPs text circumstances can be indicated which can explain the activation of ORD.

One circumstance that can account for a considerable class of dieNPs is what I call *instantiation*. 25 out of 39 occurrences of dieNPs (64.1%) can be accounted for by the notion of instantiation. The notion of instantiation can account for the dieNPs in two leaflets with an abnormally high proportion of dieNPs (leaflet 12: 23 *deze* and 9 *die*; leaflet 16: 10 *deze* and 7 *die*). Let us first consider the dieNPs in leaflet 16, in which administrative regulations are described for interim workers at 'Randstad uitzendbureau'. In the leaflet the potentialis or general perspective proper to these expository texts is often shifted to the instantiated perspective of the reader for whom the regulations hold. In PPP-terms, the effect of instantiation is captured by the postulation of another referential domain apart from the expository scene. The difference between general and instantiated perspective upon the referent is clear in the following examples, especially in (44). The underlying inferences are made explicit in brackets:

- (44) Voordat u voor de eerste keer gaat werken, vult u een loonbelastingverklaring in. *Die verklaring* (i.e., de verklaring, die u op dat moment invult) [ORDt/r] is nodig om te bepalen in welke tariefgroep u valt. *Deze verklaring* (i.e., de loonbelastingsverklaring, waarover in deze folder sprake is) [DRDd] hoeft u maar één keer in te vullen, namelijk voor uw eerste werkdag. (2:0197-0198)

*Before you go to work for the first time, you have to fill out an income tax statement. That statement (i.e., the declaration that you fill out at that particular moment) is needed in order to determine in what tax bracket you belong. You have to fill out this declaration (i.e., the declaration under consideration in this leaflet) only once, and that is before your first working day.*

- (45) Maakt u overuren of werkt u in ploegendienst, dan ontvangt u een toeslag. Vraag uw intercedent(e) wat u *in dat geval* (d.i. het geval, waarin u zich op dat moment bevindt) [ORDt/r] moet invullen. (2:0157)



*If you work overtime or in shifts, you receive an extra allowance. Ask your intercedent what you have to fill out in that case (i.e., the case that applies to you at that moment)*

- (46) U bent opgenomen in het ziekenfonds dat u aan Randstad opgeeft. U moet zich *bij dat ziekenfonds* (d.i. het ziekenhuis, dat u in dat geval hebt opgegeven) [ORDt/r] zelf melden. (2:0158)

*You are registered with the health insurance agency that you filled in on your Randstad forms. Now you have to register with that health agency (i.e., the health agency that you selected in that case) yourself.*

The same shifts can be found in the dieNPs in leaflet 12. Consider (47):

- (47) Een klein deel van al deze inkomsten wordt voor hoogstens twee jaar niet meegeteld met het totale inkomen. Dit is de vrijlatingsregeling. De grootte *van dit deel* [DRDd] ligt tussen 5% en 15% van het minimumloon. (...) *Die grens van twee jaar* [ORDt/p/r] geldt niet voor u als u een uitkering ontvangt op grond van de werkeloosheidswet en pas na het bereiken van de leeftijd van 57,5 jaar werkeloos bent geworden en dus pas *na die leeftijd van 57,5 jaar* [ORDt/p/r] recht kreeg *op die uitkering* [ORDt/p/r]. De vrijlatingsregeling geldt dan net zolang als u recht heeft *op die uitkering* [ORDt/p/r]. (2:0134-0141)

*For two years at the most, a small part of this income is not added to the total income. This is the exemption regulation. The amount of this part lies in between 5% and 15% of the minimum wage. (...) That limit of two years does not apply to you if you receive unemployment benefit and did not become unemployed until after the age of 57,5 and were therefore not entitled to that benefit until after that age of 57,5. The exemption regulation then applies as long as you are entitled to that benefit.*

The introduction of this fragment corresponds perfectly well with the expository leaflet characteristics outlined above: a general regulation is exposed on the spot, i.e., on the level of DRD. In sentence four an exception to this general regulation is introduced. In describing this exception, the general perspective is left: the exception is instantiated, applied to the concrete case of the reader, which presupposes the postulation of the referential domain in which the reader undergoes the exception concerned. The dieNPs are associated with that referential domain via the

pragmatic value [ORDt/p/r].

Instantiation also explains individual occurrences of dieNPs in other leaflets, as in (48):

- (48) Als u een patiënt op een andere afdeling wilt bezoeken dan is het nodig dat de hoofdverpleegkundige *van die afdeling* (i.e., de bepaalde afdeling die u in dat geval wilt bezoeken) [ORDt/p/r] hierover wordt geïnformeerd. (2:0110)

*If you want to visit a patient in another ward, it is necessary to inform the head nurse of that ward (i.e., that particular ward you want to visit in that case).*

Another class of dieNPs can be explained through the notion of *factivity*. That is the case in 8 dieNP-occurrences. In these cases the demonstrative *die* imposes on the referent involved the connotation of factual referent, existing in the outside world. Factivity explains the high ratio of dieNPs in leaflet 6 (5 *deze* and 11 *die*). Two examples:

- (49) Het gebeurt overal. Gewoon thuis: de brievenbus raakt overvol. Iedereen stopt er informatie in. Kilo's informatie. En *die stroom* [ORDt/p] groeit alleen maar.

*It happens everywhere. Simply at home: the letter-box gets chock-full. Everyone puts information in it. Kilograms of information. And that stream is growing and growing.*

- (50) Maar waar haalt iedereen zijn gegevens vandaan? Niet iedereen kent de weg in informatieland. Van oudsher helpen bibliothecarissen en documentalisten daarbij. Stoffige uiterlijken, strenge haarknotjes, krijtstreep pakken met uitgelubberde knieën: *dat beeld* [ORDt/p] bestaat er van hen. Fout, helemaal fout.

*But where do people get their information? Not everyone knows the way in informationland. Librarians and documentalists have always helped them here. Stuffy faces, severe looking buns, striped suits with baggy knees. That is the image we have of them. Wrong, all wrong.*

Leaflet 6 gives information about a library academy. In the leaflet the information requirements in our society are described. The emphasis here lies on the 'real' character of these requirements. Moreover, in (50) there is a clear distinction

between the opinion of the writer (on DRD) and that of people in the outside world (on ORD) about the image of librarians.

Apart from instantiation and factivity, there are two remaining classes of dieNPs in the *deze*-corpora. Firstly, there are three dieNPs in which the demonstrative choice can be explained in terms of *referential vagueness* (1:0054, 2:0121, 2:0206), as in (51), to which the interpretative elements of vagueness and reader's appeal for collaboration apply, as in (24) above. Finally, there are three *announcing dieNPs* (1:0067, 2:0126, 2:0156), for which the same interpretation holds as for the examples (38), (39) and (40) above.

- (51) Indien u bijvoorbeeld naar de dokter moet of om een andere reden afwezig bent, dan werkt u niet en krijgt u de betreffende uren niet uitbetaald. Randstad reserveert 0.2% boven op uw bruto uurloon voor dat soort verloren uren [ORDr]. (2:0206)

*If for example you have to go to the doctor or if you are absent for another reason, then you do not work and you do not get paid for these hours. Randstad reserves 0.2% on your gross hourly wage for those kinds of hours lost.*

The distribution of dieNPs according to their functional value is summarised in table (22):

Table (22): *Distribution of functional types of dieNPs in the deze-corpora (n=39)*

	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
instantiation	25	64
factivity	8	20.50
vagueness	3	7.75
announcing	3	7.75
total	39	100.0



4.3.3.2 The *die*-corpora (5,6,7,8)*DieNPs*

Corpora 5 and 6 are reviews (5 book reviews, 6 tv-programme reviews); 7 contains autobiographical fragments and corpus 8 personal comments on actual events. All corpora are from the same magazine (*Vrij Nederland*), and by the same writer (Rinus Ferdinandusse). All these corpora share the following global discourse characteristics which account for the *dieNP*-occurrences in these corpora:

- (i) *Facts* taken from books, tv-programmes, everyday topics or events determine the content of all texts, favouring *dieNPs* with the pragmatic value [ORDt/p].
- (ii) The texts in these subcorpora are mostly *narrative*, also favouring *dieNPs* with the pragmatic value [ORDt/p].
- (iii) The corpora all concern *informal and conversational* texts, in which the writer explicitly takes the reader as his partner. By default, the writer establishes an equal/mutual relational mode with the reader, in which several reader-inferences can be distinguished. This favours the use of *dieNPs*, with the pragmatic value [ORDr].<sup>20</sup>

Both types of association, expressed by the values [ORDt/p] and [ORDr] respectively, are often combined, *dieNPs* being congruent with both the narrative and the conversational character of the text involved.

There are clear cases, however, in which one of the two pragmatic values has to be assigned or at least is dominant. Firstly, there are *spatio-temporal cases*. Consider (52), (53) and (54) in which the referents underlying the demonstrative NPs are associated with the coordinates time or place of ORD, and (55) which is similar to the diegetic-narrative example in (20):

- (52) Laatst keek ik naar het acht uur journaal. Daar werd melding gemaakt van een bezoek van premier Lubbers aan China. 'Lubbers,' zo zei de nieuwslezeres aan het eind van het bericht, 'zat aan een groots banket. Met stokjes.' En precies op *dat moment* [ORDt] zag je onze

minister-president met stokjes eten. (6:0066)

*Some time ago, I watched the 8 o'clock news. There was a report of a visit of Prime Minister Lubbers to China. 'Lubbers' said the journalist at the end of the report 'was a guest at a big banquet. With chopsticks.' And exactly at that moment you could see our prime minister eating with chopsticks.*

- (53) Ik ben er zelfs van overtuigd dat de Nederlandse ministerraad *in die dagen* [ORDt] is afgeluisterd (5:0031)

*I am even convinced that the Dutch assembly of ministers was bugged in those days.*

- (54) Zo begint de psychologische thriller van René Appel, en het vervelende is, dat hij Tunesië heeft gekozen, want daardoor springt onwillekeurig de naam Patricia Highsmith naar voren, die *in dat zelfde land* [ORDp] een jonge schrijver ook met een soortgelijk probleem opzadelt. (5:0036)

*That is how René Appel's psychological thriller starts, and the trouble is that he chose Tunis, because that way the name of Patricia Highsmith, who in that same country saddles a young writer with a similar problem, strongly suggests itself.*

- (55) Wat wij zagen was dat een auto op straat zo stond te flikkeren maar *vlak naast die auto* [ORDp] was een parkeerplaats. (7:0118)

*What we saw was a car blinking its lights in the street, but there was a parking place right next to that car.*

Furthermore, there are *die*-demonstratives which, by means of the pragmatic value [ORDr], in the first place express the *mutual relational mode between writer and reader*. In general, these demonstratives are used to somehow involve the reader. As I already showed in the preceding section, this 'involvement' strategy can be elucidated by relational inferences.

The pragmatic value [ORDr] is apparent in the frequent use of *die*NPs which are non-anaphoric or have to be situated in the twilight zone of anaphoricity. If we take the presence of a clear and unambiguous antecedent as the precondition for anaphoricity, about one third of all *die*NPs in these subcorpora do not meet this condition. In these cases, the writer makes an

appeal to the reader to get his collaboration in resolving reference (cf. the cases of *referential vagueness* mentioned in the preceding sections).

First, consider the *non-anaphoric dieNPs* in (56)-(57). In examples like these, the context doesn't provide any indication in order to access the referent involved. The value of [ORDr] has to be interpreted as a suggestion of the writer that he considers the reader to be able to access the referent on the basis of knowledge he shares with the writer, as is made explicit between brackets:

- (56) <beginning of the text>

Je kon nu echt merken dat het lente begon te worden want er stonden weer *van die dikke Duitse auto's op de stoepen* (waarvan ik veronderstel dat je ze kent) [ORDr]. (7:0136)

*It was clear now that spring was coming again, for again there were those big German cars on the pavements (which I assume you know).*

- (57) Dan lees je in de krant weer *van die boze reacties van Duitsers* (i.e., waarvan ik aanneem dat je ze kent) [ORDr]. (7:0140)

*Then you can read in the papers about those angry reactions from Germans (i.e., which I assume you know).*

The same sort of inferences are associated with the *announcing dieNPs*, as in (58). Apart from the factual inferences which can be assigned to this dieNP-type, the announcing dieNPs in these subcorpora are clearly related too to the mutual-knowledge appeal I described above:

- (58) Je kent nog wel *van die verhalen van voetballers die hun schoenen aandeden en ...* [ORDt/p/r] (7:0151)

*You know those stories about football players who put their shoes on and..*

Furthermore, [ORDr] has to be assigned to a great number of *dieNPs situated in the twilight zone of anaphoricity*. In all these cases, there are certain indications in the context which can be used to access the referent. But these indications require a lot more of the reader's inferring than is needed in standard, formal discourse, in which the anaphor is connected to an explicit



antecedent according to the normal accessibility conditions on discourse reference. The use of the *die*-variant in these cases is a signal to the reader to appeal to his goodwill and collaboration in resolving reference, for, he has to be prepared to draw more or other kinds of contextual inferences than anaphoric expressions normally require, as is clear in the following examples:

- (59) Als ik zijn [Lubbers' (AM)] adviseur was - eigenlijk droom ik te vaak dat *dat telefoontje* komt [i.e., waarin Lubbers de schrijver zou vragen om zijn adviseur te worden (AM)] [ORDr] - zou ik hem met nadruk gewezen hebben op de mogelijkheid van de premier om zendtijd te vorderen op Hilversum 1 en 2. (7:0177)

*If I were Lubbers' advisor - in fact I dream too often that that telephone call comes [i.e., in which Lubbers would ask the writer to become his advisor] - I would have made it emphatically clear to him that it is possible for the Prime Minister to claim broadcasting time on Hilversum 1 and 2.*

- (60) Waarom zijn er nu geen filmsterren meer? Nou, *dat antwoord* [i.e., het antwoord op deze vraag (AM)] [ORDr] heb ik al gegeven. (6:0059)

*Why are there no film stars anymore? I've already given that answer [i.e., the answer to that question].*

Furthermore, there are quantifying *die*NPs in which the combination of the quantifier and the *die*-demonstrative signals imprecise reference, often combined with a pejorative or negative attitude of the speaker towards the referent, as is shown in (30), (31) above and (61), (62) below:

- (61) En dat geeft aan wat er *aan dat soort berichtjes* [ORDr] ontbreekt: ... (8:243)

*And that indicates what is wrong with those kinds of report: ...*

- (62) Maar tegenwoordig moet er altijd wat 'zijn'. En dus gaan *al die dorpen en streken* [ORDr] wat bedenken. En zo krijg je *al die pretparken en museumpjes* [ORDr]. (7:0080-0081)

*But these days there always has to be something here. And that's why all those villages and regions start thinking of something. And so you get all those amusement parks and museums.*

As was pointed out in the previous section, the dieNPs prompt the reader to accept the reference in all its vagueness and invite him to agree with the writer's opinions regarding the referents.

Finally, relational inferences are not restricted to non-anaphoric dieNPs at all. Consider the following example with an anaphoric dieNP, implying similar inferences of evaluation and/or mutual knowledge:

- (63) Gorbatsjov ... En ten tweede blijft *die Gorbatsjov* [ORDr] een communist, dus *die* maakt wel mooie praatjes maar *die* zit ondertussen de hele dag microfoontjes in de Amerikaanse ambassade in te bouwen. (7:0174)

*Gorbachev .. And besides, that Gorbachev remains a communist, so for all his fine talk, he is installing microphones in the American embassy all day.*

In sum, the pragmatic value [ORDr] of dieNPs in the *die*-corpora implies conversational characteristics of the relation between writer and reader, especially the appeal to the reader to collaborate in the resolution and acceptance of reference.

### *DezeNPs*

The 'opinionative' and narrative character of the *die*-corpora not only favour the use of dieNPs, they are also responsible for two uses of *deze*NPs in these corpora, which together contain 13 *deze*NPs (28.3% of all *deze*NPs):

- (i) The opinionative character yields dieNPs, signalling the writer's attempt to gain the reader acceptance, but it also yields *deze*NPs in which the writer expresses the fact that he himself wants to be responsible for the way in which he describes the referent.
- (ii) Apart from many diegetic narrative dieNPs, the narrative character of the *die*-corpora also yields *deze*NPs in contexts in which the writer explicitly intervenes in the narrative line of the discourse.

Both characteristics are present in the following example. The *deze*NP follows a long narration of the content of a thriller. On the one hand it indicates the rupture in the story line and on the other it expresses the evaluation of the writer regarding the

content of the thriller:

- (64) <Previous paragraph: Narration of the introduction and mise en scène of the thriller 'Operation Red Storm' by Tom Clancy. New paragraph>  
Wie door *deze onzin* [DRDw] heen is kan opgeruimd aan Clancy's oorlog beginnen. (5:0018)

*Once you've got through this nonsense, you can start on Clancy's war good-humouredly.*

Other *deze*NPs are simply located in text sections in which the writer intervenes in the narrative line of the text, as in (65). The clause in which the *deze*NP is embedded is located outside the story line. An indication of the writer's intervention is the presence of typically pragmatic operators as *maar* 'but' and *toch* 'however'.

- (65) Toen bij de laatste kabinetsformatie het staatssecretariaat voor Emancipatie verdween, ging er gejammer op en toen bekend werd dat de vrouwen werden ondergebracht bij De Koning en Louw de Graaf werd er zelfs gewanhoopt, maar *deze cijfers* [DRDw] wijzen toch uit dat er nog steeds vooruitgang is.

*When during the last formation of the government the Department of Emancipation disappeared, lamentations were heard and when the news came that women were to reside under the responsibility of De Koning and Louw de Graaf there was despair, but these figures indicate that there is progress still.*

On the other hand *deze*NPs indicate the opinion of the writer regarding the referent and they express the fact that the writer himself is responsible for the qualification of the referent. It is no coincidence that all these *deze*NPs are attributive demNAs:

- (66) Jaren heb ik gedacht dat *deze vorm van humor* [DRDw], of laat ik liever zeggen *deze vorm van vermaak* [DRDw], ... (6:0049-0050)

*For many years I have thought that this type of humour, or maybe I should say this type of entertainment, ...*

- (67) *Deze merkwaardige terugval op de showbusiness* [DRDw] doet een beetje denken aan Braks die ... (8:0219)



*This remarkable backsliding in show business reminds me of Braks, who*

...

Apart from these strategic uses of *deze*NPs, there are *selfreference* *deze*NPs to which the pragmatic value [DRDd] has to be assigned. In the *deze*-corpora there are 24 *selfreference* demonstrative NPs.

- (68) *Deze zomer* [DRDt] kwam de pocket in ons land. (5:0017)

*This summer the paperback entered our country.*

- (69) Op de radio was te horen waar het allemaal heenleidt: welke ellende *dit landje* [DRDp/w] te wachten staat! (7:0165)

*On the radio one could hear what this all leads to: what misery is in store for this country!*

Apart from these *deze*NP-classes, nine *deze*NPs remain in the *die*-corpora. Three of them are situated in *direct discourse*, i.e., between quotation marks; three *deze*NPs are explained by a *contrastive context* - see (11). Finally, in 3 cases the value of demonstrative *deze* is *unclear*.

The distribution of *deze*NPs according to their functional value is summarised in table (23):

Table (23): *Distribution of functional types of dezeNPs in the die-corpora (n=39)*

	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
writer's association	13	28.3
selfreference	24	52.2
direct-discourse	3	6.5
contrast	3	6.5
unclear	3	6.5
total	46	100.0

#### 4.4 Conclusion

##### 4.4.1 Theoretical evaluation of PPP

The main theoretical qualities of my DD-proposal can be summarised as follows:

##### *An absolute dichotomy*

PPP is based on an *absolute* dichotomy, each pole of which

- (i) represents a conceptually distinct pragmatic value, i.e., *either* DRD-association *or* ORD-association,
- (ii) is connected with a distinct class of demonstrative determiners.

##### *The dependence on global discourse conditions*

Although the effect of demonstrative choice can be demonstrated in 'local', individual utterances, in the PP-proposal, demonstrative choice is ultimately made dependent on global discourse conditions. The most important condition is the *relational mode* between discourse participants. Further conditions which are mentioned are the *purpose* underlying discourse and the nature of the *content*, yielding dichotomies such as narrative vs. expository. Differences between *deze*NPs and *die*NPs can be described in terms of these interrelated global discourse conditions.

It turns out that the pragmatic values, based on the association with coordination points of DRD and ORD are naturally extendable to 'demonstrative' inferences the contours of which are designed by these global discourse conditions.

As such, my proposal does not make the DD-variation dependent on the individual 'identificational history' of a referent in a discourse (in terms of accessibility or referential distance) nor on the focal mechanism, conceived of as the attentional hierarchy of referents involved at a particular moment in the discourse. Rather, it makes the DD-variation dependent on general characteristics of the relation between referent, writer and reader in discourse.

##### *Localistic and actor-oriented demonstrative uses*

The dichotomy between actor coordinates and spatio-temporal

coordinates of referential domains provides a suitable theoretical mold for dealing with differences between and combinations of spatio-temporal uses and relational uses of demonstratives. In combining both uses the way PPP enables us to, and in distinguishing clearly between pragmatic values and pragmatic inferences, two important problems can be avoided:

- (i) The problem of *overdetermination*: being based on the minimal presence-presupposition, the proposal does not start from one specific (semantic) substance which should underlie all demonstrative uses. This minimality is especially fruitful in view of demonstratives for which neither distance nor focality or relational aspects turn out to be the determining factor, as is the case with most partial-repetition demNAs in post-first-mention position (so-called contextualising demNAs). Within PPP, they can simply be said to express some kind of referential-domain association which is congruent with the global conditions obtaining in the discourse.
- (ii) the problem of *underdetermination*: the different coordination points provide us with enough anchor points for plausible extensions in the form of pragmatic inferences, thus enabling us to refrain from disputable, intractable watered-down metaphors with which special cases are linked to the basic substance of the proposal. Furthermore, an important aspect of my proposal is that these pragmatic inferences are not carried solely by the demonstrative, but also by other local-contextual and global discourse clues.

#### *The pragmatic nature of the DD-variation*

In PPP, the difference between *deze* and *die* is claimed to affect only the pragmatic position of the referent vis-à-vis coordination points in referential domains evoked in the text. At least as far as anaphoric demonstrative NPs are concerned, this means that the demonstrative choice does not affect the semantic interpretation of demonstrative NPs. More precisely, the choice of *die* or *deze* does not change the semantic representation of the referent. Varying demonstratives only results in changes of pragmatic inferences associated with referents, i.e., inferences in which the presence of the referent vis-à-vis the discourse situation is stated and in which the relationship of the referent vis-à-vis the



discourse actors is made explicit.

#### 4.4.2 A two-module processing of demonstratives

In the introduction of this chapter, an important condition was imposed on my PP-proposal, namely that it should be congruent with the MOD-proposal regulating the semantic interpretation of demNAs. In view of the results of this and the previous chapter, the congruence between PPP and MOD is guaranteed by the fact that both proposals regulate the interpretation of demonstrative NPs on a different level of language description, i.e., the pragmatic and the semantic level respectively. Thus, my view of demonstratives implies a two-module interpretation of a demonstrative NP, including a semantic interpretation in which its modificational value with regard to the semantic representation is elucidated, and a pragmatic interpretation dealing with the spatio-temporal and/or relational inferences associated with demonstrative NPs.

An important empirical reason for distinguishing between a semantic and a pragmatic interpretation component is the observation that in each semantic modification type genuine *deze*NAs and *die*NAs can be found, and that the modificational value of demNAs does not automatically alter if the demonstrative determiner is replaced by a determiner of the other demonstrative class. This is demonstrated in the following examples. After the replacement of the demonstrative determiner, the demNAs in (70) and (71) remain quantificational or classifying, the demNAs in (72) and (73) attributive and the demNAs in (17) and (18) contextualising.<sup>21</sup>

- (70) Globokar, Holliger, Penderecki... *Geen van deze componisten* (classify/quantifying; [+DRD]) heeft de capaciteiten van Stockhausen, en dat maakt de zaak dan soms pijnlijk. (3:1201)

*Globokar, Holliger, Penderecki... None of these composers has the capacities of Stockhausen, and that sometimes makes it painful.*

- (71) Volgens een functionaris van de universiteit van Californië loopt een geschoold academicus, 'die drie of vier jaar geleden een keuze had kunnen doen uit aanbiedingen, nu de kans pompbediende of taxi-chauffeur te moeten worden'. Maar ook in dat soort functies

(quantifying; [ORDr]) is op het ogenblik moeilijk werk te vinden. (3:2064)

*According to an official from the university of California, a university graduate, who three or four years ago would have been in a position to pick and choose, now runs the risk of having to accept the job of pump attendant or cab driver. But also in that line of work jobs are hard to find at the moment.*

- (72) *Nasser is dood, die bevrijder en vader des vaderlands die ondanks alles toch 'links' dacht* (attribute; [ORDr]) (3:1502)

*Nasser is dead, that liberator and pater patriae who despite everything had left wing views.*

- (73) *Deze tintelende, slagvaardige en zeer erudiete geleerde* (attribute; [DRDw]) was een mens, die met alle vezels van zijn bestaan verbonden was met het bonte leven en de harde werkelijkheid. (3:2859)

*This scintillating, efficient and very erudite scientist was a person who with all the fibers of his existence was associated with colourful life and hard reality.*

- (17) Voor mensen met een ziektewetuitkering bestaan een aantal aparte regels. *Deze regels* (contextualise; [DRDd]) kunt u vinden onder het kopje ziektewet. (2:0133)

*For people on sick leave, there are a number of separate rules. These rules can be found under the heading Health Law.*

- (18) De mechanische klep is tot nu het meest toegepast. *Die klep* (contextualise; [ORDt/p]) moet aan hoge eisen voldoen. (4:0043)

*The mechanical valve so far has been applied in most cases. That valve has to meet high standards.*

This conceptual and empirical distinction between a semantic and a pragmatic interpretation module for demonstratives does not ban the possibility of coalitions between pragmatic and semantic classes of demonstratives. In fact, my data clearly demonstrate such natural coalitions. This is shown in table (24), which contains the number of *classify*-, *attribute*- and *contextualise*-*deze*NAs and *die*NAs, in the total number of anaphoric demonstrative NPs with NP-antecedent in the DD-corpus

(n=580). In this table, the preference for attributive dezeNAs and classifying dieNAs is obvious.

Table (24): *Number of classifying, attributive and contextualising dezeNAs and dieNAs with NP-antecedent in the DD-corpus (n=580)*

	<i>deze</i>	<i>die</i>
	<i>n</i>	<i>n</i>
classify	28	58
attribute	68	28
contextualise	132	142
combination	54	28
unclear	10	32
total	292	288

The preference for *attributive dezeNAs* is reflected in other significant differences mentioned earlier, i.e., in the preference for non-same-head-noun dezeNAs in table (8) and for new-noun dezeNAs in table (18), preferences which are confirmed in Kirsner's data too. The fact is that attributive demNAs are prototypically realised by NPs with a different and supplementary lexical load with regard to the antecedent NP.

The analysis of these attributive dezeNAs in terms of PPP shows that they have to be assigned the pragmatic value [DRDw], often combined with [DRDd]. They have to be interpreted pragmatically as (66)-(67) above: the demonstratives express the association of the referent with the viewpoint of the writer and with the speech situation of the discourse involved. Starting from this association, the reader draws pragmatic inferences which capture the writer's responsibility regarding the way the referent is described and/or regarding the expository 'on-the-spot effect'.

Whereas Kirsner (1987:103/107; 1989:169; Kirsner & van Heuven 1988:223/229), looks upon this preference simply as evidence for the association of dezeNAs with reinterpreting referents and dieNAs with simply repeating referents, within my two-module framework I regard it as a natural coalition between the semantic modificational type *attribute* and the pragmatic value



[DRDw/d]. Apparently, the attributive demNA-type fits in more naturally with or is used more frequently in discourse situations in which the unequal relational mode - triggering DRDw/d - is established, i.e., typically expository context and discourse situations with interventions and evaluations of the writer towards referents.

The second preference is that for *classifying dieNAs*. Again, a natural coalition between semantic and pragmatic types can be elucidated. An important class of these dieNAs turns out to entail some kind of quantificational semantic modification, as is described in 3.4.2.2. See (74) and also the examples (71), (30) and (31). In contrast, an important (but less frequently used) class of classifying *dezeNAs* entails classifying modifications, as in (75):

- (74) Reken maar dat men in de Gouden Driehoek<sub>i</sub>, en dat soort verzendplaatsen<sub>i</sub> (classifying; [ORDr]), nauwkeurig volgt waar er gaten in de wet vallen. (8:0247)

*You can be sure that people in the Golden Triangle, and that kind of shipment places, keep an eye out for any loopholes appearing in the law.*

- (75) Het Weens Mozartensemble<sub>i</sub> ..., leuke werkjes in uitvoering, zoals die alleen maar van dit ensemble<sub>i</sub> (classifying; [DRDd]) kunnen komen. (3:1696)

*The Vienna Mozart ensemble ..., nice pieces in terms of performance, the way only this ensemble can play them.*

The dieNA in (74) classifies the referent(s) into a vaguely delineated class of referents. This semantic modification is congruent with the pragmatic value [ORDr] expressing the mutual relational mode between writer and reader and the reader's appeal to accept the vagueness of the reference.

The *dezeNA* in (75) activates the class of the referent in a totally different way. The effect of the *classify*-modification is that the referent is contrasted with other referents of the same class. This semantic value is congruent with the pragmatic value [DRDd], expressing a contrast between the referent which is exposed on the spot, and other referents which are not at issue in the discourse.<sup>22</sup>

## 4.4.3 Intrасentential dieNAs

The two-module processing procedure can account elegantly for persistent preferences in the DD-distribution. One preference, however, has not been explained so far, i.e., the preference for *intrasentential dieNAs*.

In Kirsner's corpus-analysis as well as in mine, dieNAs turned out to be significantly more frequent than dezeNAs in positions where the antecedent occurs in the same sentence, as is shown in table (19) in section 4.2.3.

In view of my data, and especially in view of the two analysed corpora (1-2 and 5-8), this preference has to be looked upon as an epiphenomenon. The fact is that the high ratio of intrasentential dieNAs is a consequence of various text conditions facilitating dieNPs, each of which is consistent with the pragmatic value [ORD]. In the *deze*-corpora, all 11 intrasentential dieNAs are clear examples of instantiation, a factor, as we know, that favours dieNPs, as is seen in table (22).

In the *die*-corpora (5-8), 12 intrasentential dieNAs are embedded in coordinated clauses connected with the narrative *en* 'and', as in (76). In cases like these, antecedent and dieNA are not closer related to each other than in the case of demNAs with an antecedent in the previous sentence:

- (76) Dat zegt president-commissaris van de NRC tegen *de chef van de parlementaire redactie*<sub>i</sub>, en *die chef*<sub>i</sub> [contextualise; ORDt/p] zegt .. (5:0001)

*That is what the president of the NRC says to the head of the parliamentary staff, and that head says ..*

Apart from these, there are 8 intrasentential dieNAs which can be characterised as conversational and informal, hinging heavily on inferences the reader has to make, such as (77) and (78):

- (77) Dus op een gegeven moment weten *alle Duitsers*<sub>i</sub> in *dat land*<sub>i</sub> [classify; ORDr/t/p] dat je niet met voorjaarsvakantie naar Amsterdam moet gaan.

*So, at a given moment all the Germans in that country know that you shouldn't go to Amsterdam for your spring holiday.*

- (78) Dus let op mijn woorden, *over tien jaar is er geen paling meer*, en *die kant*, [classify?; ORDr] gaat het met de kabeljauw ook op.

*So, mark my words, in ten years there will be no more eel, and that's the way things are going with cod as well.*

So, it turns out that some typical conditions facilitating the occurrence of *die* naturally pertain intrasententially, which - at least in these corpora - can account for the preference for intrasentential *die*.

#### 4.4.4 PPP and crosslinguistic data

As I confined myself to Dutch data in this chapter, the crosslinguistic validity of my demonstrative proposal is not touched upon. In this section I will go into one demonstrative curiosity between languages, without pretending to provide crosslinguistic validation for my PP-proposal. I only want to show that the PP-proposal enables us to deal elegantly with such peculiarities between languages.

Look at the following examples:

- (79) Th.: was hastn (dann) gelesen?  
X.: (ja) *diesen* Aufsatz von dem Olson. (Auer 1981:303)

Th.: *what did you read?*  
X.: *this essay by Olson.*

- (80) He kissed her with *this unbelievable passion*. (Lakoff 1974:347; Prince 1981a:234)

- (27) Ze knielden voor hem neer met *die typisch Braziliaanse aanhankelijkheid*. (9:1211)

*They kneeled down in front of him with that typical Brazilian devotion.*

It is clear that these examples are perfectly comparable. Semantically, they represent specific NPs with an existential presupposition. Referentially, both demonstrative NPs are clearly neither deictic, nor anaphoric. All demonstratives can be replaced by an indefinite NP (see e.g. Prince 1981a and Maclaran 1980).



All sentences fit in to a narrative and conversational kind of discourse. In summary, it is hard to discover relevant referential or semantic differences in these examples, which implies that proposals based on fixed referential values or semantic meanings attached to both classes of demonstratives will get into serious trouble in explaining such peculiarities.

In view of PPP, differences such as these have to be looked upon as the result of a different strategic choice: given the fact that the writer wants to introduce a new referent to the reader in a marked way, he can choose two strategies to do so. In Dutch, the writer chooses to associate the referent with ORD, thus suggesting a mutual/equal relational mode with the reader. This association induces the reader to make pragmatic inferences to the effect that the referent is provisionally considered as familiar, in the knowledge that more information about the referent will follow (i.e., the typical interpretation assigned to [ORDr]-dieNPs).

In English and German, the writer obviously chooses to associate the referent to his own perspective, establishing as such an unequal relational mode and inciting inferences in which the writer's responsibility for the introduction of a new, unfamiliar referent is expressed. This interpretation is consistent with Prince's (1981a:242) characterisation of this demonstrative use, which she calls *indefinite-this*. She states that the use of indefinite this - as opposed to all definite NPs - does not trigger familiarity inferences. Also the characterisation of Maclaran 1980 is stated in terms of mutuality, i.e., "*the hearer is being instructed that the referent is to be found in the speaker's world, not in the shared world of speaker and hearer*". However, in my view, the use of *this/dies-* cannot be interpreted in terms of search instructions, since the examples show that the apriori familiarity or unfamiliarity of the reader with the referent is not a necessary condition for the use of either demonstrative form. The relevant question is not whether or not - apart from this particular text setting - the referent can be found in the shared world of writer and reader, but whether or not the writer chooses to present the referent *as if* it is contained in the shared world, as a means to establish and maintain the equal/mutual or unequal relational mode with the reader.

Thus, if in cases like these Dutch *die* is used as against German and English *dies-/this* it has to be regarded as the expression of different conventionalised writer's strategies to introduce new

referents in the discourse, hinging on different relational modes between writer and reader.

## Notes to chapter 4

1. In this section examples from the different corpora are marked by the number of the corpus (1 to 9), followed by the number of the demonstrative NP in that corpus (for the corpora 1,2,4,5,6,7 and 8) or followed by the number of the sentence in which that demonstrative NP occurs (for the corpora 3 and 9).
2. For an extensive critique of different versions of the locality hypothesis for demonstratives, see Kleiber 1983.
3. Besides, there are convincing examples that show that demonstratives in conversational context which are natural candidates for a near/far interpretation do not obey the predictions of the locality hypothesis. Look at the following example from Janssen (1991c):
 

(a)	Doctor:	Doet het hier zeer? / Doet het zeer op deze plek?
	Patient:	Ja, daar. / Ja, op die plek.
	<i>Doctor:</i>	<i>Does it hurt here? / Is this where it hurts?</i>
	<i>Patient:</i>	<i>Yes, there. / Yes, that is where it hurts.</i>
4. So-called attributive demNAs consisting of a same-head noun as the antecedent plus an attributive modifier (n=39) are not counted as identificational SHN-demNAs. The fact is that they clearly have a predicative function.
5. The problem increases if we take into account that the translation of the examples in Dutch results in dieNAs in all examples, see section 4.4.4.
6. In Sidner's example D41-B (1983:322) the effect of anaphoric distance is clearly present too, but the speaker's concern (*this plan* is the plan of the speaker) coincides with the plan last mentioned in the discourse.
7. According to the classification of demNAs in my MOD-proposal in chapter 3, Sidner's classification is disputable in certain respects. It is based purely on lexical-analytical types, not upon contextual types. Hence it is necessarily inaccurate, in view of the fact that, apart from the form of the antecedent, other context conditions can determine the (modification) type of demNAs as well. Moreover, the analysis in chapter 3 shows that within Sidner's type 2 two subtypes have to be distinguished, i.e., a *classify*-type, the basic form of which is the superordinate



relation between anaphor and antecedent, and an *attribute*-type, the basic form of which is the attributive alternative anaphor.

Similarly, there is a clear difference in Sidner's type 1 demonstratives between demNAs simply repeating their antecedents (typical *contextualise*-demNAs in MOD-terms) and demNAs containing a repeated head noun plus attributive pre- and/or post-modifiers (typical *attribute*-demNAs in MOD-terms). Finally, Sidner's type-4 example coincides with the quantificational effect of demonstratives described in section 3.4.2.2.

8. Unlike in table (6), the attributive SHN-demNAs are included in this table.
9. In corpus 3, this characteristic could not be examined, because it consists of only small fragments from different texts.
10. A similar characterisation can be found in the *Algemene Nederlandse Spraakkunst* (ANS):

*Komen deze/die en die/dat niet samen in één zin voor, dan is deze/dit in het algemeen meer nadrukkelijk verwijzend dan die/dat. (ANS 1984:216)*

*If deze/die and die/dat do not occur together in the same sentence, then generally deze/dit refers more emphatically than die/dat.*

11. In his critical description of two analyses of demonstratives, the 'Columbia School' analysis and the 'Cognitive Grammar' analysis, Kirsner 1991 shows extensively that demonstrative proposals are very sensitive to the drawbacks, mentioned in (iii) and (iv).
12. See for the difference between mimetic (showing) narration and diegetic (telling) narration, Redeker (1986:62), note 1.
13. Narrative discourse is not at all restricted to the establishment of only one ORD. Redeker (1986:63), for example, shows convincingly that in film descriptions four different referential domains can be distinguished, each signalled by clear linguistic devices.

14. The association between dieNPs and past tense, being the default tense in diegetic narratives, is made clear in Kirsner, van Heuven & Vermeulen (1987:136).
15. Also Kirsner (1987:89) mentions the relation between dezeNPs and objects which are *present on the scene*.
16. It is possible to distinguish yet another actor-oriented type of demonstrative NPs, i.e., the use of dieNPs not indicating the association with writer or reader, but the non-association with the writer, as is shown in (a) (see also the dieNP in the second clause of the second sentence of the Anne Frank example).
 

(a) *Met die bruut wil ik niks meer te maken hebben.*

*I do want to have anything to do with that bully anymore.*

Although examples like these could suggest that all pragmatic RD-values have a positive and a negative subvalue (e.g. [+DRDw] vs. [-DRDw]), there is no other empirical ground for doubling the number of pragmatic values. So, I will categorise examples like these under the pragmatic value [ORDr].
17. In a sample of the spoken data in de Jong 1979 (1498 demonstratives), as mentioned in Kirsner et al. (1987:139), only 5% of the demonstratives are *deze*-demonstratives.
18. Our examples show clearly that - at least in Dutch - announcing or restrictive dieNPs are not necessarily non-specific, which is, however, claimed by Maclaran (1980:816-17).
19. In this table, corpus 9 is not incorporated, since the demonstrative NPs were neither counted nor encoded in that corpus.
20. The association of dieNPs with spoken Dutch is demonstrated in Kirsner, van Heuven & Vermeulen (1987:138-140).
21. Of course, this does not mean that the replacement of the demonstrative determiner by another demonstrative determiner leaves the acceptability judgments unchanged: most of the replacements decrease the acceptability of the examples, since they cause problems with regard to the pragmatic inferences resulting from the ORD/DRD-association.

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22. The same difference between classifying *deze*NPs and *die*NPs can be found in fixed expressions like the following: *op deze manier* 'this way' vs. *op die manier* 'that way', *in deze zin dat...* 'in this sense that' vs. *in die zin dat...* 'in that sense that'. The *die*-versions are more generally and vaguely referring and do not require a specific antecedent. They often can be replaced by elements like *zodoende* 'thus', *zo* 'thus'. The *deze*-versions indicate one particular element of a class to the exclusion of all other elements.



## *Chapter 5*

# *Nominal anaphors in legal decisions<sup>1</sup>*

### 5.1 Introduction

In this chapter the behaviour of nominal anaphors is investigated in a specific institutional type of discourse, i.e., civil court decisions, a highly formalised type of discourse. In these texts, there is a very unusual variation between pronominal and nominal anaphors: the anaphors are almost exclusively nominal (see section 5.2.2). This observation is in itself already an interesting starting point for an explanation, but it becomes highly relevant in the setting of this study: legal decisions can be seen as an application case with regard to identifying as well as qualifying explanations for the occurrence of nominal anaphors in discourse.

In this chapter, it will be shown that the notion of accessibility or - more general - the identificational function of referential expressions strongly underdetermines the behaviour and the functions of nominal anaphors, an idea which is consistent with the results put forward in the preceding chapters. The key-claim which will be argued for in this chapter is that the functional explanation of occurrences of nominal anaphors necessarily exceeds the identificational framework in which the pronominal-nominal variation is traditionally treated. It will be shown that nominal anaphors require explanations in terms of non-identificational (i.e., semantic and pragmatic) functions which find their *raison d'être* in the type of text involved and ultimately in the institution in which texts are embedded.

The analysis is based on a 4,400 word corpus of 8 old-fashioned decisions in Dutch coming from a lower Belgian civil court.<sup>2</sup> The starting point in this chapter is the distribution of nominal and pronominal anaphors in the decisions: the proportion of nominal anaphors is extremely high. Starting from this observation, the following hypotheses can be constructed, fitting in with the two functional views on nominal anaphors put forward in section 1.2.

*The identificational hypothesis*

The variation of anaphoric expressions is caused by referentially problematic discourse conditions in decisions, decreasing the accessibility of referents

Referentially problematic discourse conditions in decisions are meant to be analytically determinable discourse elements, which in other discourse varieties and studies on reference have already been advanced as elements explaining the variation of nominal and pronominal anaphors (see section 1.2.1). If this hypothesis can be validated, then the behaviour of anaphors in decisions is fully in conformity with the accessibility view. Nominal anaphors then indicate or reflect in the current text setting the low-accessibility status of the referent concerned, low accessibility being caused by internal aspects of discourse organisation and discourse content. It will be shown, however, that this hypothesis only partially explains the NA-facts.

The variation of anaphoric expressions can also be caused by elements that cannot be accounted for in terms of accessibility. According to the qualificational view on nominal anaphors, the following hypothesis regarding nominal anaphors in decisions can be postulated:

*The qualificational hypothesis*

The variation of anaphors in decisions is caused by non-identificational functions anaphors can fulfill in discourse.

In the previous chapters various instantiations can be found of non-identificational functions of nominal anaphors. Not only do these nominal anaphors identify their referents, they also turned out to be used to signal or cause changes in the semantic representation of the discourse referent (chapter 2 & 3) or to signal pragmatic changes in the relationship between discourse participants and referents (chapter 4). It turns out that such qualificational functions of nominal anaphors can account for a fair number of NAs in civil-court decisions. As in the previous chapters, these qualificational functions are based on aspects affecting the semantic or pragmatic development of referents in discourse, i.e., aspects which can be detected independent of text-external conditions imposed on discourse.

However, given the fact that decisions are encapsulated in a powerful and regulating institution of law and justice, it is plausible that this institutional setting plays an important role in determining the nature of the qualificational function of NAs. I will show in this chapter that characteristics of the text-external institutional setting of decisions guide the qualificational interpretations of NAs in these texts.

In sections 5.3 to 5.5 the validity of the different NA-explanations will be investigated. First, however, section 5.2 offers an accurate description of pronominal and nominal anaphors and of the relationship between both. Section 5.6 concludes this chapter.

## 5.2 Anaphoric expressions in decisions

### 5.2.1 The number of anaphors

In the analysis of the decisions, anaphors are defined as referential expressions the underlying referent of which is already linguistically present in previous discourse. Accordingly, nominal anaphors are defined as non-pronominal anaphoric NPs, *rementioning* or *re-accessing* an *old* referent. This broad definition of anaphoricity can be reconciled with the definition of NA, given in chapter 1.3, and with the definition mostly found in data-oriented research on reference.

The number of anaphors in the decisions is 231. Given a corpus of 4400 words, it represents only 5.25% of the total number of words in the corpus.<sup>3</sup> Compared with other corpora, this is a low anaphor-ratio. Ariel's 1988 data, for example, include four short stories, each containing about 2200 words. These stories contain 755 anaphors, i.e., 8.6% of the total number of words (1988:70).<sup>4</sup>

An explanation for the relatively low ratio of anaphors in the total number of words in the corpus, is offered by the fact that in the decisions certain syntactic positions are not available for occurrences of anaphors. In fact, the decisions are constructed as one sentence, consisting of a set of non-finite clauses related to one main clause. The basic frame of a decision is expressed in (1):

- (1) De rechtbank van ..., gezien..., gehoord..., overwegende...  
om deze redenen, beslist ...



*The court in ..., having seen ..., having heard, considering..., for these reasons, decides ...*<sup>5</sup>

This construction makes it possible to leave out the subjects in the subclauses which would normally be anaphoric elements referring to the court. A conventional construction would undoubtedly yield more anaphors, as is shown in (2):

- (2) De rechtbank ziet... {De rechtbank / ze} hoort ... {De rechtbank / ze} overweegt ... {De rechtbank / ze} beslist...

*The court has seen... {The court / it} has heard ... {The court / it} takes into consideration... {The court / it} decides ...*

Thus, one main topic of the decisions, i.e., the court, occurs only very rarely as an anaphor in the decisions.

Another structural peculiarity that is responsible for the low ratio of anaphors is the use of nominal constructions with a head noun accompanied by a set of non-finite clauses as in (3), containing only one anaphor:

- (3) ...beschikking verleend in zake: Mevrouw A.M., laborante, thans werkloos, geboren te S., wonende te S., Pstraat, nr. 21, thans verblijvende bij haar ouders te S., Vstraat, 43, bijgestaan door haar raadsman, Meester B.V., advocaat te S., er kantoorhoudende Hstraat, 5. (201)<sup>6</sup>

*...has decreed for the following case...: Mrs A.M., lab assistant, currently unemployed, born at S., living at S. 21 Pstreet, currently residing with her parents at S, 43 Vstreet, assisted by her counsellor, B.V., J.D., barrister at S., with his office at 5 Hstreet.*

In rewriting these constructions in full-subclause format, a number of syntactic positions are created which can be filled up by anaphors. This is shown in the non-nominal variant of (3), i.e., (4), which contains seven anaphors:

- (4) In de zaak Mevrouw A.M. werd beschikking verleend. Mevrouw A.M. is laborante, ze is thans werkloos. Ze is geboren te S., ze woont te S., Pstraat, nr. 21; ze verblijft thans bij haar ouders te S., Vstraat, 43. Ze wordt bijgestaan door haar raadsman, Meester B.V., advocaat te S. Die houdt er kantoor in de Hstraat.

*In the case of Mrs A.M. the following was decreed. Mrs A.M. is a lab assistant, she is currently unemployed. She was born at S. She is currently living at S., 21 Pstreet. She is residing with her parents at S., 43 Vstreet. She is assisted by her counsellor, B.V., J.D., attorney at S. He has his office there at 5 Hstreet.*

These two structural peculiarities can account for the relatively low ratio of anaphors in the decisions. It is unclear whether the structural unavailability of these positions for anaphors affects the portion of pronominal anaphors rather than that of nominal anaphors in the decisions. A way to clarify this is to rewrite the decisions, as is done in (4). In the rewritten version, it should then become apparent which anaphor positions (created in the rewritten version) are occupied by pronominal or by nominal anaphors. However, this procedure is pointless: the purpose of the analysis in this chapter is the explanation of the peculiar relationship between nominal and pronominal anaphors in decisions. Rewriting attempts all start from normal proportions in normal texts between pronominal and nominal anaphors, and cannot take into account the specific institutional embedding of the decisions. So, in analysing anaphors in the corpus of decisions, we cannot but exclude the anaphor-decreasing effect of the structural peculiarities mentioned above.

### 5.2.2 The relation pronominal vs. nominal anaphors

The distribution of pronominal and nominal anaphors in the decisions is as follows<sup>7</sup>:

Table (1): *The distribution of pronominal and nominal anaphors (n=203)*

	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
pronominal anaphors	17	8.4
nominal anaphors	186	91.6
total	203	100.0

This distribution is very unusual, compared to distributions in similar analyses of anaphors. In the corpus-analysis of Ariel (1988:70), more than 70% of all anaphors are pronominal. Francik (1985:24-25) presents the distribution of pronominal and nominal NPs in 40 elicited narratives about two actors. In these 40 narratives, 2070 references to these actors occur. 56.6% of

these are pronominal. If we take into account that each narrative probably contains a non-anaphoric first mention of the two actors in the form of a nominal NP (80 occurrences in all) then the proportion of anaphoric pronouns is higher than 60%. Clancy (1980:133) gives the distribution of pronominal, elliptical and nominal anaphors in the so-called pear-stories (English and Japanese) she analyses. Noun anaphors only represent 15.7% of the English data and 26.8% of the Japanese data. Fox (1984:293) compares the proportion of pronominal and nominal anaphors in different types of texts, i.e., conversational, narrative and expository. In the expository corpus the proportion of nominal NPs is highest, but there too, pronouns constitute the highest proportion of anaphors (52.5%).

Finally, in my own corpus of 30 opinion texts, in each of which one human referent is the main topic, 709 anaphors occur that refer to these 30 referents. Although the texts have been especially selected for their interesting potential of nominal anaphors, pronouns constitute the highest proportion of anaphors (n=371; 52.3%).

### 5.2.3 Analysis of pronominal anaphors

The number of pronominal elements referring to human referents in the decisions is 17 (i.e., 8.4%). However, only 7 of these can be regarded as so-called referential pronouns, i.e., as pronominal anaphors which can be replaced by a nominal anaphor without causing ungrammaticality or without disrupting the anaphoric relation.<sup>8</sup> The antecedents of these referential pronouns are situated either in the previous clause (4 occurrences) as in (5) or in coordinated main clauses (2 occurrences) as in (6):

- (5) *Eiseres<sub>i</sub> kan niet bij haar ouders blijven. Zij<sub>i</sub> wordt gemachtigd om op een ander nog nader te bepalen adres te verblijven.* (408)

*Plaintiff cannot stay with her parents. She is authorised to stay at another address to be determined later.*

- (6) *Overwegende dat de partijen<sub>i</sub> samen gehuwd zijn, maar feitelijk gescheiden leven. Dat zij<sub>i</sub> drie kinderen hebben...* (707)

*Considering that the parties are married, but are in fact living apart.*



*That they have three children.*

The remaining pronouns are non-referential. They cannot be replaced by a non-pronoun without causing ungrammaticality or a disruption of the anaphoric relation, as is shown in (7):

- (7) Wij...verlenen aan *verweerder*<sub>i</sub> akte van het feit dat *hij*<sub>i</sub> zich niet verzet tegen het toekennen van de afzonderlijke woonst in de echtelijke woning ... (638)

*We direct that it be entered into the records that defendant does not resist part of the marital home being assigned to plaintiff.*

Although the proportions of pronominal and nominal anaphors are in themselves already peculiar, the dichotomy between referential and non-referential pronouns makes the proportion of pronominal anaphors even more unusual: 10 out of 17 pronouns are non-referential. There, the writer is forced to choose pronominal anaphors and the option of nominal anaphors is not available.

The remaining 7 referential pronouns - the only cases in the decisions where the writer deliberately chooses pronouns - occur in discourse conditions which are ideal for pronominalisation: (i) in all cases the antecedent is located in the previous clause or sentence; (ii) pronoun as well as antecedent occupy the thematic role of subject, as is seen in (5) and (6); (iii) all referential pronouns refer to the protagonists of the decision, i.e., the process parties.<sup>9</sup>

#### 5.2.4 Formal analysis of nominal anaphors

The number of nominal anaphors is 186, i.e., 91.6% of all anaphors. The format of the nominal anaphors is expressed in table (2):

Table (2): *Format of nominal anaphors (n=186)*

	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
'bare' definite	159	85.5
possessive + N	7	3.8
demonstrative + N	9	4.8
other element + N	11	5.9
total	186	100.0

The most peculiar fact is that the vast majority of the nominal anaphors have an 'illegal' format, i.e., that of a definite singular NP without determiner. These NPs only indicate legal roles, such as *eiser(es)* 'plaintiff', *verweerder* 'defendant' or *partij* 'party' (see section 5.4.2). The nouns *eiser(es)* and *verweerder* are used exclusively without determiner.

The demonstrative nominal anaphors (n=9) only once contain a normal demonstrative determiner (*dit kind* 'this child' 421). The other demonstrative NPs contain lexical elements referring to other segments of the decisions (especially the archaic *voornoemd* 'mentioned above' or *hiernagenoemd* 'mentioned below'). In 7 nominal anaphors the referent is linked to another referent by means of a possessive pronoun (6 occurrences, e.g. *hun raadsman* 'their counsellor' 207) or by means of a post-modifier (one occurrence, i.e., *de raadsman van eiseres* 'the counsellor of plaintiff' 504).

### 5.3 The identificational hypothesis

#### 5.3.1 Preventing referential incoherence

The unusual proportions of nominal and pronominal anaphors could easily be explained if in most cases the replacement of nominal by pronominal anaphors resulted in *referential incoherence*. In that case, the conclusion would be justified that in decisions referentially problematic discourse conditions give rise to the frequent use of nominal anaphors. The term *referential incoherence* refers to two processing phenomena:

- (i) the reader is not able to link the pronoun to a referent

which is readily available at that moment of the discourse, and hence he is not able to construct a coherent representation of the discourse. I will refer to this as *referential obscurity*.

- (ii) the reader is not able to link the pronoun to one unambiguous referent, because there are two or more candidates available for the anaphor. This does not mean that somewhere in the discourse a referent - other than the intended referent - is mentioned which can potentially act as the intended referent, for example because of a congruence in gender and number. Rather, it implies that, at that moment of the discourse, the accessibility of referents is such that more than one referent yields a reasonable and coherent interpretation. I will refer to this as *referential ambiguity*. An example is (8):

- (8) Original version  
 (Wij) ...Veroordelen verweerder om voor zijn kind maandelijks een onderhoudsgeld te betalen van ...  
 Voor zover verweerder niet vrijwillig overgaat tot betaling machtigen eiseres, om het onderhoudsgeld voor *het kind Sara* rechtstreeks vooraf te nemen op alle inkomsten van verweerder. (243)

Substituted version  
 (Wij) ...Veroordelen verweerder om voor *zijn kind* maandelijks een onderhoudsgeld te betalen van ...  
 Voor zover verweerder niet vrijwillig overgaat tot betaling machtigen eiseres, om het onderhoudsgeld voor *haar* (kind? / eiseres?) rechtstreeks vooraf te nemen op alle inkomsten van verweerder. (243)

*We decree that defendant pay for his child a monthly allowance of ... If defendant does not pay voluntarily, (we) authorise plaintiff to take the allowance for [the child Sara / her] directly out of the defendant's income in advance.*

In order to check to what extent referential (in)coherence can be the motive for the use of nominal anaphors, the replaceability of all nominal anaphors in the decisions is analysed. For each nominal anaphor it is checked whether the discourse remains referentially coherent if it is replaced by a pronominal variant.<sup>10</sup> The results of the analysis are shown in table (3):



Table (3): *Replaceability of NAs by pronouns (n=186)*

	<i>n</i>	%
replaceable	139	81.3
ref. obscure	16	9.4
ref. ambiguous	10	5.8
unclear	6	3.5
non applicable	15	-
total	186	100.0

This analysis shows that only a small number of the nominal anaphor replacements cause referential incoherence. Only 10 NA-replacements cause referential ambiguity. The small number of ambiguous anaphors was to be expected, for the corpus is composed of decisions with only one party or with two parties, indicated by NPs differing in number or/and gender.<sup>11</sup> By choosing discourse protagonists (i.e., parties) indicated by NPs differing in gender or number, referential ambiguity normally cannot occur in simple cases of switch reference, i.e., when in successive clauses a different protagonist acts as subject and/or topic. All 10 ambiguous NA-replacements indeed concern non-protagonists (children or attorneys of parties).

There are two aspects which explain the 16 cases in which NA-replacement causes referential obscurity. In 11 cases the NA refers to a non-protagonist referent which is remote, such as children of the parties, attorneys, foster families etc.; in 5 cases protagonist-NAs refer to a remote antecedent. They all occur in parts of the texts in which other referents are topical, for example in decision 8, in which the tasks of an expert are described extensively. Non-protagonist status, remoteness and re-establishment of referents are known in the literature as reasons to re-access referents with nominal anaphors (see Francik 1985; Clancy 1980; Marslen-Wilson et al. 1982).

In 6 cases, it is unclear whether the impossibility of replacing NAs is caused by referential obscurity or ambiguity. Finally, there are 15 NAs which cannot be replaced; at the beginning of the decisions, they install referents in their legal role as protagonists in the decisions. An example is (9):

- (9) IN ZAKE  
 V.H.I., inpakster, wonende ...  
*eiseres*  
 TEGEN:  
 S.H., hulpwever, wonende te ...  
*verweerder*

IN THE CASE OF  
 V.H.I., packer, living ...  
*plaintiff*  
 AGAINST:  
 S.H., assistant weaver, living at ...  
*defendant*

In cases like these, the legal-role indications clearly have a predicative value. A genuine co-referential link is not under discussion here, which is clear in (9a), the explicit version of (9):

- (9a) In this decision  
 V.H.I., packer, living ... is assigned the role of plaintiff  
 and  
 S.H., assistant weaver, living in ... is assigned the role of  
 defendant.

It can be concluded that in less than 20% of the cases the replacement of nominal anaphors by pronominal anaphors causes referential incoherence. This means that referential incoherence only rarely accounts for the use of nominal anaphors in the decisions. Thus, two contextual phenomena, affecting the resolution of anaphors in discourse, play only a marginal role in determining the format of anaphoric expressions, i.e., (i) competing candidates, causing referential ambiguity and (ii) distance between antecedent and anaphor, causing referential obscurity. However, in other studies on reference, these phenomena can or are supposed to account for almost the entire variation in explicit and non-explicit anaphoric forms - see Clancy (1980:160); Ariel 1988; Givón 1983.

### 5.3.2 Indicating structural boundaries

A second possible explanation for the high proportion of nominal anaphors can be found in their structure-indicating function. Research on reference, e.g. Clancy 1980 and Fox 1984, has clearly shown that nominal anaphors can be associated with structural

boundaries in discourse.

In the corpus, there are discourse boundaries between the three standard components of each decision, i.e., the introductory part (*gezien* 'having seen', *gehoord* 'having heard'), the argumentation or considering part (*overwegende dat* 'considering that') and the dictum (*om deze redenen* 'for these reasons'). The structural position of the antecedents of the anaphors is indicated in table (4):

Table (4): *Relationship between anaphoric form and structural position of antecedent (n=203)*

	<i>antecedent across boundary</i>		<i>antecedent not across boundary</i>	
	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
pronominal anaphors	0	0	17	100.0
nominal anaphors	30	16.1	156	83.9
total	30	14.8	173	85.2

It turns out that all anaphors with an antecedent across a discourse boundary are nominal. So far a structural explanation of the occurrence of nominal anaphors is applicable. However, this explanation should be taken in a relative sense in view of the fact that only 16.1% of all nominal anaphors (n=186) - and 14.4% of all replaceable nominal anaphors (n=139) - refer to an antecedent over such a discourse boundary. So, another function must be assigned to the remaining anaphors.

### 5.3.3 Indicating non-protagonist status

According to Francik 1985, NAs can be explained by the fact that they refer to non-protagonists in discourse. In the decisions, this would mean that nominal anaphors would refer to referents not indicating process parties or the court itself. However, the results are contrary to these expectations, as table (5) shows:



Table (5): *Relationship between anaphoric form and protagonist status of referent (n=203)*

	<i>non-protagonist</i>		<i>protagonist</i>	
	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
pronominal anaphors	1	5.9	16	94.1
nominal anaphors	36	19.4	150	80.6
total	37	18.2	166	81.8

The conclusion is clear: pronominal anaphors refer to protagonists, which is in keeping with the accessibility view. However, nominal anaphors do not refer to non-protagonists: the bulk of NAs refer to the process parties in the decisions.

#### 5.3.4 Conclusion

*Competing candidates, distance, discourse boundaries* and *non-protagonist status* are discourse conditions decreasing the accessibility of referents. In keeping with the accessibility view, these discourse conditions favour the occurrence of nominal anaphors. Or, conversely, nominal anaphors can be conceived of as indicators of the discourse conditions mentioned in this section. However, they only explain a small number of the NA-occurrences: their cumulative explanation rate is 39.2% (n=73).

### 5.4 The qualificational hypothesis

#### 5.4.1 Expressing role changes

In contrast to the previous explanations, which affect the relationship between formal discourse organisation and the accessibility of referents, this section focuses on explanations based on the qualificational value of nominal anaphors. In the decisions, two qualificational explanations can be indicated, the first of which is role change.

The nominal anaphors in the decisions indicate different roles of the referents. They can indicate (i) persons (by means of proper names), (ii) legal roles adopted by the referents in the decision (e.g. *plaintiff, defendant, appellant* ...), (iii) other roles referents

adopt in scenarios evoked in the decisions (e.g. *husband*) or (iv) a combination of different roles (e.g. *the child J.S.* or *the mother-plaintiff*). The distribution of nominal anaphors according to their role value results in the following table:

Table (6): *Role indication of nominal anaphors (n=186)*

	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
proper names	20	10.8
legal roles	127	68.3
other roles	25	13.4
combination of roles	14	7.5
total	186	100.0

The proportion of legal-role indications is high, and would have been even higher if it had not been for a rather special circumstance in one decision: in the dictum of decision 7, the parties are almost exclusively indicated by their proper names. The reason for this is the fact that legal-role indications in that decision are extremely complicated and hence unusable as nominal anaphor - as the role assignments in (10) show. This accidental circumstance explains 16 out of 20 occurrences of proper-name anaphors, i.e., 80%.

- (10) V.J., schipper, wonend te ...  
*appellant op hoofdberoep, geïntimeerde op incidenteel  
 beroep*

TEGEN:

V.H.A., huisvrouw, wonende te ...  
*geïntimeerde op hoofdberoep, appellante op incidenteel  
 beroep*

*V.J., bargee, living at ...*

*appellant on main appeal, respondent to an appeal on a point of law*  
 AGAINST:

*V.H.A., housewife, living in ...*

*on main appeal, appellant to an appeal on a point of law*

Non-legal-role indications are indications of roles the referents occupy in the *story* of the case in question: referents can take the role of father, mother, child, husband, wife, tenant etc. The kind of non-legal role reflects the kind of decision.

In the combination cases, two roles are combined. Only a few NAs have the syntactic character of an apposition, as in *meester V., advocaat voornoemd V, J.D., attorney mentioned above*. Most of the combinations are so-called 'binomials', sequences of two expressions, belonging to the same formal class, and having the same syntactic function, as in *moeder-eiseres* 'mother-plaintiff', *het minderjarige kind D.W.S.* 'the infant child D.W.S.'<sup>12</sup>

Role indication of referents in the decisions provides a possible qualitative explanation for the use of NAs. NAs could be accounted for by what I call *contextual accommodation*. This means that the role indicating the referent is adapted to the context at hand. An NA indicates the role which is the most adequate in that particular context. In this view, NAs are accounted for if the anaphor-context requires another role than the antecedent-context. Two clear role changes are given in (11) and (12):

- (11) Bij onze beschikking van ... werd dagstelling verleend en partijen werden opgeroepen bij gerechtsbrieven van 14 mei 1982.  
Partijen werden gehoord in hun middelen en conclusies ...  
Partijen zijn gehuwd op 23 september 1958 en hebben ...  
Het is ter zitting gebleken dat de verstandhouding tussen de echtgenoten ernstig verstoord is. (606)

*By our decree of ... a date was set and parties were summoned by legal cover of May 14th, 1982. Parties were heard in their means and their conclusions. Parties were married on September 23rd, 1958. It became clear at the session that the relationship between the married couple is seriously disturbed.*

- (12) Wij,  
Kennen het bestuur over de persoon en de goederen van het minderjarige kind S. toe aan eiseres, met bezoekrecht aan verweerder om de veertien dagen op zaterdag van 10 tot 18 uur op last van het kind zelf bij de moeder af te halen, daarentegen dient de moeder het kind bij de vader terug af te halen. (228)

*We,  
assign guidance over the person and the goods of the infant child S. to plaintiff, with visiting rights to defendant every other week on Saturdays from 10 AM to 6 PM, with the obligation for the child to be collected from the mother. However, the mother is to collect the child from the father.*



In both examples, legal roles change into family-roles. In (11) the adequacy of the role change is clear: the defendant and the plaintiff may well be on good terms, whereas the understanding between them as a married couple is severely disturbed. In (12) too, the role change is adequate: it describes the tasks the parties in their qualities of father and mother have to accomplish with regard to their child. The role changing function is the clearest in the beginning of each decision, where the legal roles are installed, as in example (9).

Non-legal-role indications exclusively occur in contexts in which the scenario they are related to is activated. Legal roles have a broader scope. They can occur in all scenarios in the decisions. This is an indication of the fact that role changes are not identificational at all: in all cases legal-role indications would be sufficient. Contextual accommodation is a qualificational function of nominal anaphors. An NA no longer merely reflects the accessibility status of the referent, but also signals the most adequate role indication of the referent in the context at hand.

Table (7) shows that role change between antecedent and anaphor can explain a considerable subset of the nominal anaphors.<sup>13</sup>

Table (7): *The occurrence of nominal anaphors in role-change and non-role-change situation (n=186)*

	<i>n</i>	%
role change	44	23.7
no role change	142	76.3
total	186	100.0

Role changes could be compared with the notions of world- or scenario-shift, put forward elsewhere to explain occurrences of nominal anaphors. Thus, Clancy explains the preference for nominal NPs at the beginning of the stories in her English corpus (13 out of 260 nominal anaphors) by looking upon them as signalling the transition of the *real-world* perspective to the *story-world* perspective (1980:147-150). Anderson et al. 1983 provide evidence for the fact that scenario-bound referents lose their availability after the transition to another scenario in the discourse. However, this does not apply to the role changes as described in the decisions. The reason for this is twofold:

- (i) In the *scenario-shift* proposals mentioned above, nominal anaphors are merely indicators of scenario shift, a function which is not fundamentally different from other accessibility functions of NAs, such as the indication of remoteness of the antecedent, or of discourse boundaries. In all these proposals, the fact that the anaphor is nominal - as opposed to pronominal - is the crucial trigger for determining its functional value. In my interpretation of *role-change*, however, it is the lexical content of the NA - as opposed to the content of previous NAs - that is crucial in determining the functional value of NAs.
- (ii) Although the notion of scenario is useful in describing the different settings which can be evoked in decisions, there is a clear difference between scenario-shift and what I called role change. The fact is that not every single role change causes a scenario shift or is accompanied by one and that not every scenario-shift has to be signalled by a role change. Within the same discourse unit (proposition, clause) indications of different roles can occur, as in (13) where a legal-role indication coincides with family-role indications in the same unit, within which scenario-shifts cannot plausibly be assumed.
- (13) *Verweerder* biedt aan om voor het onderhoud van *echtgenote* en *kind* respectievelijk 16.500 frank en 3.500 frank per maand te betalen. (616-617)

*Defendant offers to pay in support of his wife and child the monthly sums of 16,500 francs and 3,500 francs respectively.*

Moreover, nominal anaphors themselves can signal two roles at a time (as in e.g. *moeder-eiseres* 'mother-plaintiff'). Furthermore there is the fact mentioned earlier that legal-role indications can occur in any scenario, as is shown for example in (14) and (15):

- (14) *Eiseres* is geboren op 1 oktober 1960 en *verweerder* op 26 december 1959. (209-210)

*Plaintiff was born on October 1st, 1960 and defendant on December 26th, 1959.*

- (15) ... Zeggen dat het volledig bedrag van de kinderbijslag



aan eiseres toekomt. (246)

... Say that the full amount of the child benefit is due to plaintiff.

Thus, it is the variation between the lexical content of the antecedent and the lexical content of the anaphor that determines the role changing function of NAs and not the variation between nominal and pronominal anaphors.

The qualificational nature of the role changing function of NAs can be substantiated by the following observations. The replacement of the nominal anaphors by pronouns rarely causes referential incoherence - as is shown in table (3). The replacement of non-legal-role indications by legal-role indications never causes referential incoherence. These replacements only result in differences in perspective, adequacy, relevance and/or informative value, notions known as qualificational from the preceding chapters.

#### 5.4.2 Suggesting direct discourse

A further pragmatic explanation for a subset of NAs can be found in the illocutionary mode of the decisions. Decisions are written in the performative, transactional mode. Things are not merely described or elaborated upon (see e.g. Kurzon 1989:298), they are *established* as they are described. This mode is especially clear in the dictum, which consists of an enumeration of clauses beginning with a performative verb. A characteristic of the dictum is that it does not communicate events or facts, but that it performs actions. The action verbs in the dictum are mostly explicitly performative. They indicate what parties have to do, what they are permitted or not permitted to do, what they get or have to give etc. The following performative verbs occur in the decisions: *machtigen* 'authorise', *gelasten* 'order/direct', *zeggen* 'say', *toekennen* 'assign', *veroordelen* 'convict/condemn', *toelaten* 'permit/allow', *bevelen* 'order', *toevertrouwen* 'entrust', *verbod opleggen* 'prohibit', *verwijzen* 'direct', *verklaren* 'declare', *ontbinden* 'dissolve', *verlenen* 'grant', *verbod doen* 'forbid', *compenseren* 'compensate', *uitspreken* 'utter', *ontzeggen* 'deny/refuse', *opdragen* 'be assigned', *aanhouden* 'arrest/apprehend', *aanstellen* 'appoint'.

Some of the verbs are not explicitly performative. A verb like



*zeggen* 'say' can have the character of a statement. At the beginning of a *dictum*-clause, however, the verb *zeggen* is performative and introduces a decree, as is clear in (16):

- (16) Wij ... zeggen dat het onderhoudsgeld wordt gekoppeld aan het indexcijfer van de maand juli 1984 en eenmaal 's jaar dient te worden aangepast in de maand augustus op het indexcijfer van de maand tevoren; zeggen dat het volledig bedrag van de kinderbijslag aan eiseres toekomt; (245)

*We ... say that the allowance is linked to the index-figure of the month of July 1984 and must be adapted every year in the month of August on the basis of the index-figure of the previous month; say that the full amount of the child benefit is due to plaintiff;*

The performative value of these clauses can be seen as a sound explanatory basis for the nominal character of a subset of anaphors in the decisions. Performative speech acts typically imply an interactional, direct-discourse situation. The most frequent stereotype form of a performative speech act underlying the clauses in the *dictum* is the following:

- (17) <judge to parties>  
{I / we} condemn / declare you ...

The interactional direct-discourse perspective, as in (17), is not entirely applicable to decisions. Decisions are forms of written communication, in which pronouns as in (17) can only be used to a limited extent. Thus, the second person pronoun, for example, is unable to disambiguate between plaintiff and defendant. Also, decisions not only represent the actual realisation of the decision, but they are also its written report. Finally, decisions as official reports are not only addressed to the parties in the lawsuit, but can be used by others too, for instance as precedents. These characteristics of decisions do not allow the use of the stereotype format of a performative speech act in the *dictum*. However, this format is approximated as much as possible: the *agent*-part in the performative speech acts - i.e., the court - is referred to by means of both *de rechtbank* 'the court' and *wij* 'we', as in (18):

- (18) Om deze redenen, Wij J. Z., rechter ... uitspraak doende bij voorlopige beschikking, in openbare terechtzitting op tegenspraak: ... (8)

*For these reasons, We J.Z., judge ... decreeing by preliminary provision, in open court after full argument on both sides ...*

The *dative/experiencer*-part of the speech acts, i.e., the process parties, is referred to exclusively by means of *definite-description anaphors without determiners*: all anaphors filling an argument slot of a performative verb in the decisions ( $n=47$ ; 23.2% of all anaphors) have this 'bare' nominal format, as is seen in table (8):

Table (8): *Relationship between anaphoric form and argument-slot anaphors of performative verbs in the dictum* ( $n=203$ )

	argument-slot anaphors of performative verbs in dictum		other anaphors	
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%
pronominal anaphors	0	0	17	100.0
nominal anaphors	47	25.3	139	74.7
total	47	23.2	156	76.8

Examples of argument-slot anaphors are found in (19):

- (19) Wij ... Kennen aan *verweerder* het voorlopig gebruiksrecht toe van ...; Leggen aan *partijen* verbod op deze goederen te verplaatsen, ...; Veroordelen *eiseres* om aan *verweerder* terug te betalen ... (426-431)

*We ... assign defendant the provisional right of use of ...; forbid parties to move these goods; Condemn plaintiff to refund defendant for ...*

The choice of this type of anaphor in these positions is not accidental, since it supports the direct-discourse perspective of performative communication better than pronominal anaphors. By omitting the definite determiner the legal-role indications get the format of proper names. Not only do proper names have the denoting property of uniquely identifying referents, they also have an addressing or vocative property with respect to the referent. Definite descriptions do not have either of these characteristics by default. The omission of the determiner

provides the definite descriptions with both characteristics. The vocative property of 'bare' definite descriptions - as opposed to normal definite descriptions and third-person pronouns - is shown in (20):

- (20) {Boer / \*de boer / \*hij}, pas op je kippen.

{Farmer / the farmer / he}, take care of your chickens.

It is this vocative property which accounts for the use of bare nominal anaphors in the argument slots of performative verbs in the dictum of the decisions. Bare nominal anaphors are able to suggest the direct-discourse perspective, which is essential in performative speech acts, as is seen in (19a):

- (19a) Wij ... Kennen aan {U, verweerder / ?U, de verweerder / \*U, hem} het voorlopig gebruiksrecht toe van ...;  
Leggen aan {U, partijen / ?U, de partijen / \*U, hen} verbod op deze goederen te verplaatsen, ...;  
Veroordelen {U, eiseres / ?U, de eiseres / \*U, haar} om aan {U, verweerder / ?U, de verweerder / \*U, hem} terug te betalen ... (426)

We ... assign to {you, defendant / you, the defendant / you, him} the provisional right of use of...;  
forbid {you, parties / you, the parties / you, them} to move these goods;  
Condemn {you, plaintiff / you, the plaintiff / you, her} to refund {you, defendant / you, the defendant / you, him} for ...

The vocative function of the performative nominal anaphors in the decisions is supported by the analysis of cataphorically related referential expressions in Maes 1987. There I explained the acceptability of 'illegal' cataphoric relationships like the ones in (21)-(25), by introducing the notion of direct-discourse perspective:

- (21) <Walter> ... The teacher warned *him* that *Walter* would have to work harder.  
(22) <Mary> ... *She* was told that under no circumstances would *Mary* have to compromise herself.  
(23) <Mary> ... *She* was told that if she wanted to get anywhere in this dog-eat-dog world, *Mary* was going to have to start stepping on some people.  
(24) <Mary> ... *She* was told that *Mary* would have to step on some people.



- (25) <John> ... *He* was told that *John* was a jerk.<sup>14</sup>

According to the structural restrictions on co-referentiality, such as Reinhart (1983:43), the cataphoric relationships in these sentences cause ungrammaticality, since the nominal anaphor is in the structural domain of the pronominal antecedent. However, it is claimed in Maes 1987 that the sentences are clearly acceptable, provided that the discourse referents underlying these co-referential NPs are highly accessible at the moment the sentences occur in the discourse, which normally means that both antecedent and pronoun are anaphorically related to a preceding mention of the discourse referent. The function of the nominal remention of the referent then lies in the activation of the direct-discourse perspective. Note that the replacement of the proper names by 'normal' definite descriptions would not allow the same direct-discourse interpretation. This interpretation is made explicit in the a-versions below.<sup>15</sup>

- (21a) The teacher warned Walter: "You would have to work harder!"  
 (22a) Mary was told "Do not compromise yourself, Mary, under no circumstances!"  
 (23a) She was told: "If you want to get anywhere in this dog-eat-dog world, you have to start stepping on some people".  
 (24a) She was told: "You have to step on some people".  
 (25a) John was told: "You are a jerk".

Our conclusion is that the direct-discourse perspective offers a sound explanation for a clear-cut subset of nominal anaphors in the decisions, an explanation which follows from the performative character of the dictum of the decisions. Such an explanation fits in with the non-identificational function of nominal anaphors: the direct-discourse suggestion does not affect the accessibility of the referent, but it imposes a pragmatic interactional perspective upon the referent.

### 5.4.3 Conclusion

So far, a fair number of NA-occurrences can be explained through text-internal variables, which can be determined analytically in the decisions involved. In the first column, table (9) lists the number of NAs accounted for by each variable. The successive

variables only apply to the remaining unexplained NAs. In the following column the cumulative percentage of explained NAs is given:

Table (9): *Accumulative explanation rate for NAs of textinternal variables (n=186)*

NA-explaining variable	accounted for	accounted for
	n	%
ref. incoherence	47	47/186*100=25.3
discourse boundary	14	61/186*100=32.8
non-protagonist	12	73/186*100=39.2
role change	19	92/186*100=49.5
direct discourse	33	125/186*100=67.2

All these variables together have an explanation rate of 67.2%. The remaining NA-occurrences (n=61, 32.8% of all NAs) are extremely atypical, in the sense that there are no text-internal characteristics that can explain their nominal format. No generalizable formal, semantic or pragmatic discourse characteristic turns out to be capable of explaining them.

One major factor we have not yet taken into account in explaining NAs, is the fact that decisions take up a well-established place in the highly structured institution of the law. This in fact means two things: firstly, a decision is not a free-style text, but a highly canonised text form which is modelled along the strict lines dictated by legal conventions and tradition. Secondly, a decision takes up a position in between other forms of communication in the legal procedure.<sup>16</sup>

In order to explain the functionality of nominal anaphors, I will in the following section touch on relevant aspects of the function of the law and of the function of decisions within the institution of the law. The institutional analysis of decisions will turn out to provide a suitable framework in which especially qualificational functions of NAs find a natural place. Hence, in view of the institutional function of decisions, not only the remaining NAs can be explained, but also the above mentioned qualificational variables can be fitted in.

## 5.5 Decisions as institutional texts

### 5.5.1 Law and counterfactuality

The law, as expressed, among other things, in decisions, is basically meant to solve conflicts. It does not solve these conflicts on an individual basis, i.e., it does not decide upon cases and conflicts only by evaluating and deciding upon the individual facts concerned. Instead, the law solves a conflict by divesting the conflict of its individual and subjective character, i.e., by disindividualising the conflict, without, however, neglecting the individual aspects of the case. The nature of solving conflicts by law can be expressed by the following three interpretations associated with Hegel's notion of *Aufhebung*, expressing the dialectical relationship between law as a system of rules and concepts on the one hand and the specificity of the case on the other:<sup>17</sup>

- to confirm the conflict as a conflict
- to finish the conflict
- to raise the conflict to a higher level.

Thus, the function of the law is that it creates an artificial level at which factual circumstances are abstracted from and individual inequalities are equalised. As such, the law creates a *mise en scène* in which the interaction between conflicting parties is objectified. The fact is that the judge is not supposed to decide in favour or against this or that individual, but to determine that which according to objective law is the relationship that applies.

Philosophers of law have implemented this idea of the function of the law in many ways: the law is said to reduce, transform or reconstruct factual reality. An interesting starting point for the institutional explanation of nominal anaphors can be found in the idea, put forward in Foqué & 't Hart 1990, that the law has to be looked upon as a counterfactual reconstruction of factual reality:<sup>18</sup>

*De handeling of beslissing dient vanuit een oogpunt van integriteit steeds reconstrueerbaar te zijn 'as if', alsof zij het resultaat is van die beginselen [algemene rechtsbeginselen (A.M.)], alsof de handeling of beslissing op een andere wijze tot stand gekomen is dan dat wellicht 'feitelijk' het geval is. Deze reconstructie 'as if' is met andere woorden een 'contrafactische'*



*constructie, die bewerkstelligt dat een concrete handeling of beslissing betrokken kan worden op het beeld dat de maatschappij waarin gehandeld of beslist wordt van zichzelf heeft (het 'imaginaire sociale') en in de integriteit van dat zelfbeeld opgenomen kan worden. (Foqué & 't Hart 1990:138).*

*To achieve integrity, the action or decision should always be reconstructable 'as if', as if they are the result of those principles [general principles of justice (AM)], as if the action or decision has come about in another way than might actually have been the case in reality. In other words, this reconstruction 'as if' is a counterfactual construction, which causes a concrete action or decision to be related to the self-image of the society in which the action or decision takes place (the 'imaginaire sociale') and in the integrity of which it can be incorporated.*

Legal concepts have an artificial, counterfactual meaning. This means that the terminology does not directly have empirical factuality as its object and hence can be called counterfactual (Foqué & 't Hart 1990:139). Applied to decisions, the idea of counterfactuality means that a decision is not seen as deciding upon individual conflicts, but 'as if' it were an objectified decision taken on the basis of principles of justice, applicable to everyone. In view of our interest in discourse referents, especially the counterfactual characterisation of the notion of *legal subject* is important:

*Zo is in het bijzondere de juridische categorie van de rechtssubjectiviteit een contrafactische categorie: zij beschrijft niet de feitelijkheid van het menszijn van elk individu, maar zij maakt het mogelijk het handelen en het beslissen van die feitelijke individuen te reconstrueren alsof dat handelen en beslissen het produkt is van een vrije, autonome en steeds aan zichzelf gelijkblijvende actor. Daardoor worden dat handelen en dat beslissen niet gereduceerd tot een louter individueel gebeuren, maar zij verkrijgen integendeel juist daardoor een maatschappelijke betekenis die aanspraak kan maken op integriteit. Zo levert de contrafactische categorie der rechtssubjectiviteit niet alleen een beschermend statuut aan het individu, maar betreft het dat individu juist daardoor en tegelijkertijd in de integriteit van een maatschappijbeeld dat geacht moet worden aan het*

*handelen en beslissen van elk individu ten grondslag te liggen. (Foqué & 't Hart 1990:141)*

*Thus in particular the category of legal subjectivity is counterfactual: it does not describe the factuality of each individual as a human being, but it enables us to reconstruct the actions and decisions of actual individuals as if their actions and decisions were the product of a free, autonomous and always identical actor. As a result these actions and decisions are not reduced to merely individual events but by that very assumption they acquire a social meaning which can lay claim to integrity. Thus the counterfactual category of legal subjectivity not only offers a protecting statute to the individual, but by its very existence also includes the individual in the integrity of an image of society that is considered to be fundamental to the actions and decisions of each individual.*

In the next section, it will be shown that the idea of counterfactual reconstruction can be called in to explain peculiar discourse characteristics in decisions, such as nominal anaphors.

## 5.5.2 Counterfactuality and coherence in decisions

### 5.5.2.1 Factual premises in processing discourse

The basic idea behind the applicability of the notion of counterfactuality is the following: if legal actions, such as decisions, are looked upon as a counterfactual reconstruction of factual reality, involving an artificial *mise en scène*, disindividuation and objectivation of individual and subjective facts, then it is plausible to look upon peculiar discourse characteristics as symbols or as the (re)confirmation of the counterfactual nature of these legal actions.

As I will show, not only nominal anaphors can be seen as symbols of counterfactual reconstruction. In fact, other discourse phenomena can and will be explained in a similar fashion, such as the strange sentence structure of decisions, the use of archaic words or phrases, the use of legal terms and the unusual way in which propositions are related to each other.

If we reinterpret this symbol-function from a processing view on discourse, peculiar discourse characteristics of decisions can be

functionally characterised as signals, countering or disturbing normal processing of discourse. If we assume that 'normal' discourse processing implies the construction of a coherent representation on the basis of *factual processing premises* - this term will be elaborated upon below - artificial discourse characteristics can be seen as signals indicating that the default factual premises underlying the processing of discourse do not hold in the discourse setting concerned.

The plausibility of factual premises underlying the processing of discourse is accounted for by the fact that discourse processing is necessarily embedded in and crucially dependent on 'factual', i.e., semantic and encyclopaedic knowledge. It will be argued that the following factual processing premises, which are necessary preconditions for establishing coherence, are inapplicable in legal discourse. The premises - the scope of which partly overlap each other - concern *referential*, *narrative* and *relational* coherence respectively.

(i) Factual premise underlying *referential coherence*

Whether discourse referents refer to real or fictitious individuals or objects, discourse addressees cannot but make discourse referentially coherent on the basis of their experience with factual individuals or objects.

(ii) Factual premise underlying *narrative coherence*

Whether narratives in discourse are real or fictitious, discourse addressees cannot but make a coherent representation of these narratives on the basis of their everyday experience with factual events and stories.

(iii) Factual premise underlying *relational coherence*

Discourse addressees cannot but link propositions in discourse coherently on the basis of their semantic knowledge of factual reality and their pragmatic knowledge of strategies writers use in discourse.



### 5.5.2.2 Counterfactual referential coherence

The following characteristics of the nominal anaphors in the decisions can be interpreted as signals overruling the first processing premise and obstructing normal referential coherence in decisions.

- (i) First, it is shown in section 5.3.4 that the majority of NAs *cannot be explained by identificational considerations* (60.8%; n=113). The use of nominal anaphors when/where pronouns would be the most natural referential continuation of discourse, runs counter to the normal processing of referents during reading. It indicates that the normal perception of referential coherence, determined by the notion of accessibility, does not apply in the case of these decisions.
- (ii) A second characteristic, analogous to the first, is the high number of '*autonomous*' anaphors. In section 5.2.4 we signalled the low number of anaphors requiring a link with another referent (such as possessives) or requiring an antecedent in order to be able to access a discourse referent (such as demonstratives or pronouns). This implies that most anaphors in fact enable the reader to access the intended referent without relying on another referent or an antecedent.<sup>19</sup> The use of such expressions when dependent expressions would be natural, again obstructs normal referential processing (see also section 5.5.3).
- (iii) Third, there is the high proportion of *legal-role indications* amongst the NAs (68.3%; n=127), as is mentioned in table (6); in the category of unexplained NAs (n=61), the proportion of legal-role indications is even higher (77%; n=47). During processing, legal-role indications avoid the simple linking of the referents with factual individuals. They signal the transformation from individuals to objectivated legal subjects and express the fact that legal relevance and validity only apply to legal roles, not to accidental individuals.
- (iv) Another peculiar referential phenomenon, noted in section 5.4.2, is *the absence of determiners*, which provides definite descriptions with interpretative aspects

of proper names, i.e., their vocative function and uniqueness. As such, legal-role indications are used as if they were proper names.

- (v) Finally, dispensing with pronouns makes it possible to *avoid the indication of grammatical gender*, reflecting the sex of individuals, which is irrelevant for the interpretation of legal subjects.<sup>20</sup>

Summarising, these characteristics of NAs obstruct the normal referential processing as well as a factual interpretation of referents. They do not affect the identificational value or the accessibility status of the underlying discourse referent. Instead, they symbolise institutional aspects of decisions and qualificational aspects of legal discourse referents imposed by the institution of the law. As such, they fit in naturally with the qualificational functions mentioned in section 5.4. By taking into account the institutional setting and function of decisions, the qualificational functionality of NAs can be anchored and corroborated: not just text-internal variables (such as role change and direct discourse) account for qualificational functions of NAs, but text-external aspects, stemming from the institution in which decisions occur.

### 5.5.2.3 Counterfactual narrative coherence

Decisions may well be conceived of as narratives, as a type of discourse in which events are narrated. Especially the argumentative part of decisions can easily be read as the story of what preceded the process. This is intuitively most acceptable in decision 6, the only decision in which the *considerans*-part has the format of normal sentences, as is shown in (11). It is plausible to assume that the sequence of the sentences in (11) is meant to evoke a narrative ordering of situations in time.

- (11) Bij onze beschikking van ... werd dagstelling verleend en partijen werden opgeroepen bij gerechtsbrieven van 14 mei 1982.  
Partijen werden gehoord in hun middelen en conclusies ...  
Partijen zijn gehuwd op 23 september 1958 en hebben ...  
Het is ter zitting gebleken dat de verstandhouding tussen de echtgenoten ernstig verstoord is. (606)



*By our decree of ... a date was set and parties were summoned by legal cover of May 14th, 1982. Parties were heard in their means and their conclusions. Parties were married on September 23rd, 1958. It became clear at the session that the relationship between the married couple is seriously disturbed.*

In all other decisions, the *considerans*-part has the typical format of *overwegende*-clauses, as is seen in (26) and (27):

- (26) De rechtbank van ... Gezien de voorgelegde stukken waaronder ...; Gehoord ... de heer rechter J. Z. in zijn verslag; verzoekers voornoemd...; de heer J. S., eerste substituut-procureur des Konings in zijn conclusie; Overwegende dat het verzoek ertoe strekt de verklaring van afwezigheid te horen uitspreken van J.A. ...; Overwegende dat het verzoek ontvankelijk is; Overwegende dat alvorens over de grond uitspraak te doen een getuigenverhoor dient bevolen overeenkomstig artikel 116 B.W.; (101-103)

*The court of ... Having seen the documents presented, among which ...; Having heard Mr judge J.Z. in his report; petitioners mentioned before; Mr J.S., first deputy attorney-general of the king in his conclusion; Considering that the petition aims at expressing the declaration of absence of J.A.; Considering that the petition is admitted; Considering that before deciding upon the grounds of the case an examination of the witnesses has to be ordered in accordance with article 116 of civil law;*

- (27) Overwegende dat de partijen samengehuwd zijn, maar feitelijk gescheiden leven; Dat zij drie kinderen hebben, allen minderjarig en onder de hoede van AVH ...; Dat tussen hen in art. 223 B.W. bedoelde maatregelen zijn getroffen bij de beschikking a quo ...; Overwegende dat de rechtsmiddelen beloop en omvang van de machtiging betreffen...

*Considering that the parties are married, but are in fact living apart; that they have three children, all of them minors and in the custody of AVH ...; that with respect to them measures have been taken, meant in art. 223 B.W. by a decree a quo ...; Considering that the legal remedies concern the course and the extent of the authorisation ...*

However, taking into account the counterfactual nature of legal actions, these 'narrative' sections in decisions can by no means be regarded as narrative. The purpose of these sections is to prove that the decision can be characterised as a legally valid action. Not the description, the exposition or the narration of the facts is



at issue here, but the establishment of a number of relevant juridical facts. Each fragment in the *considerans*-part refers to a procedure step, a condition or a circumstance which is necessary for the validity of the legal action of the decision. The combination of the fragments is not meant to be a coherent story of what preceded the process, but only mark the necessary and relevant juridical elements in the light of the decision which is taken in the dictum.

In line with this counternarrative interpretation of the *considerans*-part of decisions, the unusual and archaic *overwegende*-format can be said to function as a signal countering factual, narrative processing.

#### 5.5.2.4 Counterfactual relational coherence

It is plausible to assume that the coherent processing of discourse implies the establishment of coherent links between the segments of the text. However diverse the literature on relational structures in discourse may be, an underlying assumption about the ontology of coherence relations is that they are grounded in knowledge structures addressees have acquired in experiencing relations between events, objects and processes in reality (e.g. the relation between *cause* and *consequence*) or in experiencing strategies people exhibit in using language (e.g. the relation between *claim* and *argument*). These two kinds of factually acquired knowledge are the source for the recognition of semantic and pragmatic coherence relations in discourse, two types of relations which are widely accepted in discourse-relation proposals (e.g. Sanders et al. to appear).

Such a 'factual' justification of relational coherence does not apply to decisions, because in them coherent processing of relations between segments is not based on the perception of coherent world knowledge relations. This can be illustrated by (28), in which two kinds of relationships occur which are frequently found in the decisions, i.e., an *addition*-like and a *reason*-like relationship:

- (28) Overwegende dat het verzoek ertoe strekt de verklaring van afwezigheid te horen uitspreken van J.A. ...;  
Overwegende dat het verzoek ontvankelijk is;  
Overwegende dat alvorens over de grond uitspraak te

doen een getuigenverhoor dient bevolen overeenkomstig artikel 116 B.W.;

OM DEZE REDENEN,

DE RECHTBANK, Machtigt verzoekers om te bewijzen door middel van getuigen: "Dat hun broer en oom, J.A., ... sinds het jaar 1960 verdwenen is zonder enig spoor of nieuws achter te laten"; Gelast mevrouw C.V.D.H. ... met het afnemen van voorzegde getuigenverhoren. Zegt dat deze getuigenverhoren zullen gehouden worden op tegenspraak van de heer procureur des Konings te D.; Zegt dat deze getuigenverhoren zullen gehouden worden in de raadkamer dezer rechtbank. (103)

*Considering that the petition aims at expressing the declaration of absence of J.A.; Considering that the petition is admitted; Considering that before deciding upon the grounds of the case an examination of the witnesses has to be ordered in accordance with article 116 of civil law.*

FOR THESE REASONS

*THE COURT, authorises petitioners to prove by means of witnesses: "that their brother and uncle, J.A., has disappeared since the year 1960 without leaving any trace or news; orders Mrs C.V.D.H. ... to examine the witnesses mentioned above. Says that these examinations of the witnesses will be held after full argument on the side of the public prosecutor at D. Says that these examinations of the witnesses will be held in the council chamber of this court.*

Of course, the relationship between *considerans*-part and *dictum* in (28) can be labelled as *reason*, and the relationship between considerations and decisions among themselves can be labelled as *addition*, but these labels would highly underdetermine the relations expressed. Readers cannot rely upon any factual knowledge or experience justifying the *addition*- or the *reason*-relation. Instead, relational coherence in (28) relies upon explicit legal expectations, which are based upon knowledge about the legal system and about the function of decisions (see also Kurzon 1984:32). These expectations not only concern the nature, the selection and the validity of considerations and decisions but also the fact that decisions obligatorily contain two parts, i.e., (i) a legal decision taken on the basis of (ii) legal considerations. The archaism and illegal word order accompanying the link between the *considerans*-part and the *dictum* symbolises that no factual *reason*-relation is involved, but a relationship justified by legal, i.e., artificial and counterfactual sources of coherence.



### 5.5.3 Decisions and the cooperative principle

Decisions are not only marked by the counterfactual nature of the law. The institutional setting of the law also imposes a special relationship between discourse participants, which is symbolised or signalled in discourse characteristics as well.

If discourse participants communicate with each other, they normally accept that they try to achieve a common purpose in a collaborative effort. Grice calls this the cooperative principle:

*Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. (Grice 1975:45)*

On the basis of this principle, Grice distinguishes four categories, *quantity, quality, relation* and *manner*, in terms of which he formulates so-called conversational maxims. The following maxims have important implications for the format of referential expressions in discourse:

*Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. (Quantity)*

*Avoid obscurity of expression, avoid ambiguity, be brief. (Manner)*

On the basis of these maxims, discourse participants choose the referential expression which is minimally necessary for the addressee to identify the intended referent. The assumption behind this choice is that the addressee behaves cooperatively and does everything to interpret the text in general and referential expressions in particular the way the writer/speaker wants.

Different proposals concerning referential expressions in discourse can be said to be based upon the notion of cooperation and the conversational principles resulting from it. Levinson 1987 formulates a number of structural and pragmatic restrictions on co-referential relations in terms of implicatures. According to Levinson, the use of nominal anaphors where/when pronouns would suffice implies a non-co-referential reading on the basis of the quantity-manner implicature:

*The use of a marked form, a lexical NP where a*



*pronoun might have been used, or a pronoun where a zero might have occurred, will Q/M-implicate a non-co-referential interpretation. (Levinson 1987:410)*

Furthermore, cooperation is the explanatory principle behind the identificational strategies discourse participants demonstrate in the identification task described and analysed in Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs 1986. Discourse participants had to describe and order complex figures. In analysing these description tasks, Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs develop a collaborative view on reference in discourse. They show that speaker and hearer are both responsible for the identification of referents. The referential behaviour of discourse participants is claimed to be based upon *the principle of mutual responsibility*, which is stated as follows:

*The speaker or writer tries to make sure, roughly by the initiation of each new contribution, that the addressees should have been able to understand his meaning in the last utterance to a criterion sufficient for current purposes. (1986:35)<sup>21</sup>*

In fact, all accessibility-driven proposals on reference are based upon the communicative principle of cooperation: adapting the format of referring expressions to the degree of accessibility of the referent is based upon an economical, scarce use of referential expressions and hence requires a cooperative behaviour of the addressee. He is supposed to be satisfied with incomplete referent indications and to rely upon contextual and situational cues in solving reference.

Given the communicative setting of the law, discourse participants of decisions do not consider themselves bound by an attitude of cooperation or mutual responsibility. Readers of decisions are not necessarily deliberately involved in the communication process of which the decision is a part. For example, process parties can be subpoenaed. In such setting, readers do not try to understand cooperatively what is considered and decided. Rather, they try to interpret the decision *counter-cooperatively* in the way which for them is the most favourable. The counsellors for the defence and the prosecution are supposed to act solely in favour of their clients. A cooperative attitude would be unprofitable for their purposes.

Under these non-cooperative communicative conditions, writers do not want to risk any referential ambiguity or obscurity and

distrust systematically all kinds of non-explicit referential expressions, such as pronouns. This naturally leads to the high number of (over-)explicit anaphors, their main advantage being that they can refer autonomously. As such, they do not require the mediation of other referential expressions in order to be referentially unambiguous, and they allow each segment to be read as an independent statement, which is consistent with the type of relational coherence referred to above.

This writer's attitude can explain the fact that nominal anaphors are used even if they are structurally highly implausible and even ungrammatical, as in (29) and (30), the normal variants of which are (29a) and (30a) respectively:

- (29) Uit de door de raadsman van *eiseres* voorgelegde stukken en verstrekte uitleg blijkt dat *eiseres* de woning met oprit, tuin en stal te S., Bstraat 3 voor een periode van drie jaar met ingang van 1 januari 1983 aan verweerders heeft verhuurd mits een maandelijkse huurprijs groot 5.000 frank. (508-511)

*As is clear from the documents and the explanation of the counsellor of plaintiff, for a period of three years starting January 1st, 1983, plaintiff let the house with drive, garden and stable in S., 3 B.street, to defendant for the monthly rent of 5.000 francs.*

- (29a) Uit de door *haar* raadsman voorgelegde stukken en verstrekte uitleg blijkt dat *eiseres* ...

*As is clear from the documents and the explanation of her counsellor, plaintiff ...*

- (30) *Partijen* zijn nochtans over volgende punten akkoord: afzonderlijke woonst der *partijen*... (215-216)

*Parties, however, agree on the following points: separated house for the parties ...*

- (30a) *Partijen* zijn nochtans over volgende punten akkoord: *hun* afzonderlijke woonst ...

*Parties, however, agree on the following points: their separated house ...*

Finally, the tendency to use *autonomous* expressions not only characterises the anaphors in the decisions. Also non-anaphoric referential expressions mostly have an extremely self-supporting

or autonomous format. A striking characteristic of most of the indefinite and definite non-anaphoric NPs in the decisions is their right-branching format, as is illustrated in (31) and (3):

- (31) Op 21 juni 1984 heeft eiseres ter griffie een verzoekschrift neergelegd strekkende tot het nemen van dringende voorlopige maatregelen;

*On 21st June 1984 plaintiff filed a petition for urgent provisional measures;*

- (3) ...beschikking verleend in zake: Mevrouw A.M., laborante, thans werkloos, geboren te S., wonende te S., Pstraat, nr. 21, thans verblijvende bij haar ouders te S., Vstraat, 43, bijgestaan door haar raadsman, Meester B.V., advocaat te S., er kantoorhoudende... (201)

*...has decreed for the following case: Mrs A.M., lab assistant, currently unemployed, born at S., living at S. 21 Pstreet, currently residing with her parents at S, 43 Vstreet, assisted by her counsellor, B.V., J.D., barrister at S., with his office at ...*

The referential effect of these right-branching NPs is that they identify the referent extensively and unambiguously within the frame of that NP (see for further details Maes 1991a).<sup>22</sup>

## 5.6 Conclusion

The starting point of this chapter was the observation of an unusual variation between pronominal and nominal anaphors in decisions. The following three expectations, which were assumed to be able to explain this peculiarity have been investigated:

- (i) decisions simply contain a high number of discourse characteristics causing referential problems and hence favouring nominal anaphors (see section 5.3);
- (ii) nominal anaphors fulfill non-identificational, semantic or pragmatic functions (see section 5.4);
- (iii) nominal anaphors symbolise functions of the law in general or of legal actions and legal texts within the legal institution in particular (see section 5.5).



Section 5.3 showed that nominal anaphors play their expected role when referents have a low degree of accessibility, due to discourse variables decreasing the accessibility of the referent, such as non-protagonist status, discourse boundaries, distance to the antecedent or competing candidates: pronouns occur hardly or not at all with such variables. On the other hand, we made clear that only a small number of nominal anaphors can be explained by these identificational considerations: a great number of NAs remained, referring to highly accessible discourse referents. Thus, unlike normal discourse, identificational needs do not explain the majority of nominal anaphors.

Section 5.4 showed that two qualificational factors, role change and direct-discourse perspective, are able to account for two subsections of the remaining NAs. Thus, non-structural, qualificational factors are responsible for a systematic and considerable subset of NAs (39.8%), and not for some incidental NA-occurrences, as is the case in other corpus-based studies on reference, as e.g. in Fox (1984:117-136 and 233-237).

Section 5.5 made clear that the qualificational functionality of NAs - and of other discourse characteristics - can be enriched and corroborated by taking into account basic characteristics of the institutional setting in which decisions are embedded.

Of course, the analysis in this chapter does not weaken the accessibility view on referential expressions, but it points the way to an important amendment, which is consistent with previous chapters: if the default identificational value of referential expressions, in this case nominal anaphors, is neutralised, in this case by the high-accessibility status of the intended referent, other, qualificational functions of referential expressions can be exploited systematically.

It is argued that the exploitation of the qualificational function of nominal anaphors is determined by the institutional nature of decisions: in section 5.5 nominal anaphors are explained by functional aspects of the law and by basic communicative conditions of legal discourse. As we said, the qualificational variables explaining NAs in section 5.4 also fit in naturally with the legal nature of decisions. Although in section 5.4 I argued for the relevance of these variables with arguments independent of the legal context, it cannot be denied that role change and the direct-discourse suggestion of performatives are highly relevant

in the institutional setting of the law.

The institutional analysis of NAs in this chapter can be corroborated by the two following facts: (i) the analysis applies to other discourse characteristics in decisions too, such as the use of archaic words and phrases and the peculiar way in which decisions are constructed as a cluster of clauses within one and the same sentence-format. (ii) Other analyses of legal discourse also take the view that legal function and institutional setting impose peculiar discourse characteristics on legal texts (e.g. Westman 1984; Vargas 1984).

Finally, my analysis brings in massive evidence for the relevance of the text-type variable in analysing referential expressions. In other studies on reference (e.g. Fox 1984:293; Kirsner 1979:369), and in previous chapters, the relative importance of the type of text in the analysis of referential expressions is shown. But this chapter shows that text type, incorporating external conditions imposed on texts, has absolute priority in determining referential behaviour. This of course does not destroy the accessibility-view either. It only reveals the fact that accessibility is dependent upon basic conditions, imposed by the communicative setting in which a particular text functions. For decisions, I argued that two text-type conditions, reflecting their institutional function, apply, i.e., the absence of factual processing premises and the absence of a cooperative behaviour of discourse participants.

## Notes to chapter 5

1. This chapter is a slightly revised version of Maes 1991b.
2. The corpus contains the following decisions: *verklaring van afwezigheid* 'declaration of absence', *echtscheiding* 'divorce' (4 decisions), *naamsverandering* 'change of name', *achterstallige huur* 'arrears of rent', *aanstelling van een deskundige* 'appointment of an expert'.
3. This percentage assumes that each anaphor represents only one word. For two reasons, this percentage is inaccurate. Firstly, anaphors can include more than one word. Secondly, I only took into account 'overt' anaphors, i.e., anaphors which are realised linguistically. It is clear, however, that anaphors can take the form of empty elements.
4. One of my own corpora, the collection of 30 opinion texts coming from newspapers and magazines (17700 words), contains 709 anaphors (4 % of the number of words) only referring to one discourse referent, i.e., the most topical referent.
5. In view of the peculiar character of the Dutch examples, the English translations will be more or less restricted to glosses.
6. Each example taken from the corpus is accompanied by its identification number in the corpus.
7. In the analysis, I restrict myself to anaphors referring to human referents. Accordingly, 28 anaphors referring to non-human referents are not taken into account. The pronominal-nominal distribution in these non-human anaphors is comparable with the distribution in the total number of anaphors, i.e., 24 nominal, 4 pronominal.
8. For a characterisation of *referential* and *non-referential* or *syntactic* pronouns, I refer to Bosch (1983:49), see also section 2.2.1.1.
9. There is only one exceptional referential pronoun which does not share the characteristics (ii) and (iii):
  - (a) (Wij) vertrouwen de hoede over *het kind Juri Smet* toe aan verweerder, met de verplichting om *het* tijdens de week van de maandagmorgen tot de vrijdagochtend onder te brengen bij het echtpaar VDL-D. (417-418)



*We entrust the child J.S. to the care of defendant, with the obligation to put it in the care of the married couple DVDL-D on weekdays from Monday morning till Friday morning.*

10. Of course, in replacing NAs by pronouns, only one nominal anaphor at a time has been replaced. Further, NAs cannot always be replaced without minimal changes to the syntactic environment. See for example the change of a lexical postmodifier into a pronominal pre-modifier in (a):

- (a) Voor zover *verweerder* niet vrijwillig overgaat tot betaling, *machtigen* (wij) *eiseres* om het onderhoudsgeld rechtstreeks vooraf te nemen op {alle inkomsten van *verweerder* / al zijn inkomsten}.

*If defendant does not pay voluntarily, (we) authorise plaintiff to take the allowance directly out of (the defendant's / his) income in advance.*

11. The distribution of the parties in the different decisions is as follows:
- *verzoekers* 'petitioners' (2 decisions)
  - *eiseres* - *verweerder* 'plaintiff - defendant' (3 decisions)
  - *eiseres* - *verweerders* 'plaintiff - defendants' (1 decision)
  - *geïntimeerde* (m.) - *appellante* (vr.) 'respondent - appellant' (1 decision)
  - *aanleggers* - *verweerder* 'plaintiffs in appeal - defendant' (1 decision).
12. An analysis of binomials in legal discourse is found in Gustafsson 1984.
13. Since the decisive criterion for the occurrence of role change is the lexical choice of the anaphor, it is clear that pronominal anaphors are not taken into account. All pronouns are taken simply to continue the role indicated by the antecedent.
14. The examples are adaptations of examples of Mc Cray 1980 and Evans 1980.
15. Apart from indicating direct discourse, nominal anaphors in the environment of performative verbs can be looked upon as indicating the importance or prominence of the information conveyed. Indicating importance is a function which is assigned to nominal anaphors in Mc Cray 1980. She calls in pragmatic or semantic dominance to explain sentences in which nominal

anaphors are acceptable despite their structural impossibility. Sentences like (a) and (b) are considered to be acceptable because the clauses containing the nominal anaphors constitute the *semantic peak* of the sentence, i.e., "*the most climactic, important, or dominant part of the sentence*" (Mc Cray 1980:333):

- (a) *He<sub>i</sub>* gave her a diamond ring because *Walter<sub>i</sub>* loves Sally.
- (b) *He<sub>i</sub>* hasn't contacted me yet, but *John<sub>i</sub>* is back.

The same explanation is applicable to the acceptability differences in the following sentences, well known in research on co-reference:

- (c) \*In *John's<sub>i</sub>* apartment, *he<sub>i</sub>* smokes pot.
- (d) In *John's<sub>i</sub>* apartment near the railroad tracks in the Pamrappo district of Bayonne, N.J., *he<sub>i</sub>* smokes pot. (Lakoff 1976)

Similar observations about the relation between nominal anaphors and importance of information can be found in Lakoff 1976, Reinhart 1983 and Mittwoch 1983.

- 16. A referential peculiarity, occurring in three decisions, proving the dependence of decisions on other legal texts, is illustrated in (a):

- (a) Overwegende dat het verzoek ertoe strekt te horen zeggen dat de akte van geboorte opgesteld door de ambtenaar van de burgerlijke stand van de stad St.-N. op 28 oktober 1983 zal worden aangevuld met de voornaam van *het kind*. (303)

*Considering that the petition is meant to achieve verbal reassurance that the birth certificate drawn up by the registrar of the city of St.-N. on October 28th, 1983 will be extended by the first name of the child.*

- (a) occurs in the *considerans*-part of decision 3. In (a) a discourse referent is introduced by a definite description *het kind* 'the child', which is unable to identify the referent unambiguously. A justification for this referential incoherence can be found in phrase (b) preceding fragment (a) in decision 3:

- (b) Gezien de voorgelegde stukken, waaronder het hieraangehecht verzoekschrift, (300)

*Having seen the documents presented, among which the attached petition,*

This clause links the decision to previous procedure documents, i.e., the petition, where the identification of the referent can be found.

17. Taylor defines Hegel's notion of *Aufhebung* as "the dialectical transition in which a lower stage is both annulled and preserved in a higher one" (Taylor 1979:49).

The same dialectical interpretation is expressed in Foqué 1987:

*Narrativiteit en leerstelligheid, casus en leerstuk, kunnen zodoende opgevat worden als de twee polen van de hermeneutische rechtspraxis, die elkaar nooit uitsluiten, maar in de dialectische verhouding elkaar in de praxis van het oordelen bij voortduur "aufheben", dat wil zeggen elkaar niet geïsoleerd tot respectievelijk verhaal of dogma laten. (Foqué 1987:79-80)*

*Narrativity and dogma, case and doctrine can thus be regarded as the two poles of hermeneutic legal practice. They never exclude each other, but they constantly "aufheben" each other in the praxis of decision making, i.e., they do not leave each other in isolation as narration or a dogma respectively.*

18. The idea of transformation can be found in Broekman (1979:98-9):

*Datgene, waar de tekst over gaat en vooral een beschrijving van suggereert te geven, bevindt zich geenszins buiten die tekst. Elke onbevooroordeelde blik in een dossier ter terechtzitting, ter voorbereiding van een contract of tot juridische regeling van economische of andere belangen zal duidelijk doen worden, hoe hier eenduidige betekenissen door middel van een juridisch transformatieproces tot stand komen. De jurist leeft van die transformatie, al meent hij hardnekkig, dat de levensfeitelijke en de juridisch-feitelijke werkelijkheid gelijkvormig zijn.*

*That which the discourse is about and of which especially it pretends to give a description, is by no means situated outside that text. Any unprejudiced glance at a court file, to draw up a contract or to reach a legal settlement of*



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*economic or other interests, will show how unambiguous meanings are arrived at here by means of a legal transformation process. The lawyer's livelihood is based on this transformation, although he obstinately holds on to the idea that actual reality and legal reality are congruent with each other.*

19. I am aware that the notion of *autonomous anaphor* is in fact contradictory.
20. Of course, legal-role indications can, but need not be used in a 'feminine' version.
21. This principle is similar to the so-called *principle of optimal design* in Clark, Schreuder & Buttrick (1983:246):

*The speaker designs his utterance in such a way that he has good reason to believe that the addressees can readily and uniquely compute what he meant on the basis of the utterance along with the rest of their common ground.*

22. Hiltunen (1984:121) observes a similar right-branching format in the sentence structure of legal texts. The explanation he gives is applicable to our right-branching NPs too:

*The explanation as to why the right-branching should be the most frequent variant was assumed to be perceptual, for it is the only type which is in principle and practice open-ended.*

## Chapter 6

### Summary and conclusions

#### 6.1 The scope of the study

If one surveys the attention of linguists for referential expressions in natural language, a study on nominal anaphors can raise divergent expectations about its objectives and about the empirical demarcation of the subject matter. In investigating nominal anaphors in this study, I concentrated on the contextual effect of the use of nominal anaphors, on the interpretative system underlying nominal anaphors in discourse and - more generally - on the contribution of the use of nominal anaphors to the coherence of discourse.

With respect to both the empirical scope and the theoretical objectives of this study, this means that I did not focus on the study of *structural, intra-sentential restrictions* on nominal anaphors following the line of research on co-reference practised mainly by syntacticians. The fact is that the use of nominal anaphors is highly dependent on non-structural determinants and that NAs predominantly occur inter-sententially, which means that the framework for the study of intra-sentential phenomena of co-reference can never be sufficient for our purposes.

In order to deal with NAs, this study subscribes to a both promising and delicate framework of *discourse semantics*, which focusses on the development of proposals on linguistic phenomena in which the effect of the context and considerations affecting the processing of language take a central place.

Taking into account the context and the processing of discourse does not imply, however, that this study entails either the *resolution* of nominal anaphors in natural language, if this means that it provides a full-fledged procedure including all relevant determinants in the processing of nominal anaphors, or a fully developed 'implementable' algorithm for the resolution of nominal anaphors in a natural language understanding system. In fact, the proposals on the interpretation of nominal anaphors in this study have to be regarded as a systematised product-oriented

description of interpretations of nominal anaphors in discourse. They are not meant either to elucidate or to prove how exactly the processing of NAs 'really' comes about, or how exactly the processing of NAs can be simulated in an expert module of an NLU-system (for a similar position, see Spooren 1989:157).

In view of the 'real' or 'simulated' processing of nominal anaphors in natural language, one crucial question has not been dealt with in this study, which is the question of why and when a reader decides to take a definite nominal NP in discourse as a trigger accessing an 'old' DREF, instead of a new one. In other words, why and when is it that readers decide whether a definite nominal NP is anaphorically related with an NP in previous discourse? This question is especially pertinent in the case of alternative definite NAs and 'antecedentless' NAs, which often hinge heavily on knowledge associations which can hardly be formalised in a processing procedure or resolution algorithm. Of course, it is possible to list and systematise relevant discourse conditions affecting the anaphoric nature of definite nominal NPs in discourse (such as *contextual nearness*), linguistic features (such as *semantic relations between lexical items*) and extra-linguistic features (such as *knowledge of and relations amongst world referents or events*). However, this does not yet provide us with a watertight processing procedure or resolution algorithm which shows how these different information sources and triggers interact in order to decide whether a definite nominal NP is an anaphor or not.

Although this study takes as its point of departure a type of knowledge (i.e., the anaphoric nature of nominal NPs in discourse) the establishment of which still remains to be accounted for theoretically, the kind of work which has been done in this study constitutes the necessary and missing link between the sentence-internal system underlying anaphoric expressions and the full understanding of the processing of anaphoric expressions in human communication.

## 6.2 A short survey of the results

In this study, two minimal formal criteria cross-classifying nominal anaphors were taken to partition the field of nominal anaphors, i.e., the formal relationship between antecedent and anaphor, yielding *literally repeated* and *alternative* nominal



anaphors and the nature of the determiner, yielding *definite* and *demonstrative* nominal anaphors.

Chapter 2 resulted in a proposal for the interpretation of definite alternative nominal anaphors based on implicit coherence relations within the representation of the discourse referent underlying the nominal anaphor. It is argued that an adequate interpretation of definite alternative nominal anaphors is dependent on the question whether they are adequate actualisations of implicit coherence relations which, in turn, have to be adequate specifications of the intentions underlying the text. Furthermore, different types of alternative nominal anaphors are distinguished based on their contribution to the coherence of discourse.

Chapter 3 proposes an interpretative mechanism for demonstrative nominal anaphors, based on the *Modification of Demonstrative* (MOD) proposal. According to the MOD-proposal, a demonstrative determiner activates a non-default interpretation of the NP concerned and so modifies the underlying discourse referent representation. Four modificational types are distinguished. It is argued that the availability of the defNA-demNA variation is the major factor in determining the interpretation of demonstrative nominal anaphors and that the markedness of demonstrative nominal anaphors is non-identificational by nature, in that it signals in the first place semantic changes in the representation of discourse referents.

Chapter 4 claims that the variation between *deze*NAs and *die*NAs is pragmatic by nature, and only affects the association of the referent with coordination points of referential domains in the text. In the *Presence-Presupposition Proposal*, the variation between *deze* and *die* is ultimately made dependent on interrelated global discourse conditions. In this proposal, localistic as well as actor-oriented uses of demonstratives are shown to find a natural explanation. As such, it does not make the demonstrative variation dependent on the individual identificational history of the referent involved, nor on the notion of focality, but on general characteristics of the relationship between referent, writer and reader in discourse.

Finally, chapter 5 offers an application case for the analysis of identificational and qualificational functions of nominal anaphors in one particular kind of discourse, i.e., judicial decisions. Falling

outside the core of the NA-proposals in this study, chapter 5 proves that qualificational functions can account systematically for the use of nominal anaphors and that the type of text can be decisive in the functioning of referential expressions. Thereby, an important amendment of the *accessibility* view on referential expressions is revealed: if the identification of a referent is self-evident, for example, by its high-accessibility status, other - in this case qualificational - functions of referential expressions can be exploited systematically.

### 6.3 Interpreting vs. processing NAs

#### 6.3.1 Introduction

Although section 6.1 made a clear distinction between my systematic analysis of NA-interpretations and an algorithmic NA-processing procedure as the objective in studying referential expressions, my analysis of NAs produced results which can be translated in terms of reliable heuristics readers might use while processing discourse. By way of conclusion, I will summarise these results, reformulated as conditions and actions, which are active in the processing of *dem*NAs. It can be plausibly assumed that the processing of NAs is guided by the following *processing heuristics* (henceforth PHs).

#### 6.3.2 The processing of *def*NAs

**defPH1** While processing a *defNA*, the reader depends on the formal-lexical relationship between antecedent and *defNA* as the initial determining trigger, providing him with the following information:

**defPH1a** when processing a *literally repeated defNA*, the reader has to pass through PH2-4

**defPH1b** when processing an *alternative defNA (daNA)*, the reader has to pass through PH5-6.

*literally repeated defNAs*

- defPH2 While processing a *literally repeated defNA*, the reader by default assumes that the underlying DREF has a low degree of accessibility.
- defPH3 The reader assumes that the *literally repeated defNA* is used to identify an identificationally problematic DREF. He assumes that the corresponding pronominal variant would not have done the referential job equally well.
- defPH4 The reader infers from the *literally repeated defNA* one or more of the following search instructions:
- defPH4a Look for a DREF which is a member of competing candidates
  - defPH4b Look for a remote DREF
  - defPH4c Look for a DREF across a discourse boundary
  - defPH4d Look for a DREF with non-protagonist status
  - defPH4e Look for a DREF outside the current scenario, point of view, frame...


*alternative defNAs*

- defPH5 While processing a *daNA*, the reader by default assumes that the underlying DREF is highly accessible.
- defPH6 The reader assumes that the *daNA* is not just used to identify an identificationally problematic DREF. He assumes that the corresponding pronominal variant would have done the referential job equally well.
- defPH6a While processing a *daNA* 'minimally', the reader by default infers an *identify-relation*.
  - defPH6b While processing a *daNA* 'maximally', the reader *can* infer other coherence relations (complex or simple, update or surplus) obeying the pragmatic Conditions of Centrality and Relevance.



The processing heuristics of defNAs can be modelled as in figure (1):

Figure (1): *The processing of defNAs*



### 6.3.3 The processing of demNAs

**demPH1** While processing a *demNA*, the reader by default assumes that the underlying DREF is highly accessible.

**demPH2** The reader assumes that the *demNA* is the non-default variant of the corresponding *defNA*-version, which is the starting point of the processing heuristics PH4-6, leading to *semantic inferences*.

**demPH3** The reader assumes that the *demNA* is the variant of the corresponding *demNA*-version, which is the starting point of the processing heuristics PH7-9, leading to *pragmatic inferences*.

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*semantic processing*

- demPH4 While processing a *demNA*, the reader by default assigns more than just an *identify*-relation.
- demPH5 In determining the semantic-modificational type of a *demNA*, the reader hinges on the formal-lexical relationship between antecedent and *demNA* as the initial determining trigger, providing him with the following information:
- demPH5a When the *demNA* has a *superordinate* relation with its antecedent, the reader by default infers a *classify*-relation;
  - demPH5b When the *demNA* contains *attributive modifier(s)* not entailed in the antecedent, the reader by default infers an *attribute*-relation, relaxing the pragmatic Condition of Centrality and/or Relevance;
  - demPH5c When the *demNA* just (*partially*) *repeats* its antecedent, the reader by default infers a *contextualise*-relation.
- demPH6 Other contextual clues can add a supplementary *evaluate*-relation to the semantic inferences of PH5.

*pragmatic processing*

- demPH7 While processing a *demNA*, the reader depends crucially on the following global discourse conditions determining the pragmatic value of the *demNA*: *discourse purpose*, *discourse content* and *relational mode*.
- demPH8 While processing a *dezeNA*, the reader assigns the pragmatic value [DRD] and thus associates the underlying DREF with one or more coordination points of the Deictic Referential Domain [DRD]:
- demPH8a The reader assigns the pragmatic value [DRDp/t/d], i.e., he infers an association with one or more spatio-temporal coordination points of DRD.

The association of the referent with [DRDp/t/d] enables the reader to make pragmatic inferences affecting the spatio-temporal location of the referent within DRD.

and/or

demPH8b The reader assigns the pragmatic value [DRDw], i.e., he infers an association with the writer.

The association of the referent with [DRDw] enables the reader to make pragmatic inferences in which the writer establishes the unequal relational mode with the reader and expresses his own perspective on and evaluation of the referent involved.

demPH9 While processing a *dieNA*, the reader assigns the pragmatic value [ORD] and thus associates the underlying DREF with one or more coordination points of the Other Referential Domain [ORD]:

demPH9a The reader assigns the pragmatic value [ORDp/t], i.e., he infers an association with one or more spatio-temporal coordination points of ORD.

The association of the referent with [ORDp/t] enables the reader to make pragmatic inferences affecting the spatio-temporal location of the referent within a particular referential domain distinct from DRD.


and/or

demPH9b The reader assigns the pragmatic value [ORDr], i.e., he infers an association with the reader. The association of the referent with [ORDr] enables the reader to make pragmatic inferences in which the writer establishes the equal relational mode with the reader and asks for the reader's collaboration and approval with regard to the referent.



The processing heuristics of demNAs can be modelled as in figure (2):

Figure (2): *The processing of demNAs*



#### 6.3.4 Concluding remarks

The processing heuristics of definite and demonstrative NAs differ in at least one important respect from an implementable resolution algorithm: they do not provide 'backtracking' mechanisms, which are necessary to resolve exceptional NA-cases, which do not obey the default descriptive characteristics of NAs mentioned in the previous chapters. For example, although most of the definite alternative NAs access highly accessible referents, there are undoubtedly exceptional NA-cases which successfully access referents with a low degree of accessibility, for example, on the basis of general encyclopaedic knowledge. For these cases, defPH5 is not applicable.

Furthermore, a remark should be made with respect to the *procedural order* of the heuristics presented. In figure (1) the left or the right path of the procedure applies depending on the formal type of the defNA. On the other hand, the processing of a

demNA in figure (2) implies a simultaneous processing of the left and the right path of the procedure.

A further remark concerns the *role* of the different PHs in the processing of defNAs and demNAs. In fact, the different PHs can be divided into two functional types. On the one hand, there are components acting as *input* for the processing actions, such as defPH1 and demPH7. On the other hand, there are components representing *actions* in the processing of NAs, such as defPH4 or demPH5.

Finally, a last point should be made concerning the relationship between the systematic analysis in this study and the processing of NAs. Although sufficient proof has been given that the heuristics presented above are based on empirical characteristics of NAs in discourse, this, however, does not yet provide us with a verified description of the way in which these characteristics 'work' during processing. The fact is that the '*provability*' of the processing value of the analytical characteristics of NAs is problematic. Moreover, it is difficult to determine how fruitful it is to develop experimental evidence corroborating the psycholinguistic validity of the interpretation proposals in this study. An important difference with standard experimental work on reference in discourse is that the interpretation proposals in this study do not entail predictions with respect to 'identificational' processing questions such as *which discourse referent is accessed by the reader?* or *when and how does the reader access this referent?* but with respect to 'qualificational' questions such as *how does the reader 'enrich' or 'modify' the representation of discourse referents.* It is not clear yet how such qualificational characteristics can be validated by experimental evidence.

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# Samenvatting

In tekstwetenschappelijk onderzoek is het laatste decennium een levende belangstelling te constateren voor het functioneren van referentiële uitdrukkingen in teksten. Binnen het cognitief- en proces-georiënteerd referentie-onderzoek is een visie op referentiële uitdrukkingen ontstaan die op algemene acceptatie kan rekenen. In die visie worden referentiële uitdrukkingen opgevat als middelen die toegang verschaffen tot representaties van tekstreferenten. De vorm van een referentiële uitdrukking is in die visie afhankelijk van de *beschikbaarheid* van de onderliggende referent in de representatie die een ontvanger op dat moment van de tekst heeft opgebouwd. Deze visie is congruent met vele referentie-voorstellen, zowel psycholinguïstisch als tekstanalytisch georiënteerde.

Een belangrijk deel van het tekstgeoriënteerd referentie-onderzoek is gewijd aan de relatie tussen pronominale en nominale anaforen. De resultaten van dat onderzoek zijn in overeenstemming met de beschikbaarheidsvisie: nominale anaforen worden gebruikt als de beschikbaarheid van de referent laag is en pronominale als de beschikbaarheid van de referent hoog is.

Dit proefschrift vertrekt van de dichotomie van pronominale en nominale anaforen en concentreert zich op de semantische en pragmatische functies van nominale anaforen in teksten. Het doel van het proefschrift is om een visie op nominale anaforen te ontwikkelen die duidelijk maakt wat de bijdrage is van nominale anaforen in de coherentie van teksten.

Centraal in het proefschrift staat de tweedeling tussen identificationele en kwalificatiele functies van nominale anaforen. Een nominaal anafoor is identificationeel gemotiveerd als een pronomen niet of niet in gelijke mate in staat zou zijn om de bedoelde referentie tot stand te brengen. Nominale anaforen hebben een kwalificatiele functie als ze een informationele meerwaarde hebben ten opzichte van een pronomen.

De opbouw van het proefschrift is gebaseerd op twee minimale, formele classificatiecriteria voor nominale anaforen. Er is ten eerste de formele relatie tussen antecedent en anafoor. Die levert *letterlijk herhaalde* en *alternatieve* nominale anaforen op. Ten tweede is er de aard van de determiner, resulterend in *definiëte*

en *demonstratieve* nominale anaforen.

In hoofdstuk 1 wordt het kader geschetst waarbinnen nominale anaforen worden onderzocht en beschreven. In hoofdstuk 2 worden definitieve alternatieve nominale anaforen (daNAs) geanalyseerd. De centrale vraag in dat hoofdstuk is welke informatieve lading definitieve nominale anaforen in teksten kunnen en mogen bevatten. In het hoofdstuk wordt een voorstel gedaan voor de interpretatie van daNAs op basis van impliciete coherentierelaties in de representatie van een tekstreferent die ten grondslag ligt aan een nominaal anafoor. Betoogd wordt dat een adequate interpretatie van daNAs afhankelijk is van de vraag of daNAs adequate realiseringen zijn van impliciete tekstrelaties, die op hun beurt adequate instantiëringen moeten zijn van de intentie die aan de tekst ten grondslag ligt. Verder worden in dit hoofdstuk verschillende typen daNAs onderscheiden op grond van hun bijdrage in de coherentie van de tekst.

In hoofdstuk 3 wordt een interpretatief mechanisme voorgesteld voor demonstratieve nominale anaforen, gebaseerd op het *Modification of Demonstrative* (MOD)-voorstel. Volgens het MOD-voorstel activeert een demonstrativum een non-default interpretatie van de betrokken NP en zorgt het op die manier voor de modificatie van de representatie van de onderliggende tekstreferent. Vier modificationele typen worden in het hoofdstuk onderscheiden. Essentieel in het voorstel is dat de gemarkeerdheid van demonstratieve nominale anaforen niet identificationeel van aard is, maar dat het demonstrativum in de eerste plaats semantische veranderingen signaleert in de representatie van de betrokken tekstreferent.

In hoofdstuk 4 wordt betoogd dat de variatie tussen NPs met *deze* of *dit* en NPs met *die* of *dat* pragmatisch van aard is, en enkel de associatie betreft van de betrokken referent met coördinatiepunten van referentiële domeinen in de tekst. In het *Presence-Presupposition* (PP)-voorstel wordt de variatie tussen *deze/dit* en *die/dat* afhankelijk gemaakt van globale tekstcondities. In dat voorstel vinden zowel localistische als actor-georiënteerde gebruiksvormen van demonstratieven een natuurlijke verklaring. Als dusdanig maakt dit voorstel de variatie tussen de twee typen demonstratieven niet afhankelijk van de identificationele geschiedenis van de betrokken referent in de tekst, noch van de notie van focaliteit, maar van algemene eigenschappen van de relatie tussen referent, schrijver en lezer in



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teksten.

Hoofdstuk 5 moet worden opgevat als een toepassing van de analyse van identificatieve en kwalificatieve functies van nominale anaforen in een speciaal soort teksten, i.e. vonnissen van een lagere rechtbank. Het hoofdstuk toont aan dat het gebruik van nominale anaforen op een systematische manier kan worden verklaard door kwalificatieve functies en dat het type tekst bepalend is voor functies van referentiële uitdrukkingen. Het hoofdstuk geeft aanleiding tot een belangrijke amendering van de beschikbaarheidstheorie: als de identificatie van een referent buiten kijf staat, dan kunnen andere, kwalificatieve functies van referentiële uitdrukkingen systematisch worden geëxploiteerd.

In hoofdstuk 6, ten slotte, worden de resultaten uit de vorige hoofdstukken vertaald in het licht van de verwerking van nominale anaforen. Het uitgangspunt is dat de voorstellen de weg wijzen naar psychologisch plausibele en empirisch ondersteunde verwerkingsheuristieken voor nominale anaforen in teksten.

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